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The present debate in legal theory is 
dominated by an unfruitful schism. On the one 
hand, analytical theories are concerned with 
the positivity of law, running the risk of missing 
the law's relation to society. On the other 
hand, sociological approaches analyze all 
sorts of social interactions of law, but have 
developed no conceptual tools to do justice 
to the autonomy of law. The theory of 
autopoiesis offers law a chance of getting 
round the falsely posed alternative between 
an autonomous rule system or a socially 
conditioned decision-making process. It is a 
theory of law that sees the law's autonomy in 
the self-reproduction of a communication 
network and understands its relation to 
society as interference with other 
autonomous communication networks.
Building on the ideas of Humberto Maturana, 
Heinz von Foersterand Niklas Luhmann, 
Gunther Teubner uses the concepts of self­
organization and autopoiesis to develop a 
concept of law as a hypercyclically closed 
social system.
This book will stand as a landmark in legal 
theory and become a standard point of 
departure in the sociology of law.
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The Talmud tells us how once, during a heated halachic discussion 
when no agreement could be reached, Rabbi Eliezer, whose detailed, 
elegantly justified legal opinion was not shared by the majority, 
claimed that if he were right, then the tree outside would move a 
yard or two to prove it. When the tree did in fact move, the other 
rabbis remained unimpressed. Thereupon he announced that the 
river would begin to flow backwards and the walls of the synagogue 
to bend. But the rabbis were not impressed by these wonders either. 
Finally he said that heaven itself would prove him right. When a 
heavenly voice did indeed confirm Eliezer’s point of view, the rabbis 
shook their heads and said: ‘We are not going to pay any heed to a 
voice from heaven, for you yourself wrote in the Torah on Mount 
Sinai: “ One must bend to the will of the majority.’”  And God 
laughed, and said: ‘My sons have defeated me, my sons have de- j  
feated me.’1
The best way of getting to the spirit of a new theory -  in this case 
autopoiesis in law -  is by telling an old story. Joseph Weiler told me 
this one while we were discussing whether the concepts of self­
reference and autopoiesis could inform our understanding of law.
We can read this as a story about self-reference in law. As with all 
/{ good stories, several interpretations are possible. Starting with 
the most obvious reading, the emphasis is on the absence of an 
Archimedean point of reference outside the law. Law, as Rabbi 
Eliezer had to learn the hard way, is not determined by external 
authorities, or by the authority of the Scriptures, secular power, the
i Talmud, Baba Mezia 59b.
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law of nature, or divine revelation. Rather, law arises from the 
arbitrary nature of its own positivity.
It is the self-referential nature of law, the application of legal 
operations to the results of legal operations which gives the law 
validity. Legal validity cannot be brought in from outside; it can 
only be produced within the law. We can agree with Luhmann and 
say: ‘ ĵThere is no law outside the law,- therefore no input or output 
of law in relation to the social environment of the system.’2 Even the
fiat of the legislative or divine will has first to be approved by the 
rabbis: it is their discourse which ultimately decides how it is to be 
received in the law. According to our first reading of the story, then, 
: / positive law is self-produced law -  not only in the sense that it is 
/ made by men, but in the sense of law produced by law.
Another way of interpreting this story would be to emphasize the 
fact that law is essentially self-referential and unpredictable. The 
ideal of legal certainty, essentially based on the predictability of 
law in itsHipplication to actual cases, founders on the law’s self- 
referentiality. So does the notion that predictability can be obtained 
\ by causal analyses of the sociology of law.
In this context von Förster would interpret Eliezer’s legal dispute 
in the following way: God laughed because the rabbis had antici­
pated the impotence of the Laplacian world spirit.3 For the latter 
only has power over what von Förster describes as ‘trivial’ machines. 
These link particular inputs with particular outputs in a fixed, 
ordered way. ‘Trivial’ machines are synthetically determined, ana­
lytically determinable, independent of the past, and predictable. 
Law, on the other hand, if it is indeed autonomous rabbinical law, 
would have to be understood as a self-producing and self-reproducing 
/  process. As the operations of the law are dependent on its inner 
states, it would have to be defined as a ‘non-trivial’ machine. Law is 
certainly synthetically determined, but it is not analytically deter­
minable: it is dependent on the past, but cannot be predicted. 
According to this way of looking at it, the indeterminate nature 
of law is inextricably bound up with its autonomy. In fact, accord­
ing to Hejl, it is precisely this indeterminacy which is the main 
feature of the system’s autonomy.4 Hejl defines autonomy as input- 
independence of living systems. Inputs which appear identical to the 
outside observer do not necessarily have the same internal effect.
2 Luhmann, 1986c, pp. 20 ff.
3 Cf. von Förster, 1984b, 1985.
4 Hejl, 1984.
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II
These are two rather obvious ways of interpreting self-reference in 
law. They only say something about the fact that law cannot be 
determined from the outside, that it is impenetrable and uncon­
trollable. We can get at a far deeper issue by interpreting the story 
in ^  third way/which reveals its essential circularity. Rabbi Eliezer 
makes good use of the entire hierarchy of legal norms. He goes 
through the stages one after another -  the legal discussion of the 
rabbis, the text of the Talmud, natural law, secular power, and 
divine revelation -  only to perform afstrange loop/at the end and 
land right back where he started from. ‘Tangled hierarchies’ is the 
term used by Hofstadter to describe the phenomenon whereby the 
highest level in a hierarchy ‘loops into’ the lowest one.5 In the last 
analysis, the final arbiter of the validity of divine law is the triviality 
of procedural norms (‘One must bend to the will of the majority’).
Hofstadter himself6 makes clear that even the hierarchy of legal 
sources is not immune to the circular ‘looping together’ of hier­
archies: ‘The irony is that once you hit your head against the ceiling 
like this, where you are prevented from jumping out of the system to ^  
a yet higher authority, the only recourse is to forces which seem less 
well defined by rules, but which are the only source of higher-level 
rules anyway: the lower-level rules.’7
What the story of the dissenting Rabbi Eliezer is getting at is the 
ineluctable self-referentiality of law. Admittedly, it is presented to us 
in a highly elaborate form in the story. The hierarchy of legal 
sources has only one small flaw; the highest level draws on the 
To west.8 If one pitches the highest source of law high enough, then 
the world of law can live with this circularity, even if God does find 
the whole thing rather amusing.
Things change somewhat when we look at them in yet another 
way and consider the original self-reference which underlies the 
‘tangled hierarchy’ of law in the Talmud. As soon as the simple 
distinction between legal and illegal is applied in any context what- j 
soever, self-reference poses a threat to the law. If the distinction 
between legal and illegal is applied not merely ad hoc, but with 
claims to universality, then at some stage it will be applied to
5 D. Hofstadter, 1979, pp. 684 ff.
6 Ibid., pp. 692 f.; D. Hofstadter, 1985, p. 71.
D. Hofstadter, 1979, pp. 692 f.
8 Escher, 1961; see Locher, 1971.
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I itself. Indeed, its very claim to universality forces it to become self- referential. It is at this point that ‘paradoxes of self-reference’ emerge.9 As the desperate attempts of the dissenting Rabbi Eliezer demonstrate, the hierarchy of legal sources is merely an inadequate 
attempt to avoid this original self-reference by piling layer upon 
layer of meta-levels, the top level of which, however, is identical 
with the bottom.
There are those, like Spencer Brown, who want to put a stop to 
this type of ‘self-indication’ because the distinction cancels itself out 
in it.10 Others, like Francesco Varela, see ‘self-indication’ as an 
opportunity for a new logical calculus.11 These are assessments of 
an operation which can always be carried out, at least in theory: 
namely, the application of a distinction to itself. The danger is that 
this type of self-application ends up blocking any decision. If the 
positive value of a distinction is applied to itself, then one ends up 
with a tautology, albeit a fairly harmless one: ‘It is legal to apply the 
distinction legal/illegal.’ If we turn this the other way round, it 
becomes much more of a problem: the statement ‘It is illegal to 
apply the distinction legal/illegal’ leads to an insoluble paradox: 
legal-illegal-legal-illegal. . .
As soon as one becomes aware of the problem, one sees self­
references, paradoxes, and antinomies everywhere in the law.12 As 
Hofstadter says, ‘Reflexivity dilemmas. . .  crop up with astonishing 
regularity in the down-to-earth discipline of law.’13 The great 
paradoxical issues of the repeal of the law through the ‘right of 
resistance’ and raison d3état are well known, as are the paradoxical 
creation of law through the force majeure of revolution14 (‘Each 
act of illegitimacy carries within it the possibility of its own legiti­
macy’15), the paradox of the hierarchy of norms which we noted 
above, and the Münchhausen trilemma of the foundation of norms: 
infinite regression, circularity, or voluntary rupture.16
We can come up with many other more concrete examples of 
legal self-reference which lead to paradoxes: ‘Who watches the
9 Bateson, 1972; Wormell, 1958; Quine, 1976; von Forster, 1984a; Krippendorff, 
1984; Suber, 1990; Barwise and Etchemendy, 1987, pp. 7 ff.; Hutter, 1989a.
10 Spencer-Brown, 1972, p. 135.
11 Varela, 1975, p. 5.
12 Fletcher, 1985, pp. 1268 ff.; Suber, 1990.
13 D. R. Hofstadter, 1985, p. 71.
14 Luhmann, 1984a, pp. 12 ff.; 1984c; Benjamin, 1977, pp. 179 ff.
15 Resta, 1984, p. 10; 1985.
16 Popper, 1972, pp. 93 ff.; Albert, 1985, ch. 1; Alexy, 1989, p. 179.
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watchman’ as the problem of constitutional jurisdiction; ‘the 
paradox of self-amendment’ in constitutional law; tu quoque, or 
‘equity must come with clean hands’ ; renvoi in conflict of laws; 
‘ignorance is no excuse’ ; the prohibition of bigamy; ‘prospective 
overruling’; circularity in defining ‘the interests of an organization’ ; 
frustration in contract as ‘the relevance of the irrelevant’ ; or the 
‘fiction theory’ of the legal person, according to which the State as a 
legal person must, like Miinchhausen, pull itself up by its own 
bootstraps by inventing itself.17
Ill
Self-reference, paradox, indeterminacy everywhere! Yet the real 
problem arises when we ask ourselves the next question: how do we 
deal with paradoxes induced by self-reference?18 Like Luderssen, we 
can make it easy for ourselves and dismiss the ‘messing around with 
self-referentiality, which is passed off as unadorned circularity’ as ‘a 
dubious piece of intellectual fancifulness. . .  which has long since 
plagued intellectual history and which has rightly been rejected as 
sterile’.19 Otherwise we are left with three ways of dealing with 
the ‘paradoxes of self-reference’ that appear in law, each of which is 
the subject of intense debate.20
One of the ways of dealing with self-reference which is currently 
favoured by the Critical Legal Studies movement is radical legal 
critique.21 Their subtle analyses of legal doctrine are in fact an 
exercise in deconstruction, and a strange one at that. Legal doctrine’s 
claim to consistency and its practical-moral hopes are reduced to the 
point where all kinds of contradictions, antinomies, and paradoxes 
are shown up within the doctrine itself.22
17 On the constitutional law paradoxes, see Cappelletti, 1989; Ross, 1969; Suber, 
1990. On tu quoque, Teubner, 1975. On renvoi, Kegel, 1987, pp. 240 ff. On 
paradoxes in penal law, Fletcher, 1985, P. 1268. On corporate interest, Teubner, 
1985b, p. 485. On frustration, Deggau, 1987b. On the paradox of the legal person, 
H. J. Wolff, 1933, pp. 63 ff.; Flume, 1983, p. 13; Teubner, 1986c, p. 351; 1988a, 
pp. 417 ff.; 1988b.
18 Krippendorff, 1984, pp. 51 ff.
19 Luderssen, 1986, pp. 343, 349.
20 Wormell, 1958; Quine, 1976.
21 Cf. esp. Kairys, 1982b; Stanford Law Review, 1984; Boyle, 1985; Kelman, 
1987; Frankenberg, 1989; Joerges and Trubek,1989.
22 For a good overview, see Gordon, 1984, p. 101.
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It all started with the uncovering of contradictions between 
formality and materiality, between individualism and altruism in 
contract law; with policy-oriented law in the welfare state’s inherent 
instability and tendency to fragment; and with the paradox that for 
every rule there is counter-rule.23 Trubek reduced this kind of legal 
critique to the formula ‘indeterminacy, antiformality, contradiction 
and marginality’.24 The approach rapidly caught on.25 Now there is 
hardly an area of law left that has not been deconstructed by the 
Critical Legal Studies movement.26
There are numerous variants of this critique. The indeterminacy 
of law is ascribed to a variety of quite different causes: individual 
case decisions, legal institutions, the logic of legal argumentation, 
legal doctrine, social interests or policies.27 There is always an 
element of determinacy, however, in the position adopted by Critical 
Legal scholars. This varies according to the area they choose to 
focus on: social context, institutional environment, political ideo­
logies, or ‘social hegemony’.28
But just how radical a critique of law is this? It appears to me that 
the rediscovery of indeterminacy, the ideological demystification of 
legal doctrine, all the ‘debunking’ and ‘trashing’, only gets to the 
superstructural phenomena of legal self-descriptions but never to the 
heart of the fundamental legal paradox. Is not Sophocles’ critique of 
law much more radical when he has Antigone express her opposi­
tion to Creon’s law prohibiting her from burying her brother? 
c r e o n : And yet wert bold enough to break the law?
An t ig o n e : Yea, for these laws were not ordained of Zeus,
And she who sits enthroned with gods below,
Justice, enacted not these human laws.
Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man,
Could’st by a breath annul and override 
The immutable unwritten laws of Heaven.
They were not born to-day nor yesterday;
They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang.
I was not like, who feared no mortal’s frown,
To disobey these laws and so provoke 
The wrath of Heaven.
(Sophocles, Antigone, p. 349)
23 Duncan Kennedy, 1975-6, pp. 1685, 1712ff.; Unger, 1976, pp. 192ff.; 1983, 
pp. 576 ff.
24 Trubek, 1986, p. 70.
25 Cf. Singer, 1984, p. 1; Boyle, 1985, p. 685; Peller, 1985, p. 1151.
26 For private law, see Feinmann, 1984, p. 678; Dalton, 1985, p. 997; for public 
law, Kairys, 1982a, p. 140; Tushnet, 1983, p. 781; Frug, 1984, p. 1276.
27 For a critical view, see David Kennedy, 1985; Frankenberg, 1989.
Cf. Duncan Kennedy, 1984; Singer, 1984.28
7‘And God Laughed9
One should not see this purely as a conflict between divine and 
secular law, but rather as an insoluble paradox. Antigone maintains 
that Creon’s laying-down of what is legal or illegal is itself illegal. 
It is at this point that the radical nature of Sophocles’ critique of 
the law becomes clear. It is not, as contemporary critique would 
have it, individual legal norms, principles, or doctrines that lead to 
antinomies and paradoxes. Rather, it is the fact that the law itself is 
based on a fundamental paradox which even alternative visions of a 
communal law cannot escape.
Contrary to all the hopes of the Enlightenment, the uncovering of 
contradictions and paradoxes cannot lead to a ‘deconstruction’ of 
the law, but at most to a ‘reconstruction’ of its latent foundations, 
to a reconstruction of the relationships between self-reference, 
paradox, indeterminacy, and the evolution of the law. One cannot 
argue that when lawyers are made aware of the latent contradictions 
and paradoxes in law, these are thereby irrevocably destroyed. This 
would be to underestimate the difference between the reflective 
awareness of lawyers as individuals and of law as a social process. It 
would also downplay the operative closure of legal discourse vis-à- 
vis theoretical discourses, including that of legal theory. Wiethòlter 
regards it as
the dominating phenomenon of the last 10 to 15 years that the work 
of lawyers as socially oriented and exercised practice has remained 
almost untouched by all the more fundamental challenges facing our 
legal system, jurisprudence and legal doctrine.29
Heller supplies the post-structuralist explanation: ‘Law is essentially 
a cognitive and professional, rather than a normative, discipline, 
referring to theory only in the liminal cases where the content of the 
settled practice comes into crisis.’30 This makes him rightly sceptical 
as to the enlightening effects of a legal critical ‘delegitimative 
analysis’.
Joerges concludes that ‘the problem of indeterminacy proves to 
be a paradox. One knows that one does not know why the law 
functions; but one also knows that one can act precisely because it 
functions.’31
There are other legal theorists who favour a more civilized way of 
dealing with the profoundly self-referential nature of the law. They 
define the problem of self-reference in law as a problem of the
29 Wiethòlter, 1986b, p. 53.
30 Heller, 1985, p. 185.
31 Joerges, 1987b, p. 168.
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‘paradoxes in legal thought’.32 By defining the problem in this way, 
they have made the relation between self-reference and paradox 
appear to be a ‘fallacy’ of human thought and can then set about re­
establishing the consistency of legal thought. The entire exercise 
becomes merely a matter of finding an effective method of getting 
rid of paradoxes: ‘The main way of solving the problem is to 
elaborate distinctions.’33 This is obviously a reference to the famous 
theory of types. There are, however, other ways of getting round the 
paradox of self-reference.34 In any case, one should not be rattled by 
unresolved paradoxes and antimonies: they pose ‘a challenge to legal 
theory that we cannot ignore. If we are committed to the consistency 
of our legal principles, we shall someday have to devise a construct 
or a theory that will resolve this antimony.’35
All respect for ‘consistency as an overriding legal value’ !36 But 
who is to make sure that these mental gymnasts don’t get caught up 
in a ‘tangled hierarchy’ as they leap from levels to meta-levels to 
meta-meta-levels? Who is to see that they don’t perform a ‘strange 
loop’ on the highwire, leap right out of the system, and land right 
back where they started from? Perhaps Fletcher is taking the easy 
way out when, having got bogged down with paradoxes as intel­
lectual games, he understands paradoxes as purely intellectual 
mistakes.
We certainly cannot help the dissenting rabbi of our story by 
offering him a new distinction which would be a way of getting over 
an alleged fallacy in his thinking about law. Rabbi Eliezer ends 
up in exile anyway. His problem is not merely ‘paradoxes in legal 
thought’ but ‘paradoxes in legal practice’. He has to discover the 
hard way that it is the reality of the law itself, not merely thinking 
about it, that is paradoxical. And this brings us to the third way of 
dealing with legal paradoxes induced by self-reference: namely, to 
shift the paradox from the world of thinking about law into the 
social reality of law. This third way out breaks a legal taboo: 
the taboo of circularity. Legal doctrine, legal theory, and sociol­
ogy of law are at one in seeing circular arguments as logically 
inadmissible. In all three disciplines circular arguments are banned 
as petitio principii?7 This taboo also characterizes the exertions of
32 Fletcher, 1985, pp. 1263; see also H. Hart, 1983; Ophuels, 1968; Ross, 1969.
33 Fletcher, 1985, pp. 1263, 1279.
34 Hart, 1983; Ross, 1969; for a critical view, see Suber, 1990.
35 Fletcher, 1985, p. 1284.
36 Ibid., p. 1265.
37 See e.g. Klug, 1966, pp. 153 ff.; Alexy, 1989, p. 179.
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our mental gymnasts, whose acrobatics are premissed on the pro­
hibition of circularity. This is also the tacit premiss of the critical 
deconstructionists, whose critique would be meaningless if the 
prohibition on circularity were lifted.
The theory of autopoiesis does not lift the taboo on circular 
inferences only to declare them logically acceptable. That would 
only produce meaningless tautologies or block the process of 
thought altogether. What autopoiesis does is to find a way around 
the taboo. Circularity is seen no longer as an intellectual problem 
but as a problem of legal practice. The social reality of law resides in 
an abundance of circular relations. The components of the legal 
system -  actions, norms, processes, identity, legal reality -  are 
constituted in a circular fashion, and are cyclically bound up with 
each other in a variety of ways.38 Self-references, paradoxes, and 
indeterminacy are real problems of social life, not merely errors in 
the intellectual reconstruction of this reality.
This new way of dealing with self-reference is more than am­
bitious. Circularity, which was hitherto looked upon as a funda­
mentally unacceptable mode of thought, is now regarded as a 
productive and heuristically valuable practice. It is a way of revo­
lutionizing not only legal theory, but our whole way of thinking 
about society. As Luhmann put it, ‘The concept of self-reference is 
generalized to a description of existence as such which at the same 
time establishes the conditions of observability.’39 As Zolo has 
demonstrated, it is based on a generalization of the following 
‘circular’ phenomena:
1 linguistic self-reference of cognitive processes (W. V. O. Quine, 
O. Neurath),
2 theories of order through fluctuation and dissipative structures in 
the physics of irreversible processes (I. Prigogine),
3 logical circularity in mathematically axiomatized structures (K. 
Gödel) and general paradoxes and contradictions in recurrence 
and in logical-linguistic self-inclusion (B. Russell, K. Greiling, A. 
Tarski),
4 reflexivity of the mechanisms of homeostatic or self-catalysing 
self-regulation in molecular biology or neurophysiology (L. von 
Bertalanffy, M. Eigen, H. von Förster),
5 recursive phenomena (feedback, re-entry) in cybernetics and in
38 Teubner, 1988b.
39 Luhmann, 1987d, p. 45.
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the cybernetics of cybernetics (second-order cybernetics) (W. B. 
Ashby, H. von Forster),
6 processes of spontaneous morphogenesis and the self-organisa­
tion of social groups (F. A. von Hayek),
7 the traditional concept of mental awareness in man and in 
anthropoid primates (H. Maturana, G. Pask, N. Luhmann).40
The dynamic character of this way of dealing with self-reference and 
the potential significance of its contribution stem from its central 
thesis that reality has a circular structure, independent of its cog­
nition.41 This has been rather rashly criticized by some as a naive 
mixture of idealistic and realistic cognitive premisses.42 But why 
should a rigidly constructivist world-view be unable to distinguish 
between the environmental constructs of systems and their real 
environments, if it is clear that both are merely constructs of the 
observer?
IV
It is this insistence on ‘real paradoxes’, to coin a phrase which brings 
to mind Karl M arx’s ‘real contradictions’, that makes theories of 
self-reference and autopoiesis potentially so promising. For the 
research strategy is to reveal blanks on the map of social (and legal) 
phenomena by identifying circular relations in law and society and 
investigating their internal dynamics and external interactions. 
There have, of course, been many attempts to do this already. Legal 
hermeneutics, which studies the intricacies of the hermeneutic circle, 
has made the greatest progress in this area.43 In legal theory, it has 
been mainly Hart and Ross who have been concerned with self- 
referential norms.44 On the other hand, legal methodology and 
argumentation theory have relatively little to say on the circularity 
of the relation between legal norm and purpose in teleological 
explanation.45 And until now the sociology of law has thought of
40 Zolo, 1992.
41 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 12.
42 Cf. e.g. Zolo, 1992.
43 See e.g. Esser, 1970.
44 Hart, 1983; Ross, 1969, p. 1.
45 See e.g. Alexy, 1989, pp. 235 ff.
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circularity only in terms of simple feedback relations between law 
and society.46
From the point of view of autopoiesis, however, these phenomena 
are merely further illustrations of the essentially circular nature of 
law.47 The legal system, like other autopoietic systems, is seen as 
nothing but an ‘endless dance of internal correlations in a closed 
network of interacting elements, the structure of which is con­
tinually being modified. . .  by numerous interwoven domains and 
meta-domains of structural coupling’.48
The reality of law itself is circularly structured. That would be 
the final way of interpreting the story ‘And God laughed’. Not only 
is the rabbis’ reasoning about law self-referentially constituted, but 
so is the subject-matter itself. The most important consequence 
of this shift from thought to practice is that the paradox induced 
by self-reference need no longer present an obstacle. The rabbis 
are indefatigable in their attempts to refine and develop Talmudic 
law, irrespective of the paradoxes which emerge. They thus follow 
the second alternative in Krippendorff’s characterization of a 
paradoxical situation:
Unless one is able to escape a paradoxical situation which is what 
Whitehead and Russell achieved with the theory of logical types, 
paradoxes paralyze an observer and may lead either to a collapse of 
the construction of his or her world, or to a growth in complexity in 
his or her representation of this world. It is the latter case which 
could be characterized as morphogenesis.49
We can now analyse how legal practice copes with the blocks 
imposed by the paradoxes of self-reference and how it stabilizes 
itself despite extreme fluctuations. The practice -of law transforms 
total indeterminacy into relative determinacy. The theory of auto­
poiesis is ultimately concerned with the relation between the fol­
lowing elements: self-reference, paradox, indeterminacy, and stability 
through eigenvalues. In applying the distinction between legal and 
illegal, the legal system founds itself upon a self-referential circle. 
This inevitably leads to tautology and paradox, and thus to the 
fundamental indeterminacy of the law. But this indeterminacy 
should not necessarily prove an obstacle; nor should we give way to
46 e.g. Weiss, 1971; Eckhoff, 1978, pp. 41 ff.
47 Febbrajo, 1988.
48 Maturana, 1982, p. 28.
49 Krippendorff, 1984, pp. 5 Iff.
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it. For there are practical solutions to the problem of indeterminacy 
induced by paradox. The key lies in ‘deparadoxizing paradoxes’, in 
the ‘creative application of paradoxes, in the transformation of the 
infinite into a finite burden of information, in the translation of 
indeterminable complexity into determinable complexity’.50
One may, like von Forster, rely on the fact that self-reference 
ultimately leads to stable solutions.51 When an operation is con­
stantly reapplied to itself, stable eigenvalues are formed. A classic 
example of an eigenvalue is ‘This sentence has x letters’. The num­
ber thirty-one is the eigenvalue of that sentence. To put it more 
generally, through recursive ‘computation of computation’, a system 
learns the modes of operation which hold good in an environment 
which is inaccessible to the system. Or we may, like Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, look for inspiration to poets, who ‘overcome the 
anxiety of influence by misreading (or distorting) poetic reality’ and 
interpret law as a continuous ‘misreading of reality’.52 Or, like 
Luhmann, we may try to get round the problem altogether and 
interpret the resulting pattern as a structure of order, as a mor­
phogenetic development of the system.53 In this way we can look for 
social solutions to self-reference by concealing paradox, neutralizing 
it, by thinking of it as a mere contradiction, and attempting to 
‘deparadoxize’ it in a variety of other ways. The establishment of the 
legal system on the basis of the legal code (legal/illegal) which 
renders the paradox of self-reference a harmless, albeit forbidden 
contradiction would effectively eliminate paradoxes from the law. 
The paradoxes of self-reference would not be resolved, however; 
they would merely be held in check. The hierarchy of legal sources, 
the apex of which is best left in the penumbra of natural or divine 
law, is a good symbol of this latency. Yet, no sooner has it been 
pushed into the background than self-reference creeps in through the 
back door: ‘And God laughed.’
50 Luhmann, 1987a, p. 320; 1988b.
51 von Forster, 1981, p. 274; 1985.
52 Santos, 1987, p. 281.




How does autopoiesis change the concept of law? In particular, 
what does it have to offer as opposed to the notion of law as a 
system which is open to the environment, as it has been described in 
cybernetic and functionalist theories?1
Systems theory owed much of its success and dynamic quality to 
the fact that it viewed systems as open to the environment and 
adaptive.2 By ceasing to regard systems as closed, windowless 
monads, it was possible to focus on the way they interacted with 
their respective environments, and in particular on how they were 
dependent upon them. It was the environment which determined the 
operating conditions of systems. Systems had to adapt to survive — a 
view shared by both neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory and the 
contingency theory of sociology of organization.3
Given that systems were seen as being both open to the environ­
ment and adaptive, it seemed obvious that they could be directly 
influenced, regulated, and even determined, by their environment. 
For their very flexibility and adaptability depended upon their being 
able to respond to changes in the environment, either by making 
internal modifications, or, in the case of ultra-stable systems, by 
altering their mode of operation. As far as the regulation of social 
systems is concerned -  and this would include social regulation 
through law -  this had two main implications: first, it was a ques­
tion of making the systems to be regulated as flexible as possible; 
secondly, it involved enabling the regulating actors (administration,
1 On law as an environmentally open system, see e.g. Weiss, 1971; Rottleuthner, 
1973, pp. 142. ff.; Friedman, 1975, pp. 5 ff.; Parsons, 1981, pp. 60 ff.; and on 
Parsons, Damm, 1976.
2 Buckley, 1967; Buckley (ed.), 1968, pp. 490 ff.
3 Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a,b, 1969.
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management, State) to intervene directly by defining environmental 
constraints.
This way of thinking of systems as environmentally open and 
adaptive was a considerable step forward. The environment un­
doubtedly has an effect on systems, be they organisms or organ­
izations. It is also obvious that politics and administration, through 
the medium of the law, exert some influence in practically all areas 
of society. This has lead to widespread criticism of the ‘juridifica­
tion’ not only of all societal subsystems, but of the life-world itself.4
The distinction between system and environment was a key 
feature of the open system, and was replicated within it in the 
form of self-differentiation. It focused attention on concepts like the 
relationship between input and output, the ability of a system to 
adapt to its environment, the re-establishment of equilibrium by 
control and regulation, or the ‘rational’ organization of a system 
towards a particular end. Purpose rationality, control, management, 
adaptation to the environment, and the maintenance of the system’s 
equilibrium also inform political strategies of reform. These were 
aimed at effecting specific changes through the law in various social 
domains. Being based on an understanding of law as a means of 
direct social intervention, this could be compared to an analogous 
understanding of other forms of intervention: power, money, 
knowledge, and technology.
While it is undoubtedly true that intervention of this type had 
some effect, it has become increasingly clear that its impact on the 
social systems concerned has been somewhat unexpected. Sometimes 
it has been too slight, at other times too great. Sometimes this type 
of intervention has been effective only for a short period: sometimes 
it has been counterproductive, often counter-intuitive, and fre­
quently has somehow got ‘swallowed up’ by the system.5 People 
have been quick to attribute blame. It was either too much or too 
little policy, or too much or too little law. Sometimes the imple­
mentation policy was considered inadequate, the reform too zealously 
implemented, the wrong instruments used, and the procedure no 
longer adequate. The main culprits, however, were traditional 
reform policy and traditional methods of direct, purpose-rational 
intervention in general.6
It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that at this very moment the
4 Voigt (ed.), 1980, 1983a,b, 1986a,b; Habermas, 1985; Teubner, 1987e.
5 See Teubner, 1987d.
6 Gorlitz and Voigt, 1985, pp. 27 ff.
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notion of self-organization became increasingly attractive.7 The 
further development of this notion towards a theory of autopoietic 
systems appeared absurd at first, in that it seemed to be harking 
back to the idea of a closed system, which was considered to have 
had its day.8 For the theory of self-referential systems is based on the 
assumption that a system’s unity and identity are derived from its 
being entirely self-referential in its operations and processes. This 
means that it is only with reference to themselves that systems 
can continue to organize and reproduce as systems which are dif­
ferentiated from the environment. It is the operations of a system 
which produce its elements, structures, and processes, its boundaries 
and its unity in a circular way.
The idea of self-reference and autopoiesis presupposes that 
systems seek the fixed points of their mode of operation in them­
selves and not in the environmental conditions to which they adapt 
themselves as best they can (as is assumed in open systems). To put 
it more precisely, they look for these points in a self-description 
which functions as a programme of internal regulation, organizing 
the system in such a way that it corresponds to this self-description. 
This interplay between self-description and the way the system 
operates presupposes that it is possible to explain its molecular and 
biochemical bases, at least in outline.9 However, it is by no means 
easy to determine their equivalents in those systems which are 
constituted in the world of meaning.
It does at least seem clear that self-referential closure occurs when 
complex processes revert back to the production of their original 
conditions in a hypercyclical fashion or in an ultra-cyclical fash­
ion.10 In so doing, they become independent of their environment. 
Self-referentiality and ‘organizational closure’ thus mean one and 
the same thing: the closed form of organization of the recursive, self- 
reproducing processes of a system.11
The question then, of course, is what does self-referentiality have 
to offer as against an open system? The answer is basically this: 
without self-referentiality, without ‘basic circularity’ and organ­
izational closure, stabilization of self-maintaining systems is not
7 Prigogine, 1976; Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Jantsch, 1979; von Forster, 1981, 
1984b. On the history of this idea, see Krohn et al. 1987, pp. 446 ff.
8 Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1988; Maturana, 1982; Varela, 1979; Zeleny, 
1980, 1981b.
9 Zeleny, 1981a.
10 Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Ballmer and Weizsacker, 1974.
11 Varela, 1981b, pp. 37 ff.
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possible.12 It is only the recursive closure of a self-referential process 
-  which must thus comprehend all the sub-reaction cycles and 
therefore be closed — which makes it possible to reconstruct this 
whole process according to immanent rules of regulation. The latter 
make a self-referential system appear independent of its environment 
and not subject to its direct influence. If this were not so, it would be 
the environment which determined whether or not the system con­
tinued and reproduced. Its development would then be contingent, 
rather than the necessary consequence of its recursively organized 
operations.13 If the process of making the connection and selection 
of operations in the system is stabilized by self-description, we arrive 
at the extremely complex process of autopoiesis, which is the basis 
of self-producing systems.14
II
During this brief excursus into recent developments in general 
systems theory, we have come across the basic concepts which 
are the starting-point for all further developments: autopoiesis, 
' self-reference, self-description, reflection, self-organization, and 
self-regulation. If we are to use these constructs to inform our 
understanding of law as an autopoietic system, we must be careful 
to distinguish clearly between different dimensions of self-reference 
and not merely equate every self-referential phenomenon with 
autopoiesis.15
There is considerable conceptual confusion surrounding this 
term.16 Self-reference, self-production, self-organization, reflexivity, 
and autopoiesis are often equated with one another without a 
moment’s thought. A particularly glaring example of this conceptual 
confusion is found in Jantsch, who has no difficulty in constructing 
a complete theory round it.17 Yet, even the masters of autopoiesis,
12 Maturana, 1982, p. 35.
13 For a good overview, see Zeleny, 1981a.
14 Maturana, 1982.
15 See Zolo, 1992; Roth, 1987b, p. 394; Rottleuthner, 1987, p. 114.
16 Compare e.g. the different ways the concept is used in the collected works of 
Benseler et al. (eds), 1980; Zeleny (ed.), 1980, 1981b; Roth and Schwegler (eds), 
1981; Dumouchel and Dupuy (eds), 1983; H. Ulrich and Probst (eds), 1984; 
Baecker et al. (eds), 1987; Haferkamp and Schmid (eds), 1987; Teubner, 1987a, 
1992b; Krohn et al. (eds), 1990.
17 Jantsch, 1976, 1979, 1981.
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who are generally far more careful when it comes to making con­
ceptual distinctions, frequently treat self-reference and autopoiesis as 
one and the same thing.18 Sometimes ad hoc definitions are used, or 
distinctions drawn from concrete examples which are lacking in any 
systematic foundation. Zolo is not entirely wrong when he speaks of 
a ‘pathological syndrome’ of ‘conceptual inflation and disorder’, for 
which he considers a ‘linguistic therapy for the whole autopoietic 
lexicon’ advisable.19
Varela’s attempt at a conceptual definition gets us no further 
either.20 He defines autonomy as self-referential closure in very 
general terms. He views autopoiesis as a special case, characterized 
by the fact that the components of the system ‘produce’ each other 
in the strict sense of the term. This effectively limits the concept 
of autopoiesis to the domain of natural science, and makes it im­
possible to apply it to social phenomena. It hardly seems right that a 
key concept -  namely, the production of the elements of a system -  
should be restricted to a single phenomenological domain. More­
over, the definition of autopoiesis as a particular instance of self­
reference does not provide a complete description of its conceptual 
assumptions.
Roth comes up with the following categories: self-organization, 
self-production, self-maintenance, and self-referentiality.21 In his 
view, systems are self-organizing if their components are so con­
stituted that they ‘spontaneously’ assume a particular order. Self­
production, on the other hand, arises from the cyclical linkage of 
self-organizing processes. Self-maintenance -  that is, the preserva­
tion of the identity of the system, the maintenance of a boundary 
and the supply of energy -  must be added to self-production so that 
the autopoiesis of a system, in the sense of the self-reproduction of 
its elements as Maturana understood it, is possible. According to 
Roth, a system becomes self-referential when its elements interact 
in a cyclical way. This does not mean, however, that it is self- 
reproducing in the strict sense of the term.
These distinctions are obviously arrived at on the basis of close 
observation of particular chemical reactions (self-organization), 
cellular processes (autopoiesis as self-production plus self­
maintenance), and neurological processes (the brain as a self- 
referential but not an autopoietic system). This does not necessarily
18 Maturana, 1982, p. 36; Luhmann, 1984a, p. 59.
19 Zolo, 1992.
20 Varela, 1981a, pp. 17ff.; 1981b, pp. 3 7 if.; 1983, 1984.
21 Roth, 1986, 1987a,b.
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mean that they can be generalized for systems theory. The concept 
of element and structure is also unclear. Are the elements of purely 
self-referential systems not merely part of another type of auto- 
poiesis? Does self-organization mean only the production of a parti­
cular order (structure), or is it the circular production of elements 
that is being referred to? However, what makes Roth’s categories 
interesting is the clear distinction between self-reference and auto- 
poiesis, between self-production and self-maintenance, and the idea 
that if circularly organized processes are cyclically linked, a higher 
degree of stability is achieved.
Even Luhmann has not yet given a systematic treatment of the 
whole field. He has developed series of concepts which do not, 
however, give a consistent overall picture.22 The problem with these 
is that not only do they alter characteristics within one dimension; 
they affect other dimensions as well.23
One way of treating the issue in a systematic way would be 
to regard self-reference as the most general concept. This would 
encompass the notions of circularity and recursivity. Self-reference 
in such a broad sense would include phenomena such as circular 
causality, feedback, re-entry, auto-catalytic self-regulation, as well as 
intra-discursive reference, self-observation, spontaneous order 
formation, and self-reproduction. Circular logical relations such as 
tautologies, contradictions, infinite regress, and paradoxes would 
merely represent special cases of self-reference.
As a consequence, a system can be self-referential without nec­
essarily being self-organizing, self-regulating, or even autopoietic. 
For example, if one understands the legal system as a system of 
rules, or more generally as a system of symbols,24 then it is clearly 
iself-referential, since the legal rules and concepts refer to each other. 
There is, however, no self-regulation or even autopoiesis here. For 
how are norms to produce norms or symbols to generate symbols? 
We can only conceive of the law producing itself if we understand it 
no longer as a mere system of rules but as a system of actions.
Once self-reference has been defined in this way, then other self- 
referential phenomena can be derived by differentiating between 
both dimensions of self-reference: that is, from different types 
of ‘self’ and different types of ‘reference’. A third dimension of 
differentiation emerges from the fact that the subject and the object 
of self-reference are identical only in situations of pure tautology.
22 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 11, sect. I.
23 For a detailed critique of Luhmann, see Teubner, 1988b, pp. 49 ff.
24 e.g. Coing, 1962; Canaris, 1969.
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Self-reference normally includes additional aspects, such as feedback 
from a third party, and excludes others, as when referring to the 
part from the whole.
There is therefore a need to construct a conceptual space for self­
reference, the dimensions of which are shaped from a typology 
of ‘autos’, a typology of ‘reference’, and a typology of referrer/ 
reference relations. It is in this conceptual space that the various 
phenomena of self-referentiality must be located.
Ill
Our discussion of the conceptual space of self-reference will focus 
not so much on the ‘auto’ types25 as on the various types of ref­
erence. With this typology we can distinguish various phenomena of 
self-reference, ranging from self-observation, self-organization, and 
self-regulation to self-production, self-maintenance, and autopoiesis.
Self-observation describes the capacity of a system to influence its 
own operations in a way that goes beyond merely linking them 
together in a sequential manner. The system reconstructs its own 
operations in such a way as to inform its future development in a 
system-specific way. Self-observations take on a structural value, 
and self-description is the term used to describe this type of effect 
on the complex unity of the system. Self-observation and self­
description open up an additional plane in the system, described by 
von Forster as ‘second-order cybernetics’.26
The notions of self-observation and self-description are crucial to 
our understanding of self-referential systems. In formal organiza­
tions, for example, the ‘corporate actor’ cannot be identified with 
the primary operations of the organization (sequences of decision), 
but only with its secondary operations (descriptions of identity). A 
corporate actor is the self-description of an organization to which 
the capacity for action is ascribed.27 Another example is legal 
doctrine. As the ‘second-order cybernetics’ of law, legal doctrine 
does not produce valid law, it merely produces self-descriptions of 
the primary legal operations and their structures.28
Self-organization refers to the ability of a system spontaneously to 
produce an autonomous order. Order is not imposed from the
25 see Teubner, 1988b, pp. 52 ff.
26 von Forster, 1985.
27 See Teubner, 1988a, pp. 133 ff.; 1988b, pp. 66 ff.
28 See Luhmann, 1984a, pp. 42 ff.
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outside, but is produced internally through the interplay of the 
components of the system. A legal system is self-organizing when it 
uses what Hart describes as ‘secondary rules’ to produce ‘primary’ 
rules of conduct through forms of identification and procedure.29
Self-regulation is the dynamic variant of self-organization. A 
system can be described as self-regulating if it is able not only to 
build up and stabilize its own structures, but also to alter them 
according to its own criteria.30 Law can be said to be self-regulating 
when it has developed not only secondary rules for identification but 
also norms and procedures for changing the law.
If self-regulation and self-description are combined with each 
other in such a way that the (self-constituted) identity is used as a 
criterion of structural change, then the system effectively becomes 
self-reflexive. The development of a coherent form of argumentation 
about the identity of the system makes the system self-reflexive. One 
can thus speak of reflexive law in the strict sense of the term31 only 
if legal theory and legal doctrine deal with the prevailing social 
conditions of law (particularly its role in the general process of 
social differentiation) and if it informs decision-making practice in 
law (see chapter 5 below).
The concept of self-production is particularly difficult to grasp, 
and needs to be discussed in more detail. A system can be said to be 
self-productive when it produces its own components. The concept 
of ‘production’ has been particularly prone to misunderstanding. 
Rottleuthner considers it a ‘woolly’, inappropriate metaphor, and 
asks what precisely is meant by it: causal determination, function, or 
‘illustration’ ?32 Mayntz considers it a kind of sociological shorthand 
to speak of the self-reproduction of communication through com­
munication.33 If one were to emphasize the dynamic element of 
communication, one could say only that communication is ‘stimu­
lated’ by communication, but generated by the social agent. Even 
Luhmann has given only a brief sketch of the concept of production. 
He defines self-production as the control of some, but not all, causes 
in a system.34 This has merely resulted in a shift in emphasis from 
production to control.
The problem with self-production is that it appears to contradict
29 H. Hart, 1961, pp. 77 ff.
30 See Mayntz, 1987, pp. 91 ff.; for a more general view, see Willke, 1983, 1992.
31 Teubner and Willke, 1984; Luhmann, 1992c.
32 Rottleuthner, 1987, p. 119; see also idem, 1975, pp. 202 ff.
33 Mayntz, 1987, pp. 100 ff.
34 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 1, sect. II.
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the obvious fact that much of what occurs within a system is 
brought about by external factors. For the legal system in particular, 
the notion of self-production seems difficult to reconcile with the 
fact that law is determined to a considerable extent by political 
influences, economic structures, and social factors. Does the idea of 
legal self-production lead to a revival of positivism or decisionism? 
Or to an imaginary legal autarchy? It is reservations like these which 
lead some people, particularly legal sociologists, to reject the notion 
of autopoiesis in law.35
To allay all suspicion of autarchy, I should like to make it clear 
that self-production does not imply that all causes are located within 
the system; neither does it imply that the more important of these 
(and who or what determines the criteria of importance?) or even 
most causes have their origins within the system. Despite what has 
been said to the contrary, a self-producing legal system is strongly 
influenced by social, economic, and political factors. Indeed, it is 
assumed that this will necessarily be the case. What is different, 
however, is the way in which the environment influences self- 
producing law. We will examine this in more detail in chapter 3, 
section III.
In response to Mayntz’s criticism, it must be emphasized that the 
role of the social agent is certainly not diminished by the idea of 
social self-production. Social agents as psychic systems do exert a 
considerable external influence on communication; what is more, 
‘persons’, as social constructs, are absolutely necessary for the 
attribution of actions. Mayntz differentiates between stimulation 
(communication through communication) and production (com­
munication through actors). This distinction does not do justice, 
however, to the productive role of the social system in the self- 
reproductive process of communication. Nevertheless, Mayntz does 
make the point that the way the social system functions in the 
production of communications must be defined more precisely.
It needs to be stressed that self-reproduction presupposes that 
the system is influenced by its environment. Indeed, the role of the 
environment is vital. Both external and internal factors influence 
the way a system reproduces itself. However, this also happens in 
allopoietic systems. What distinguishes a self-producing system from 
all others is that it reproduces itself by extracting and constituting, 
as it were, new elements from the flow of events, which it then uses 
by linking them up selectively.
35 Blankenburg, 1984, pp. 279ff.; Friedman, 1985a; 1985b, pp. 2 7 ff.; Lempert, 
1987, pp. 173 ff.; Rottleuthner, 1987, pp. 114 ff.
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Chess is a good example. The flow of events made up of words, 
gestures, and movements is ‘organized’ by the game of chess in such 
a way that it is possible to derive a sequence of ‘moves’ from it. 
One move produces another by opening up a limited number of 
possibilities. Self-production in this context is the constitution of the 
basic element ‘move’, the production of the next ‘move’ by the first 
‘move’, and the incorporation of these ‘moves’ into the concrete 
system of the game of chess itself. However, this example is less 
suited to elucidating the dynamics of self-production. For in chess 
the rules are fixed, and in any one particular game self-regulation 
in the sense of dynamic structural change is not possible. The 
legal system provides a better example of this. Hofstadter’s essay 
illustrates the difference in a simplified form.36 Whereas in standard 
games there is a certain continuity which stems from the fact that 
the rules remain the same, law is self-regulating: it is a rule-governed 
set of systems, directives, and processes undergoing constant rule- 
governed change.
On the one hand there is less to the concept of self-production 
than its opponents would lead us to believe. Self-producing systems 
do not simply arise out of a vacuum; rather, they emerge from an 
existing material substructure. On the other hand, there is more to 
self-production than the ‘spontaneous’ formation of an order, as 
Hayek would have it.37 For the emerging system does not merely re­
order existing elements: it extracts new elements from ongoing 
processes. These elements form the new system.
Autopoiesis, which of all the new forms of self-referentiality is 
perhaps the most difficult to define, should not be confused with any 
of the above-mentioned phenomena, not even self-production. 
Autopoiesis is a particular combination of various mechanisms of 
self-reference. The self-production of elements can be regarded as 
only a minimum condition for autopoiesis.
This minimum condition is certainly enshrined in the ‘official’ 
definition of autopoiesis: ‘Autopoietic organization is defined as a 
unit through a network of constituents which (1) have a recursive 
effect on the network of the production of constituents which also 
produces these constituents and (2) which realize the network of 
production as a unit in the same space in which the constituents are 
located.’38 Whether autopoiesis is in fact any more than the self-
36 ‘Nomic: a self-modifying game based on reflexivity in law’ : D. R. Hofstadter, 
1985.
37 See e.g. Hayek, 1973, p. 18.
Maturana, 1982, p. 158.38
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production of elements is, of course, a matter of some dispute. In my 
view, one has to take on board certain additional conditions, which 
can be read into the ‘official’ definition.
Not only the elements of the system, but all its components -  the 
elements, structures, processes, boundaries, identity, and unity of the 
system -  have to be self-produced.39 Not only must the system be 
self-producing, but the self-producing cycle must also be capable of 
maintaining itself.40 This is achieved through the interlinking of the 
first self-producing cycle with a second one which makes cyclical 
production possible by guaranteeing the conditions of its production 
(hypercycle).41 Finally, autopoiesis is unthinkable without second- 
order cybernetics.
There is some dispute among autopoieticists as to whether more 
than one self-referential operation is admissible. The relationship 
of the ‘hard’ operations of the system, such as production and 
reproduction, to the ‘soft’ ones, such as observation, information, 
and control, is also the subject of continued debate.
In his ‘second-order cybernetics’, von Forster concentrates on the 
soft operations of ‘computations of computations of computations’ 
without looking at how they facilitate the self-perpetuation of 
the system.42 Maturana, by contrast, represents a rigorously ‘be­
haviourist’ approach to the concept of autopoiesis.43 He restricts the 
term to describing how elements of the system and the system itself 
reproduce themselves in a cyclical fashion. All ‘soft’ operations like 
observation, control, regulation, functionalization, and instrumen- 
talization are relegated to the external perspective of the observer. 
According to Maturana, in the autopoietic system there is ‘no 
processing of information, no attempt to make behaviour corre­
spond to the conditions of the external world, no goal-oriented 
processes in the functioning of the organism’. There are only re­
productive operations, the ‘endless dance of internal correlations’ .44
Several writers, Varela, Roth, Braten, and Luhmann among them, 
have, in their own ways, attempted to get round the tension between 
reproduction and observation in the system. Varela tries to arrive at 
a synthesis by declaring that ‘operative’ and ‘symbolic’ explanations 
are two different, equally valid, complementary ways of explaining
39 Luhmann, 1987e, pp. 14 ff.
40 Roth, 1986, 1987a.
41 Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Zeleny, 1981a; Teubner, 1988b, p. 56.
42 von Forster, 1981, 1984a,b.
43 Maturana, 1982, pp. 18 ff.
44 Ibid., p. 28.
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autonomous systems.45 However, he too is merely looking at the 
problem from the point of view of the observer, albeit in a different 
way from Maturana. Roth, on the other hand, focuses on the 
operational level, and differentiates between ‘hard’ reproductive 
operations and ‘soft’ interactions of states.46 However, he also tends 
to associate them exclusively with different types of system, and 
distinguishes accordingly between autopoietic systems (cell, or­
ganism) and self-referential systems (cognitive and social systems).
Braten attempts to overcome the limitations of the ‘mechanical’ 
conception of autopoiesis by ‘opening up’ the closed realm of self­
reproduction by means of a model of dialogue.47 He envisages a 
constant dialogue and exchange between organized closure and 
symbolic representation. In this situation autopoietic reproduction 
effectively makes the system closed, and acts of observation open 
it up.
Luhmann approaches the problem in yet another way.48 He puts 
forward a type of ‘big bang’ theory of autopoiesis in which a 
combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ operations makes autopoietic 
reproduction possible. Autopoiesis can only come into being when 
self-reproduction and self-description coincide. Self-descriptions are 
for their part self-reproductive operations. They facilitate the inter­
linking of individual operations by determining that they belong 
to the system. Self-descriptions introduce the distinction between 
system and environment into the system, and thus serve to regulate 
self-reproduction. To put it in more concrete terms, communications 
must be defined by reflexive communication as belonging to the 
system; only when they are defined as ‘actions’ in this way can 
further actions connect with them.
If we take these additional features into account, then the concept 
of autopoiesis becomes very complex. Nevertheless, its main features 
can be summarized as follows:
1 self-production of all the components of the system,
2 self-maintenance of the self-producing cycles by means of 
hypercyclical linking,
3 self-description as the regulation of self-production.
45 Varela, 1981a,b.
46 Roth, 1986, 1987a.
47 Braten, 1984, 1992.
48 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 11, sect. I.
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Law  -  A Hyper cycle?
i
I Is law an autopoietic system? Can it be said to reproduce itself? The answer is a qualified yes. Law is in fact a second-order autopoietic system. It distinguishes itself from society, the first-order autopoietic system, by constituting its components in a self-referential way and 
linking them together in a hypercycle.
This rather summary definition of legal autopoiesis, which will be 
explained in more detail below, has its opponents. There are those, 
such as Lempert, Mayntz, and Rottleuthner, who are sceptical about 
the whole idea of autopoiesis. However, even its most staunch 
defenders, such as Maturana, Varela, Hejl, and Luhmann have their 
doubts. In order to simplify things somewhat, I shall merely list the 
various objections and my responses to them, then go on to look at 
the issues in more detail in the succeeding sections of this chapter.
(1) As one might expect, biologists dispute the fact that a social 
phenomenon such as law can be described as autopoietic. In their 
view, the term can be applied only to the production of organic life.1 
However, they are prepared to admit that the autopoietic character 
of living and cognitive systems also has some influence on social 
phenomena.2 But law as a social subsystem -  and this is the line 
taken by sociologists with some knowledge of biology — is neither 
autopoietic nor self-referential. At most it is ‘synreferentiaP.3 Is it 
meaningful to apply the concept of autopoiesis to law on the basis
1 Varela, 1979, pp. 53 ff.; 1981b, p. 38.
2 Maturana, 1982, pp. 37, 212, 220; Maturana and Varela, 1988.
3 Hejl, 1986.
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of life, or does autopoiesis in law come to life on the basis of 
meaning?
My response is as follows: compared to biological autopoiesis, 
social and legal autopoiesis are distinguished by their emergent 
properties. New and different self-referential circles have to be 
formed in order to provide the basis for higher-level autopoietic 
systems.
(2) The ‘productive forces’ of legal autopoiesis are also a matter of 
some controversy: what produces itself? Rottleuthner’s doubts as to 
whether law spawns law stem from the understandable concern that 
symbolic systems cannot be self-generating.4 What is the role of 
human agents in all of this?5 Will justice, as Renate Mayntz fears, 
become ‘a woman without a body. . .  deprived of its social base 
and all its real driving power?’6 What elements of the legal system 
can then be said to ‘produce’ each other in the strict sense of the 
term? Jurists, the bar, legal organizations, legal norms, legal 
communications ?
I shall keep my answer brief for the moment. It is not only the 
elements of the system, the legal acts, that are involved in the 
process of self-reproduction; elements, structures, processes, 
boundaries, identity, function, and performance all play their 
part. Human agents play an important double role in this process. 
They function as semantic constructs of the legal system and as 
independent autopoietic (psychic) systems in the environment of the 
law.
(3) Legal sociologists find the ‘circular closure’ of autopoietic law 
a stumbling block. Obviously this goes against their ideas of law 
as an open system which both shapes and is shaped by its social 
environment.7 (See chapter 2, section III.) Some see this type of 
operative closure as the beginning of a new legal formalism.8
My answer to this is as follows: self-reference and autopoiesis, 
establish a high degree of legal autonomy based upon the consti­
tution of circular relationships. This new kind of autonomy does not 
exclude causal interdependencies in the relationship between law 
and society. Quite the reverse! However, it demands that these
4 Rottleuthner, 1987, p. 122.
5 Schimank, 1985, p. 421.
6 Mayntz, 1987, p. 102.
7 Friedman, 1975, ch. 1; 1986, pp. 313 ff.
8 Lempert, 1987, pp. 173 ff., or as a new ideology for the legal profession: 
Blankenburg, 1984; Tonnies, 1987.
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interdependencies be viewed in a new way and be seen as subject to 
the external influences of ‘non-trivial’ machines.
(4) There is one final objection directed against the idea of the 
hypercycle itself. Some see it as an over-complicated construct, and 
doubt whether it is really necessary to establish the independent 
autopoiesis of law. Luhmann has a very much simpler solution.9 
Social subsystems achieve autopoietic closure merely by constituting 
independent elements. The ‘discovery’ of the legal act thus makes it 
possible for the legal system to become self-referentially closed. It 
is continually reproducing itself by adding new legal acts.10 The 
development of legal autopoiesis is thus described as an ‘all-or- 
nothing’ process. For Luhmann, the concept of autopoiesis is one of 
‘inflexible hardness’.11 Law either reproduces itself or it doesn’t. 
According to Luhmann, there is no such thing as partial autopoiesis.
In my view, autonomy and autopoiesis should rather be under­
stood as questions of degree.12 Whether one is analysing the his­
torical development of law or the legal systems in existence at any 
particular time, it is always possible to identify different degrees of 
autonomy. Self-reference and autopoiesis can then be turned into 
rather exact criteria for these gradual stages of autonomy. This 
is only possible if one views legal autopoiesis as a slightly more 
complex construct than does Luhmann. A minor modification of 
Eigen and Schuster’s notion of ‘hypercycle’ might serve our purpose 
here.13 We may conclude by saying that a legal system becomes 
autonomous to the extent that it manages to constitute its com­
ponents -  action, norm, process, identity — into self-referential 
cycles. It achieves autopoietic autonomy only when the components 
of the system formed in this way are linked together to form a 
hypercycle.
II
The concept of autopoiesis was intended to elucidate basic processes 
of life, particularly at the level of the cell and of the central nervous 
system.14 As various people have pointed out, the difficulties of
9 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 11, sect. VII.
10 Luhmann, 1985b, pp. 113 ff.; 1987e, pp. 16 ff.; 1992c.
11 Luhmann, 1991.
12 Cf. Teubner, 1987b,c, 1988b, 1992b; Roth, 1987b; Stichweh, 1987; Mayntz, 
1988, pp. 20 ff.
13 Eigen and Schuster, 1979.
Maturana, 1982; Varela, 1979.14
28 Law -  A Hypercycle?
applying this concept to social phenomena are considerable.15 In 
particular, it is unclear whether autopoiesis should be limited to 
biological phenomena or whether it can be meaningfully developed 
into a concept of social autopoiesis.
Biologists, such as Maturana and Varela, have opted for the first 
method, as have the social scientists influenced by them, notably 
Hejl, Krohn, and Kiippers. Autopoietic systems are best left to the 
realms of biology and psychology, and are used only as a ‘generative 
mechanics’ for social phenomena. Social phenomena are then con­
strued as interactions between individuals understood as autopoietic 
systems.16 Societies appear as ‘systems of coupled human beings’,17 
and, as far as society is concerned, it seems that we are dealing with 
autopoietic bio-systems of a higher order.
Maturana has gone into the question of the build-up of first-, 
second-, and third-order autopoietic systems in the area of multi­
cellular patterns of organization, as well as in animal and human 
societies.18 His distinctions can also be applied to other fields.19 
Maturana distinguishes three instances of autopoiesis: (1) the simple 
coupling of autopoietic systems, in which the systems neither lose 
their identity nor blend into a new unity; (2) the establishment of a 
new autopoietic unity, in which the subsystems lose their identity; 
and (3) a higher-order autopoietic system, whose autopoiesis nec­
essarily presupposes that of the coupled autopoietic unities.20
This model might help us deal with certain problems in the social 
domain, such as problems of umbrella organizations and corporate 
groups and the corresponding questions of ‘unity and multiplicity’.21 
However, the model breaks down when it is applied to all auto­
poietic systems that emerge beyond the level of the organism. This 
becomes particularly clear when we look at Maturana’s concept of 
society. If one thinks of societies as ‘systems of coupled human 
beings’, then one can consider societies only as ‘apparently auto­
poietic’.22 Even if we follow Hejl and make individual cognitive
15 Beer, 1980; Zeleny and Pierre, 1976; Luhmann, 1981c, 1992b; Hejl, 1982a,b, 
1984, 1985, 1986; Teubner, 1987b, 1987d, 1992b; Teubner and Willke, 1984; H. 
Ulrich and Probst (eds), 1984; Baecker et al. (eds), 1987; Haferkamp and Schmid 
(eds), 1987; Maturana and Varela, 1988; Baecker, 1988; Knyphausen, 1988.
16 Hejl, 1985, 1986.
17 Maturana, 1982, p. 212.
18 Maturana, 1982, pp. 37, 211 ff.
19 See Maturana and Varela, 1988, pp. 98 ff., 195 ff.
20 For more of these types of distinction, see Mossakowski and Nettmann, 1981.
21 Balz, 1974, 1985; see also ch. 7 below.
22 Maturana, 1982, pp. 212, 220; 1987.
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systems or parts of them, rather than organisms, the basic unit of 
society, then social systems cannot be seen as self-organizing, self- 
maintaining, or self-referential. They are at best ‘synreferential’ .23
The ‘category mistake’ lies in the following statement: ‘It is a 
constitutive feature of a social system that its components are living 
beings.’24 The mistake is to structure higher autopoietic systems 
exclusively according to the pattern which dictates that the auto­
poietic system of the first order (organism, cognitive system) nec­
essarily becomes an element of the higher-order autopoietic system 
(society). This way of looking at things ultimately leads to the 
notorious hypostasization of social systems as collectives.25 Not 
surprisingly, Maturana and Hejl are somewhat irritated by this 
consequence of their theory.26
Luhmann has come up with a way out of this impasse: higher- 
order autopoietic systems can be formed in such a way that emergent 
unities are constituted which provide their elements.27 In the case of 
society, these emergent unities are communications (not human 
beings or cognitive systems). Thus society is hot ä  bio-system, but a 
system of meaning. This opens the second way of applying auto­
poiesis to social science: by describing social systems as themselves 
emergent autopoietic systems. The real issue does not concern 
analogies, however, whether social systems are organisms or even 
whether they have a kind of life principle. Analogies are replaced by 
a controllable context of generalization and respecification.28
This second way, which is the one Luhmann29 opted for, can be 
described briefly in the following terms. Social autopoiesis is 
autonomous from the autopoiesis of living organisms. Social systems 
are autopoietic systems in the strict sense of the word. They are not 
only self-organizing in the sense described above: namely, that 
they spontaneously produce an autonomous order. They are self- 
producing in that they produce their own elements. They differ from 
biological systems (cell, organism, nervous system) in that their basis
23 Hejl, 1984, 1985; 1986, p. 359.
24 Maturana, 1983, p. 7; see also Krohn and Küppers, 1989, pp. 25 ff.
25 Cf. Maturana’s ‘coupled human beings’ (1982, p. 220) or the description of the 
‘bee-state’ as a third-order autopoietic system (ibid., p. 37). For a critique of 
collectivist hypostasizations, see Teubner, 1988a,b.
26 Maturana, 1982, pp. 220 ff.; Hejl, 1985.
27 Luhmann, 1986a, pp. 172 ff.
28 In regard to the biological point of departure, when the focus is on social 
systems, see Stichweh, 1987, p. 447.
29 Luhmann, 1992b.
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is not life. Social systems, including face-to-face interactions, formal 
organizations, and society as a whole, reproduce themselves on the 
basis of meaning. The components of all these social systems are 
communications, not individual human beings. Communications as 
a unity of communication, information, and understanding con­
stitute social systems by reproducing recursive communications.
Ill
If, like Luhmann, we opt for a concept of social autopoiesis, we 
soon find ourselves confronted with a new problem: where does law 
fit in?30 It is not surprising that we are faced with this kind of 
dilemma, for ‘the question of how, if indeed at all, one can conceive 
of autopoietic systems within autopoietic systems’ entails ‘an irri­
tating objection to the concept of autopoiesis’.31 Is the law also 
organized autopoietically? And if so, how? Does a social subsystem 
merely have to constitute its own elements from the flow of com­
munication? Or do we have to set up a second-order autopoietic 
system in order to establish the autonomy of law?
Higher-order autopoietic systems develop on the basis of an 
autopoietic system if they really ‘produce’ their own components 
themselves. Moreover, these self-producing components are not 
identical with the basic autopoietic system, nor with its components. 
In other words, one has to be able to identify emergent properties if 
one is to speak of higher-order autopoiesis. Roth claims that there 
has to be a change on a phenomenological level before there can be 
higher-order autopoiesis.32 However, this may be asking too much. 
Why should it not be possible for new components to arise on 
the same level? All it takes is the formation of new and different 
self-referential circles to constitute the elements of a higher-level 
autopoietic system. This also serves to illustrate the difference 
between our concept of emergent properties and the traditional one, 
according to which the decisive factor is the formation of new 
structures on the basis of given elements.33 In the case of the law, 
this means that autopoietic closure can occur only when commu-
30 For two differing views, see Luhmann, 1987a, p. 318; Teubner, 1988b, pp. 45, 
60 ff.
31 Luhmann, 1987a, p. 318.
32 Roth, 1987b, p. 398.
Cf. Stichweh, 1987, p. 449.33
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nication about law constitutes its own elements — legal acts. These 
legal acts change legal structures, and thereby set in motion the 
autopoietic cycle of legal act, change in the law, legal act.34 Thus, 
the ‘invention’ of the legal act establishes the autonomy of the law.
But this does not yet help us fully understand the self-reproduc­
tive character of the law. It is not only legal acts that have to be 
self-constituting; all the components of the system -  structures, 
processes, boundaries, and environments — have to be self-generating 
and linked together in a self-reproductive hypercycle.
For a subtle enough understanding of the autonomy of law, we 
have to rid ourselves of the idea that autopoiesis is a completely 
‘rigid and inflexible’ concept.35 According to Luhmann, a system is 
either autopoietic or it is not: ‘There are no half autopoietic, half 
allopietic systems.’36 Obviously one cannot dispute the fact that a 
system either reproduces itself in a circular pattern or it does not. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to think of degrees of autonomy. For 
our purposes it is useful to think of autonomy as the cumulative 
emergence of self-referential relationships which enables the entire 
system to reproduce itself under certain conditions.
Roth puts forward an alternative view of autopoiesis which 
contrasts with the ‘inflexible rigidity’ of Luhmann’s and Maturana’s 
approach:
Self-referentiality and autonomy are not necessarily all-or-nothing 
states: they can be present to varying degrees and gain or diminish in 
importance as the system develops. A system can become increasingly 
self-referential if the network of its components undergoes the 
following modifications:
1 greater feedback between the components,
2 variability in the strength of the coupling of the components 
(functional plasticity) or re-formation of the couplings (structural 
plasticity),
3 reconstitution of components within the network (self­
differentiation).37
The cumulative increase in circular relationships thus makes auto­
poiesis a gradual process.38 In order to understand this step-by-step
34 Luhmann, 1987e, p. 17.
35 Luhmann, 1991c; cf. Maturana, 1982, p. 301.
36 Luhmann, 1987a, p. 318.
37 Roth, 1987b, p. 400.
38 See also Stichweh, 1987; Mayntz, 1988, pp. 20 ff.
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process, it is useful to distinguish more precisely between self­
observation, self-constitution, and self-reproduction. It is one thing 
for a social system to observe its components as elements, structures, 
processes, boundaries, environments, and identity through reflexive 
communication. However, it is quite another for it to constitute 
them itself and to put these self-defined components into operation. 
Self-reproduction -  that is, the capacity of the system to produce 
components recursively by the network of components — is some­
thing else again. Self-observation does not necessarily include self­
constitution, and self-constitution does not necessarily include 
self-reproduction. For the system to be able to reproduce itself, 
its components must be in a complementary relationship to each 
other. This has to happen to enable a self-reproductive cycle to come 
into existence in the first place. Or, to put it another way, the 
existence of a self-reproducing hypercycle is dependent upon the 
cyclical interlinking of the components of the system, which are in 
turn cyclically organized.
To put it more precisely, social subsystems acquire increasing 
autonomy if their components (element, structure, process, identity, 
boundary, environment, performance, function) are self-referentially 
defined via reflexive communication (self-observation). The degree 
of their autonomy is also determined by whether these self-obser­
vations are made operational in the system (self-constitution). 
Finally, their autonomy is dependent upon whether their com­
ponents are linked together in a hypercycle and produce each other 
on a reciprocal basis (autopoiesis).
Historically, complex hypercycles do not develop according to a 
predetermined pattern or towards a particular goal. ‘Blind’ socio­
cultural evolution prevails.39 Self-observations arise spontaneously, 
as it were. Whenever a distinction is applied to empirical phenom­
ena, sooner or later it also applies itself to itself. If God and the 
world are the subject of conversation, then at some point or other 
the nature of the conversation itself will also be discussed. In this 
way the components of social subsystems are also communicatively 
observed; they are discussed in the language of the system itself. 
These random observations form the mechanism of variation for 
the evolution of social self-reference. How they are selected then 
depends upon whether they are successfully constituted -  that is, 
upon whether the system has anything to gain from them. This does 
not mean that the system becomes better adapted to its environ-
39 Campbell, 1969, 1970, 1975; Giesen, 1980; van Parijs, 1981.
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ment. Indeed, the reverse is the case. The system benefits only if it 
frees itself from its turbulent environment, if it becomes indepen­
dent. It is the hypercycle which ultimately stabilizes the selected 
variations, making the production of the components of the system 
more independent of the environment, so that they guarantee the 
conditions of their production on a reciprocal basis. ‘The circular 
organisation of the processes of production and replication must be 
stable, precise and protected from environmental turbulence.’40 
Whereas self-reference takes over the function of the self-production 
of the components, self-maintenance is the main function of hyper- 
cyclical linkage.41
— The key to understanding law’s autonomy lies in this three-tiered 
relation of self-observation, self-constitution, and self-reproduction. 
As soon as legal communications on the fundamental distinction 
between legal and illegal begin to be differentiated from general 
social communication, they inevitably become self-referetitial, and 
are forced to consider themselves in terms of legal categories. This 
leads to ‘vicious’ and ‘virtuous’ circles, tautologies, contradictions, 
paradoxes, and infinite regress.42 The law is forced to describe its 
components using its own categories. It begins to establish norms 
for its own operations, structures, processes, boundaries, and en­
vironments -  indeed, for its own identity. When it actually uses 
these self-descriptions, it has begun to constitute its own com­
ponents. This leads to the emergence of self-referential circles in 
relation to legal acts, legal norms, legal process, and legal dogmatics, 
with the result that the law becomes increasingly ‘autonomous’. The 
law itself determines which presuppositions must be present before 
one can speak of a legally relevant event, a valid norm, and so forth. 
Law begins to reproduce itself in the strict sense of the word if its 
self-referentially organized components are linked in such a way that 
norms and legal acts produce each other reciprocally and process 
and dogmatics establish some relationship between these. It is only 
when the components of the cyclically organized system interact in 
this way that the legal hypercycle becomes possible.
This definition of legal autonomy is in marked contrast to pre­
vious ones. The degree to which law becomes autonomous is 
determined by the extent to which it constitutes self-referential 
relationships, ranging from minor normative cross-referencing to
40 Zeleny, 1981a, p. 101.
41 For an overview of the evolution of the hypercycle, see also ibid., pp. 100 ff.
42 Varela, 1979; 1981a, p. 19; see also ch. 1, sect. II.
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the circular closure of a hypercyclically constituted law. We have 
already discussed how this resembles Luhmann’s concept of au­
tonomy and how it differs from it. As we have seen, Luhmann 
identifies autonomy with autopoiesis.43 However, since he endows 
both with ‘unyielding inflexibility’, he can no longer accommodate 
varying degrees of autonomy.
Generally, however, autonomy is equated with the capacity for 
self-regulation.44 In the language of systems theory, this would 
describe the system’s ability ‘spontaneously’ to organize its own 
structures (self-organization) or alter them as it saw fit (self-regu­
lation). Although this conception of autonomy is not incorrect, 
it gives only part of the picture, albeit an important one: namely, 
that the system is able to establish its own rules. Other aspects 
of autonomy are no less important, however. These include the 
capacity of the system to generate its own operations in the first 
place or to produce its own identity. Legal autonomy thus refers not 
only to law’s capacity to generate its own order, but also to the self­
constitution of legal actions, the regulation of processes, and the 
invention of new schemata in legal dogmatics.
There is another conception of legal autonomy which is modelled 
on base—superstructure constructs: namely, that of freedom from 
external causal influences, particularly political and economic 
ones.45 The question of causal dependence/independence/inter- 
dependence is a central issue in the Marxist-inspired discussion of 
the relative autonomy of law.46 The same applies to the post-realism 
of the ‘law and society movement’.47 I should make it clear that we 
are dealing with quite different concepts of legal autonomy here. 
The sociologists of law who criticize autopoiesis, from either the 
materialist or the bourgeois point of view, could have saved their 
breath had they looked at the issue in more detail. Then it certainly 
would not have been possible to argue that the notion of the oper­
ative autonomy of an autopoietically closed legal system amounts 
to the promotion of legal autarchy. Nor could they have adduced 
empirical evidence of the law’s dependence on politics and econ­
omics. As Walter Buhl, a keen critic of social autopoiesis, has rightly 
pointed out, autopoiesis ‘has nothing to do with an exclusive
43 Luhmann, 1992c.
44 See e.g. Dupuy, 1987, pp. 55 ff.
45 See ch. 2, sect. III.
46 See Rottleuthner (ed.), 1975; Jessop, 1992.
47 Friedman, 1975; 1986, pp. 313 ff.; esp. Lempert, 1987; Lempert and Sanders, 
1986.
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internal determination which is in alleged contrast to an equally 
exclusive “ external regulation” or “ external explanation” ,48
We need to insist on the sharp conceptual distinction between 
circularity on the one hand and causal independence on the other. 
Legal autonomy refers to the circularity of the way in which law 
produces itself, not to its causal independence of the environment. 
That is not to say that these two issues are not related. On the 
contrary, legal autonomy understood as the circularity of legal 
operations is eminently suited to generating hypotheses for causal 
relationships. When the internal organization of law is circular, then 
the causal models of its external influences are necessarily more 
complex. There has to be a move away from the simple logic of 
cause and effect towards a logic of ‘perturbation’.49 Factors which 
influence law from the outside have to be described according to the 
model of ‘non-trivial machines’, as discussed in chapter l .50 Legal 
autonomy in this sense thus does not exclude the possibility that 
law, economics, and politics are interdependent. In fact, it assumes 
that they will be interdependent to a considerable extent, with the 
proviso that this be seen as a problem of how circular, causal 
processes are subject to external influences. We will examine the 
implications for social regulation through law in more detail in 
chapter 5.
Finally, there is another phenomenon which can be reconciled 
readily with the idea of a high degree of legal autonomy. This is 
the adoption of social meanings into law, particularly the ‘latching 
on’ to current social values.51 In fact, these are often adduced as 
empirical evidence against the notion of legal autonomy. In our 
terms it is not a question of legal autonomy, but a problem which 
has arisen as a consequence of the interplay of closure and openness 
in law as an autopoietic system. In cognitive openness, law refers to 
social meanings in a variety of ways, as well as to constructs of 
reality and social values. In a self-referentially closed legal system, 
however, these forays into current social values assume the guise 
of normativization in its legal form. Their normative content is 
produced from within the law itself, by constitutive norms which 
refer back to these values. It is a condition of all forays into current 
social values that they be subject to legal reformulation. As soon as 
they are in dispute, a decision has to be made about them according
48 Bühl, 1987, p. 228.
49 Roth, 1982.
50 von Förster, 1984a, 1985.
51 Lempert, 1987; Esser, 1956a, 1970.
36 Law -  A Hypercycle?
to criteria established by the law itself. In some cases it may be 
necessary to redefine them.
IV
On a slightly ironic note, Rottleuthner reproached the autopoie- 
ticists for their obscure metaphorical language.52 In his view their 
concept of production and constitution is extremely vague. It re­
minds him of the similarly blurred conceptual distinctions which 
commonly marred interpretations of legal theory from a Marxist 
perspective in the early 1970s. What are the autopoieticists really 
getting at? Is it the recursive production of legal acts by legal acts, 
the circular relationship between legal norm and decision, the 
reflexive relation between primary and secondary norms, the legal 
constitution of ‘institutional facts’, or the specifically legal way of 
describing actions? Why, Rottleuthner asks with some justification, 
should the term ‘self-production’ with respect to law be used to 
describe all these differing aspects? Luhmann does indeed use the 
term ‘self-made law’ to describe a whole range of circular relation­
ships (circularity between legal decisions, circularity between higher- 
and lower-ranking rules, between the decision and the rule, and so 
forth).53 As well as asking for conceptual clarification, Rottleuthner 
makes an ‘urgent request’ for greater precision as regards time and 
place: ‘At what point does the legal system become autopoietically 
closed?’54
There is an answer to Rottleuthner — at least to the extent that the 
typologies of self-reference introduced here maintain a clear division 
between the phenomena to which he refers. The thesis of auto- 
nomization through hypercyclical linkage also allows us empirically 
to identify critical threshold values — at least with the same degree 
of precision as Hart’s theory of ‘secondary rules’ or Bohannan’s 
concept of the ‘double institutionalization of norms’.55
If we apply the idea of the hypercycle to law, we see that legal 
autonomy develops in three phases (see figure 1). In the initial phase 
of ‘socially diffuse law’, the elements, structures, processes, and 
boundaries of legal discourse are identical to those of general social
52 Rottleuthner, 1987, pp. 112ff, 119 ff.
53 e.g. Luhmann, 1981d, p. 99; 1985b, pp. 113 ff.; 1987e, pp. 19 ff.
54 Rottleuthner, 1987, p. 113.
55 H. Hart, 1961, p. 77; Bohannan, 1968, p. 73.
Law — A Hy 37
CO
1 §
s | - a
. { “ E 0 = 0  
0 . 0  0
%






















S I S  
W 8E
F/g. 1. Self-reference and hypercycle in law.
communication — or, at least, are heteronomously determined by 
social communication. Law enters the ‘partially autonomous’ phase 
when the legal discourse begins to define its own components and 
use them operatively. Law only becomes ‘autopoietic’ when the 
components of the legal system are linked together in a hypercycle.
It is tempting to apply this model to legal history and legal
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ethnology and to test its applicability to legal evolution.56 It is 
perhaps even more interesting to apply it, within the framework of a 
‘pluralist concept of law’,57 to an examination of contemporary 
phenomena of a socially diffuse law -  for example, in conflict 
regulation within groups or organizations. It can also give us an 
insight into present-day forms of partially autonomous law -  for 
example, international law, the lex mercatoria, or the internal laws 
of international organizations.
‘Socially diffuse law’ is, by definition, hard to differentiate from 
other norm-oriented social communications, such as co-ordination 
by means of social norms or unspecified forms of conflict resolution. 
Not every institutionalized conflict resolution should be identified 
with law.58 In particular, the ending of conflict by suppression, 
enforcement on the basis of power, arbitration, or compromise is 
still a non-legal form of conflict resolution. One can speak of law 
only in a rudimentary sense when (1) conflicts are defined as a 
divergence of expectations that calls for a decision and (2) this 
conflict of expectation is resolved by using the distinction between 
legal and illegal. Archaic forms of law are not the only examples of 
this: the phenomenon of ‘indigenous law’59 in family or group 
conflicts, very much a feature of contemporary society, should also 
be taken into consideration. If family or group disputes are resolved 
by testing the controversial behaviour against group norms and 
describing it as legal or illegal accordingly, we are dealing with 
genuine legal processes. This is the case even when such rudimentary 
legal orders are independent of official law, or, as in the case of the 
Mafia, downright illegal.
However, this type of law is still produced by reference to external 
factors. For expectations are essentially based on social norms which 
are shaped not in the context of conflict resolution but in the quite 
different context of the co-ordination of behaviour.60 One cannot 
yet speak of a legal system in the strict sense, since legal actions are 
identical with general social actions, as are legal norms with social 
norms and legal processes with the general processes of conflict 
resolution.
The critical threshold of ‘partially autonomous law’ is reached 
when one or more of the components of the legal system become
56 Cf. Wesel, 1985; Watson, 1985.
57 e.g. Galanter, 1981; Cotterell, 1983; Griffiths, 1986; Santos, 1987.
58 Cf. Wesel, 1985, pp. 52 ff.
59 Galanter, 1981, pp. 161 ff.
60 Cf. Geiger, 1964, pp. 48 ff.
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independent through self-description and self-constitution. The best- 
known example of legal self-description is Hart’s idea of ‘secondary 
rules’.61 According to Hart, we can speak of law only if the primary 
rules of conduct are overlaid and regulated by secondary rules 
of identification and procedure. For Hart, ‘the heart of a legal 
system . . .  [is] the structure which has resulted from the combination 
of primary rules of obligation with the secondary rules of recog­
nition, change and adjudication.’62 In our terms, legal communi­
cations arise which deal with legal communications — ‘le droit du 
droif.63 They form structures which regulate the selection of other 
structures. However, according to our view, the mechanism of 
secondary rules cannot be equated with legal autopoiesis. The law 
does not yet reproduce itself entirely. ‘Secondary rules’ constitute 
only one of many self-referential circles which takes the form of the 
self-description of legal structures.
‘Secondary rules’ thus mark an important stage in the develop­
ment towards a partially autonomous law. However, from our point 
of view they provide an incomplete picture of self-referential rela­
tionships. For similar self-referential operations are possible in 
relation to other components of the law. These include the con­
ceptualization of elements of the law, the legalization of processes, 
the legal definition of the categories of legal and illegal, and the 
description in legal categories of the world outside law. As we have 
said already, all this is merely self-description; it cannot be described 
as self-constitution, and certainly not as second-order autopoiesis.
As we saw in section III, the components of the legal system can 
be said to be self-constituting only if the self-descriptions are in fact 
used to regulate communications in law.64 As we said above, con­
structing secondary rules or demanding their implementation (self­
description) is one thing, but actually using them in the decision­
making process (self-constitution) is quite another. In modern law, 
the distinction between self-description and self-constitution is 
institutionalized in the separation of legal doctrine, as pursued in the 
law schools, and adjudicatory and legislative practice, which applies 
or rejects these self-descriptions. Being quoted by the Federal 
Supreme Court, the highest accolade of the German law professor,
61 H. Hart, 1961, pp. 77 ff.; cf. also Bohannan’s (1968) concept of law; Nonet and 
Selznick, 1978, pp. 10 ff.; Galanter, 1981, pp. 162 ff.
62 H. Hart, 1961, p. 95.
63 Ewald, 1987.
64 Cf. Deggau, 1987a.
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marks the transition from mere self-description to self-constitution 
in the legal system.
It might be worth differentiating between legal systems according 
to the extent that, if at all, they can be said to be self-constituting. It 
is particularly important to differentiate them according to the 
components of the system to which they relate. It should be no more 
difficult to identify them empirically65 than to describe legal systems 
in which secondary rules are already in operation.66
As has often been pointed out, one consequence of the fact that 
law is self-constituting is that legal rules begin to take on a ‘life of 
their own’. They no longer appear as (legal) means to a (social) end, 
but as an end in themselves. As Alan Watson points out in The 
Evolution o f Law , it seems as if the law begins to lead a life of its 
own and stops merely being a reflex of other aspects of society.67 
Legal rules become a kind of shorthand for underlying social values. 
At the same time, however, they begin to free themselves from 
these values. As a result, the relationship between law and society 
becomes more tenuous. Law does not always adequately reflect 
social needs and values. As Watson points out, it is always possible 
to situate legal provisions in a completely different social context. 
He explains this by reference to the role of legal elites, legal culture, 
and the legal consciousness of jurists. However, professionalism is of 
minor importance compared with the structural phenomenon of 
self-reference in law. The fact that legal standards appear to have a 
life of their own can be explained by the relation between self­
reference and formality. If legal norms are constituted in the manner 
described above, they become ‘formal’ in the sense that references to 
the social environment are eliminated in favour of exclusive self­
reference.68
Even if legal systems are to some degree self-generating, they are 
still not autopoietic in Maturana’s sense of the term. They do not 
generate new elements through their existing elements and net­
works. Legal autopoiesis can arise only if the self-referential circles 
referred to above are constituted so as to link together in a self- 
reproductive hypercycle. Once again, we can explain this by reference 
to secondary rules. Legal techniques of norm identification may take 
their criteria from very different sources. These include religious 
texts, divine revelations, true cognitions of nature, long-established
65 See Rottleuthner, 1987, p. 113.
66 Cf. H. Hart, 1961, pp. 91 ff.
67 Watson, 1985, pp. 67 ff., 119.
68 On this concept of formality, cf. Luhmann, 1987e, p. 23.
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tradition, group-specific usages, or the straightforward exercise of 
power. This is an obvious case of the legal self-constitution of 
norms; but it is not yet autopoiesis in the full sense of the word. It is 
the legal system itself which uses ‘secondary rules’ to establish and 
use the criteria, even if the ‘substance’ of the rules is determined by 
outside agents.69 The way in which the legal order refers to social 
norms in general clauses is an excellent example of this.70 Unlike 
socially diffuse law, social norms are not simply legal norms. It 
requires a secondary rule from either a legislator or a judge to make 
it possible for some social norms to become legal norms.
There is one particular instance of self-constitution which is of 
interest to us here. This occurs when the rules for the recognition of 
norms are constituted in such a way that they do not refer to extra- 
legal sources, but to internal components of the legal system. Law 
becomes autopoietic when its self-descriptions develop a theory of 
legal sources in which norms can be generated by precedents or 
other processes of law creation internal to the law itself. Legal 
norms are thus defined by reference to legal acts; that is, legal 
components are produced by legal components. This is what nor­
mally happens in modern ‘positive’ law.71 In positive law, legal 
norms can be produced only by way of precisely defined legal acts, 
be they statutes, decrees, or intra-organizational acts. Nowadays, 
even customary law must be seen as judge-made law, since it has to 
go through a ‘constitutive’ (not merely a ‘declaratory’) legal act if it 
is to count as positive law.72
In some respects the key to autopoiesis lies in self-description, as 
it is this which determines the actual course of the reproduction 
process.73 This does not mean that self-description follows self­
reproduction precisely. They overlap to the extent that self-descrip­
tion directs self-reproduction even if that direction is not ‘recognized’ 
conceptually. A familiar example of this is the production of law 
from subjective rights whose subjects have disappeared, leaving the 
law to refer to itself.74
What has just been said about legal structures (legal norms) 
applies equally to other components of the legal system (elements, 
processes, boundaries, and so on). Legal acts, the elements of a legal
69 H. Hart, 1961, p. 92.
70 See Teubner, 1971, 1982.
71 Luhmann, 1985c, ch. 4; Dreier, 1983, pp. 419 ff.
72 Cf. Esser, 1967; Freitag, 1976, pp. 103 ff., 169 ff.
73 Ladeur, 1987b.
74 Luhmann, 198Id, pp. 96 ff.
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system, must then be constituted so as to be capable of producing 
legal norms in a manner appropriate for autopoiesis. But this is 
not self-evident. Legal acts can also be defined in other ways: for 
example, as behaviour which is subject to the law, as opposed to 
‘law-free zones’, such as social acts, acts of sovereignty, and extra­
territorial acts. These legal acts are self-constituted elements of the 
system. They are not, however, linked to other components of the 
system in a hypercycle. This only comes about when such acts which 
bring about a real change in the law are seen as elementary oper­
ations of the law.75 Only then can elements be said to produce 
structures.
This hypercyclical linking of element and structure as the recip­
rocal production of legal act and legal norm seems to be the hall­
mark of modern law. Ladeur, for instance, speaks of a ‘looping 
together’ of the levels of action and norm.76 The circular relation­
ship of rule and decision is at the heart of positive law.77 Statute law 
acquires validity only through the judge’s act, the validity of which 
can in turn be established only by reference to a statute.78 The 
same applies to the other components of the system, particularly 
dogmatics and process. Both must be made to refer to legal acts on 
the one hand and legal norms on the other. If one looks at it more 
closely, neither legal process nor legal dogmatics is directly linked to 
the other components of the system. It is the relationship between 
the components that provides the link. Process and dogmatics are 
linked to the relationship between norm and decision. They regulate 
the way in which the law reproduces itself. It is only when the 
system has created the necessary conditions for hypercyclical linking 
by describing and producing its own components that the actual 
autopoiesis of law can begin. Legal communications generate 
themselves through the network of legal expectations, and are 
regulated by legal dogmatics and legal process.
V
This view of legal autonomy has far-reaching consequences for 
the four basic categories used here: action, norm, process, and
75 Luhmann, 1987e, p. 17.
76 Ladeur, 1987b, pp. 265 ff.
77 See esp. Esser, 1956a, pp. 123 ff., 253 ff.; 1970, pp. 71 ff.
78 See also Fikentscher’s ‘case norm’ (1977, pp. 202 ff.).
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dogmatics. At this point we shall concern ourselves merely with the 
consequences for a legal concept of action. If actions represent self­
descriptions of communications which make it possible for com­
munication systems to reproduce themselves, then concepts of action 
must be seen as a system-relative construct. It is not an outside 
observer who defines the concept of action but the system itself. 
There is thus no universally valid concept of action, whether of a 
philosophical, sociological, or purely practical nature. It is also true 
that no one system-relative concept of action is superior to another. 
This means that it is impossible to interpret action as a phenomenon 
which unfolds over time and can be directly observed scientifically. 
Instead, we are dealing with a self-simplification of the system which 
can, however, then be reconstructed by an outside observer. Never­
theless, concepts of action are not arbitrary. They have to be suited 
to autopoiesis; that is, they have to be adapted, as self-descriptions, 
to describing the elementary operations which are responsible for 
the closure and reproduction of the system.
Even if there is no universally valid concept of action, it is still 
possible to formulate a general theory which can analyse the func­
tion of system-specific constructs of action. Such a theory would 
have to work out the relationship between communication, action, 
and self-reproduction.
Can this help us explain system-relative, as well as legal, concepts 
of action? It appears that it can, but only by confirming the system- 
relativity and autonomy of the various concepts of action. It can 
also do it in a positive way by stating the abstract conditions which 
must be fulfilled for a system to develop an operatively successful 
concept of action. In general the conditions are such that the action 
must represent a self-description which is suited to specific auto­
poiesis of the focal system. If, therefore, a new concept of action is 
put forward in a subsystem, either as a result of internal reflection or 
as the result of an external proposition, then it only makes sense to 
accept it if the following criteria are fulfilled: (a) as a self-description 
it must make further self-descriptions possible; (b) it must be 
capable of avoiding paradoxes if it is to avoid getting into a ‘vicious 
circle’ ; (c) it must make use of the guiding distinction in the system 
and not use any others, for otherwise it would not be capable of 
autopoiesis; (d) it can, as it were, incorporate other guiding dis­
tinctions as subcategories. These must, however, all refer back to the 
original guiding distinction. This means that a legal concept of 
action must always be made to fit the code legal/illegal. It can 
absorb elements of other concepts of action -  for example, psy-
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chological, philosophical, or sociological ones -  but these must not 
impair the capacity to make a decision according to the criterion of 
the legality or illegality of an action. A completely deterministic 
concept of action is thus inadmissible in law, since this would mean 
that the individual was no longer judged fit to choose freely. It 
would therefore no longer be possible to determine whether this 
behaviour was lawful or not. Finally (e) the concept of action must 
in some way meet the needs of the social environment to which it 
applies. It must, however imperfectly, take into account the func­
tional requirements of other systems. One example of this is the 
change in the legal ascription of guilt from a subjective, individ­
ualistic concept to a more standardized, objective one which has 
regard only to objective states of affairs. The effect of this is that 
individualized elements of liability become more and more like 
objectivized role descriptions.
We have gone into the consequences of the theory of autopoiesis 
for a legal concept of action in order to draw attention to an 
important consequence of the paradigmatic change in systems 
theory. Abstract legal thought, dogmatics, and construction as self­
descriptions of the legal system have to become central to legal- 
sociological analyses in a way that would have appeared impossible 
in the wake of sociological disillusionment over law, be it in the 
tradition of ideological critique, that of legal realism, or in the ‘law 
and society movement’. Sociological enlightenment -  does this mean 
today that constructivist jurisprudence is dead -  long live con­
structivist jurisprudence?
VI
But where is the individual in all this? Does the legal hypercycle not 
mean that law is dehumanized?79 ‘No subject, no reason’?80 Is 
Frankenberg right in claiming that the hypercycle is ‘as postmodern 
as the neutron bomb which eliminates the subject while leaving 
everything else as it was’ ?81 Frankenberg can take comfort and lay 
down his arms. He is so blinded by systems theory that he fails to 
notice that it is reinstating the autonomy of the individual. Despite
79 Cf. Griinberger, 1987.
80 Podak, 1984, p. 734.
81 Frankenberg, 1989, p. 336.
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the rumours of the destruction of the individual, ‘the autopoiesis of 
consciousness’82 is a radical attempt to reformulate the individual’s 
consciousness and his capacity for self-reflection in a system-theor­
etical way. The objection that systems theory marginalizes the 
human individual for society, that it treats individuals as ‘blind 
agents’, as ‘dolls, without which the game could not go on’,83 is 
without foundation. On the contrary, the human subject which is 
consigned to the social environment involves society to a consid­
erable extent. On the one hand, the social constructs of ‘persons’ are 
absolutely essential for society to be able to constitute actions from 
communications by means of self-observation. On the other hand, 
the social system is disturbed by turbulent psychic systems by means 
of operative and structural coupling.
Autopoiesis thus breathes new life into the individual. Yet its real 
contribution lies elsewhere. It breaks up the unity of the individual 
and society, and makes us view human thought and social com­
munication as autonomous processes which reproduce themselves 
according to a logic of their own. These processes are linked in 
three ways: through reciprocal observation, interpenetration,
and co-evolution. Despite premature reports to the contrary, the 
autonomous reflecting subject is still with us. It has certainly not 
been deconstructed, merely decentred. In its unique position it is 
threatened by communicating social systems, law among them, 
which have at their disposal independent (communicative) mech­
anisms for understanding the world and for self-reflection. Herein 
lies one of the most important innovations of systems theory, one 
which makes it so relevant, particularly for law. Law is not identical 
with the sum of lawyers’ consciousnesses. Rather, it is the product 
of an emergent reality, the inner dynamics of legal communications.
Legal norms are not psychic phenomena. Nor are they social- 
psychological phenomena in the sense that they represent an aggre­
gation of individual preferences or a consensus of actors. They are 
autonomous social phenomena, the reality of which resides in the 
mere fact that they are communicated. ‘Legal reality’ is not that part 
of social reality which relates to law. Nor is it a reflection of how 
lawyers view the world. Rather, it is the construction of a world as 
it comes into existence through the specific limitations (and specific 
opportunities) of legal communication. ‘Legal reality’ is to be dis­
tinguished from the lawyers’ view of the world in two ways. It is a
82 Luhmann, 1985a, p. 402.
83 Blanke, 1987, p. 162.
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social, not a psychic construct; that is, it is the product of com­
munications. And among social constructs, it is a highly selective 
one, since it has come into existence within an autonomous social 




If we understand legal autopoiesis as hypercyclical self-closure, what 
does this mean for the evolution of law? The unfolding of an inner 
logic of development? Is the development of law an exclusively 
internal process? Is it appropriate to view it as dependent on social 
conditions if changes in the law proceed only on a circular, self- 
referential, closed basis?
Before we attempt to answer these questions, we should clear up 
some misunderstandings about the concept of legal evolution as it 
stands today. In recent years evolutionary theories have increasingly 
been used to explain legal developments.1 This has engendered 
criticism, and provoked misunderstandings which prevent the 
concept of evolution being applied to legal phenomena in a fruitful 
way.2 The root cause of these misunderstandings lies in the mean­
ings imposed upon the concept of evolution since the nineteenth 
century. The misunderstandings relate to its normative-analytical 
status, the range of phenomena which it explains, and the con­
ceptual models therein. In my view, we can only rid the concept of 
evolution of its burdens by making more realistic claims about what 
it can and cannot do.
The fiercest criticism is reserved for the controversial issue of
1 Luhmann, 1970, 1985c, ch. 3; Hayek, 1973; 1979, pp. 167ff.; Eder, 1976, 
1978, 1985, 1986; Habermas, 1976, pp. 144 ff.; 1984, ch. 2, sect. 4; 1987, ch. 8, 
sect. 2; Unger, 1976; Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977; Goodman, 1978; Nonet and 
Selznick, 1978; Briiggemeier, 1980, 1982b; Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980; 
Tugendhat, 1980; Hirshleifer, 1982; Zemen, 1983; Watson, 1985; Wesel, 1985; 
Vanberg, 1986, pp. 75 ff.; Hotter, 1989b.
2 See e.g. Friedman, 1975, Blankenburg, 1984; Gordon, 1984; Rottleuthner, 
1986a,b; Tonnies, 1987.
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normative implications. According to Blankenburg, the develop­
mental logic, phasing, and conceptual models of legal developments 
are haunted by the ‘spectre of evolutionism’.3 This threatens the 
clear division between empirically based theory and normative 
projections. Nevertheless, there is more to it than the simple op­
position between theory and practice. It is not simply practical 
orientation versus a purely theoretical construct: both these come 
into play, although not at the same time. It depends on the context, 
be it social-scientific analysis or reflections in legal theory.
In any case we must distinguish between the various elements of 
the old concept of evolution. Organic growth, progress, natural 
causation, necessity, universality, irreversibility, unilinearity, and 
directionality must be separated from the analytical core of evo­
lutionary theory. The distinction between ‘evolutionist’ and ‘evo­
lutionary’ highlights the nature of the problem.4 ‘Evolutionist’ 
concepts, in which a particular direction is attributed to processes 
of change, such as progress, logic of development, and perfection, 
are not under discussion here. Doubts have been expressed about 
such evolutionist concepts, particularly as regards their unexplained 
normative-analytical status.5 However, ‘evolutionary’ concepts, 
which are based on the mechanisms of development rather than its 
direction, give less cause for concern. I am referring here to filter or 
trial-and-error mechanisms.
Evolution is not unequivocally goal-oriented, it is merely ‘teleonomic’, 
i.e. it continues to build upon the established system according to 
particular rules or laws. It recombines successful programmes and 
eliminates unsuccessful ones. Although this development is irre­
versible, it does not lead to a state that is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than 
its predecessor. Nor does it guarantee greater viability or security, 
more ‘good fortune’ or ‘consciousness’. In this sense evolution is not 
‘evolutionist’, i.e. it does not support the eschatological political 
doctrine of evolutionism, according to which mankind, following a 
‘logic of development’, progresses from stage to stage until the ‘goal’ 
or merely the ‘end of history’ is reached.6
It is not ‘evolutionist models’ of law, directed by a mysterious 
normative logic, that we are discussing here, but ‘evolutionary’ ones,
3 Blankenburg, 1984, p. 273.
4 Toulmin, 1972, pp. 321 ff.; van Parijs, 1981, pp. 51 ff.; see also Mayr, 1984; 
Biihl, 1984, p. 303.
5 See Friedman, 1975, pp. 287 ff.
6 Biihl, 1984, p. 303.
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in which the historical development of law is regulated by iden­
tifiable filter mechanisms. It would be rather difficult to ascribe 
‘normative projections’ to such models.7 Claims that theories of 
legal evolution are unable to account for National Socialist law8 are 
also unfounded. For an evolutionary view of legal development, 
‘reprimitivization and mobilization of the masses, merging and 
subjection, catastrophes and cataclysms are the order of the day.’9 
The distinction between ‘evolutionist’ and ‘evolutionary’ makes it 
possible to clarify the question of theory and practice. How legal 
evolution is used depends upon the context, upon whether it is being 
used in the social sciences or in legal theory. Such a refined concept 
of evolution can be used by legal sociologists as a theoretical model 
for explaining the major developmental trends in law. At the same 
time, however, a concept of evolution as a ‘more or less empirical 
theory with a practical purpose’10 can be effectively taken up in 
legal theory in the consideration of ‘strategic legal concepts’. I would 
doubt whether the use of ‘evolutionary’ constructs in legal theory 
strengthens ‘normative projections’. It is more likely that notions 
of ‘blind’ interplay between mechanisms of legal evolution put a 
damper on hopes for legal progress.
I think that a theory of legal evolution has great analytical and 
practical power if it stops claiming to be able to explain individual 
events and concentrates instead on explaining structural patterns.11 
Evolutionary theory is concerned with -  and should be limited to — 
how the filter mechanisms of variation, selection, and stabilization 
interact. Certainly, individual events cannot be predicted by struc­
tural models alone. Additional explanations are necessary in order 
to bridge the gap between structure and events. From the point 
of view of evolutionary theory, these appear accidental. Causal 
analyses of a different kind must come in. A theory of legal evolu­
tion will be able to explain or even predict general structures of the 
law. It will not, however, be able to explain individual legal acts, 
court verdicts, laws, and administrative acts.
Thus, the common criticism of theories of legal evolution that 
they do not help to explain concrete legal phenomena12 misunder­
stands evolutionary explanations by both overestimating and
7 Blankenburg, 1984, p. 284.
8 Rottleuthner, 1986b, p. 225; 1989.
9 Bühl, 1984, p. 319.
10 Rottleuthner, 1986b, p. 222.
11 Hayek, 1967; Luhmann, 1975a, p. 152.
12 Gordon, 1984, p. 81.
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underestimating them. It overestimates their capacity to explain and 
predict singular historical phenomena. At the same time it under­
estimates the value of structural explanations. Explaining structures 
is no less important than explaining events. Both approaches make a 
contribution to scientific debate, and have some bearing on practice.
This puts the critique of what Gordon termed ‘evolutionary 
functionalism’ in law in a somewhat different light. Gordon’s main 
point is that actual developments are reinterpreted as functional 
necessities. Legal forms appear as a necessary response to social 
requirements. However, there is a fundamental misunderstanding 
here. The point about the combination of functional analysis and 
evolutionary theory is that it reconstructs history from the per­
spective of functional equivalents, of possible alternatives. It is 
precisely this modern ‘equivalence functionalism’ that produces the 
awareness of contingency, the consciousness of historical alterna­
tives so urgently demanded by Gordon. Gordon draws attention to 
the submerged ‘humane’ progressive alternatives in order to make 
them available again for political action. That is a commendable 
normative perspective. The question, however, is whether equi­
valence functionalism offers more extensive analytical instruments 
rather than good political intentions do. Elaborating a conceptual 
apparatus which allows comparison and evaluation of various alter­
native solutions to historical problems, other resultant problems, 
and their side-effects seems more likely to be fruitful than lamenting 
over submerged discourses.
In fact, the idea of submerged discourses must be generalized by 
breaking down causal relationships between society and law into 
contingent requirements and contingent solutions to problems. This 
is precisely what modern equivalence functionalism has taken as its 
starting-point. It achieves it by making the solutions to a problem 
functionally equivalent and multifunctional. Furthermore, it must be 
made clear that every solution to a problem can in turn be defined as 
a problem. The choice of problem is contingent. This, however, is 
not a criticism of evolutionary functionalism, but the very basis of it.
Gordon has another criticism of causal models of law and society. 
It has been demonstrated time after time that the social causes and 
effects of law vary considerably, despite the fact that they start from 
similar conditions. Whether one can level this against evolutionary 
functionalism, as Gordon does, seems doubtful, since equivalence 
functionalism is always conscious of contingency. It should certainly 
be seen as an argument, however, for the highly developed autonomy 
of the legal system. Indeed, it is also an argument for the uncon-
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trolled effects which self-reproductive social systems exert on each 
other in their co-evolution.13
In conclusion Gordon asks whether it might not be more appro­
priate to abandon grandiose functionalist explanations and opt for 
more concrete explanations of developments by reference to interest 
groups and their strategies. Systems theory’s response to this is to 
build upon functionalist explanations, rather than abandon them 
entirely. We are dealing with two different levels of analysis. On the 
level of concrete interactions, particularly in the political system, 
legal norms can adequately be explained as the result of power and 
decision-making processes by various interests and interest groups. 
The question then arises as to what extent, if at all, these legal 
norms represent functional solutions to social problems.
II
The next step is to determine which elements of evolutionary theory 
are still relevant today. From the morass of notions of legal pro­
gress, the logic of normative development, the universal history 
of law, and so forth, I should like to single out three key ideas: (1) 
the ‘blind’ interplay between variation, selection, and retention;
(2) the combination of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development;
(3) the co-evolution of law and society and other social subsystems. 
If we set these ideas in the context of autopoiesis, then they can 
make a useful contribution to further analysis.
It is thanks to Campbell that biological analogies of evolution 
have become fruitful for social science. Socio-cultural evolution is 
possible only when the differentiation and interplay of the three 
universal functions of evolution referred to above are guaranteed by 
specific social mechanisms.14 Luhmann took this idea further, and 
applied it to the evolution of law. He suggested that specific legal 
mechanisms should be grafted on to evolutionary functions.15 He 
proposed that in the legal system norms take over the function of 
variation, institutional structures (particularly procedures) that of 
selection, and dogmatic conceptual structures that of retention.
This should free us from the unproductive notion of unilinear 
progress in legal development. More important, it should also 
free us from the legacy of social Darwinism, which has put major
13 For more on this, see sect. II and V.
14 Campbell, 1969, 1970, 1974; cf. also Blute, 1979.
15 Luhmann, 1970; 1985c, ch. 3.
52 Blind Legal Evolution
obstacles in the way of an impartial investigation of evolution.16 
Apart from the normative hypostasizations of evolution in social 
Darwinism, the main difference between it and socio-cultural evo­
lutionism is that the units of evolution are not human individuals 
and their aggregates -  groups, nations, races -  but socio-cultural 
phenomena -  ideas, customs, and forms of organization. ‘Survival of 
the fittest’ is not the selection mechanism for cultural evolution. This 
is an extreme, rather improbable case. The co-existence of a variety 
of viable socio-cultural phenomena represents the normal process of 
evolution.
Socio-cultural theories of evolution must also be clearly distanced 
from socio-biological approaches which have recently gained 
currency in the sociology of law. Socio-biology has stirred up 
controversy by identifying the ‘selfish’ gene, rather than the in­
dividual or the group, as the unit of evolution. This is the basis on 
which it has attempted to explain the development of patterns of 
social behaviour.17 Socio-biologists insist that social evolution is 
biological. They thus fail to take account of the autonomy of social 
systems and their evolution. As we saw in chapter 3, it is the essence 
of social and legal autopoiesis that society and law represent emer­
gent systems of communication. Although these have an organic and 
psychic basis, they are self-referentially closed in their mode of 
operation. Biological evolutionary mechanisms can thus have no 
direct impact on social or legal development. Socio-legal evolution, 
defined as the interplay between variation, selection, and retention, 
can occur only if the corresponding mechanisms have emerged 
within the communicative sphere. The unit of social or legal evo­
lution is neither the human individual nor a grouping of individuals 
nor a ‘selfish’ gene, but society or law itself as a system of com­
munications. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that 
genuine biological evolution and genuine social evolution might 
reciprocally influence each other. However, any such influence can 
be conceived only as a reciprocal relationship between autonomous 
systems which evolve according to their own logic. It is not ‘bio- 
cultural’ evolution in the sense of the biologically determined social 
development described by Bühl.18 What we are talking about here is 
co-evolution. This is defined as the development of autonomous
16 Cf. R. Hofstadter, 1945; Francis, 1981.
17 E. Wilson, 1975, 1978; Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1978; Lumsden and Wilson, 
1981; cf. Meyer, 1982.
18 Bühl, 1984, pp. 305 ff.
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evolutionary mechanisms in closed systems and their reciprocal 
structural coupling.19
It appears as if the concept of evolution has given us more 
problems than we bargained for. For example, the phenomenon of 
‘stasis’20 is hard to interpret from the point of view of evolutionary 
theory. If cultural phenomena like law are exposed to the constant 
pressure of environmental selection, how can we account for the fact 
that certain legal structures remain stable over a long period of time, 
despite the many inducements to change? A similar criticism has 
always been levelled against evolutionary functionalism. How can 
social systems maintain their ‘identity’ in the face of constant 
change?21 We must also ask ourselves how we explain the fact 
that the relationship between social developments and legal devel­
opments is underdetermined. As Gordon rightly points out, ‘Com­
parable social conditions. . .  have generated contrary legal re­
sponses, and comparable social forms have produced contrary social 
effects.’ Moreover, ‘Legal forms and practices don’t shift with every 
realignment of the balance of political power.’22 How can a post- 
Darwinian evolutionism deal with these problems?
Obviously the solution must lie in the fact that social phenomena 
such as law dispose of a higher degree of autonomy in the process of 
evolution than the theory of selective environmental pressures 
suggests. According to this theory, evolution is nothing more than 
a ‘meandering process almost entirely shaped by environmental 
contingencies, rather than insulated from them’.23
One solution considered by Campbell is that the process of 
organization which goes on within the system, the ‘organisational 
“ reality” ’ itself, could determine whether there is stability or 
change. However, he rejects this solution on account of its ‘un­
desirable circularity’. In so doing, he blocks what we will see is the 
most promising solution to the problem of ‘stasis’. This solution 
does not avoid circularity: on the contrary, its whole approach is 
based on it.
It is the autonomy of normative phenomena that leads Habermas 
to suggest a combination of two different models of evolution.24 In 
his view, post-Darwinian theories of social evolution, which are
19 For more on this, see sect. V.
20 See Wake et al., 1983.
21 Habermas, 1971, pp. 147 ff.; 1975, p. 3.
22 Gordon, 1984, pp. 100 ff.
23 Campbell, 1969, p. 70.
24 Habermas, 1976, 1979; 1984, ch. 2, sect. 4; 1987, ch. 8, sect. 2.
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based on the interplay of variation, selection, and retention, are not 
in a position to analyse the moral-normative sphere of society and 
its potential for autonomous development. It is for this reason that 
Habermas supplements the system/environment model of evolu­
tionary functionalism with a model of ‘rational reconstruction’ 
which describes autonomous learning processes in the cultural- 
normative sphere. Following on from the tradition of Piaget and 
Kohlberg, he uses theories of moral development, and translates 
them from an individual to a social context. The ‘evolutionary 
dynamics’ of basic social structures is confronted with an ‘evolu­
tionary logic’ of normative structures of which law is one. The 
consequence of this interplay is a sequence of ‘principles of social 
organisation’ which is irreversible, leads to a structured hierarchy, 
and follows a developmental logic.
An inherent developmental logic in law would in fact solve 
the three problems of socio-cultural evolution discussed above: 
evolutionary stasis, the identity of the evolving legal system, and the 
underdetermined nature of the relationship between society and law. 
However, by introducing the second model of evolution, an inherent 
developmental logic in the normative sphere, we lose the advantages 
of a modern evolutionary theory discussed above. Habermas’s 
model of ‘rational reconstruction’ is essentially a new variant of 
the embryological model of development: ‘The evolution from 
an “ indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent het­
erogeneity” takes place as a result of internal dynamics. . .  as an 
orderly, progressive, goal-directed unfolding.’25 And the question 
of which mechanisms affect the transfer from the development 
of the individual to the development of social morality remains 
unanswered.26
The ‘early’ Luhmann27 resolves the problem of the evolutionary 
autonomy of law in another way. He leaves the basic model of 
variation, selection, and retention unchanged, but enriches it by 
multiplying the system references in which evolutionary mechanisms 
emerge. The three evolutionary mechanisms thus operate ‘endo­
genously’ as well as ‘exogenously’. They work in the interplay of 
rules, institutions, and dogmatics within the law. They also operate 
through analogous mechanisms in other social subsystems which 
influence the law. Socio-legal evolution is thus characterized by the
25 Campbell, 1969, p. 70.
26 Cf. Bühl, 1984, pp. 319 ff.
27 Luhmann, 1970, 1985c.
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interaction between the ‘endogenous’ evolution of the law on the 
one hand and the ‘exogenous’ evolution of the social environment 
on the other. The relative importance of endogenous evolutionary 
mechanisms (norms, procedures, dogmatics) is either increased or 
diminished by certain principles of social organization. In either 
case, these principles influence the internal dynamics of the legal 
system from the outside. The law is thus adapted to the various 
developmental stages of social differentiation. The dominant prin­
ciple of organization in society (segmentation, stratification, func­
tional differentiation) creates distinctive configurations in the legal 
system and, occasionally, specific ‘bottlenecks’ for the development 
of law.
In segmental societies, the problem facing the evolution of 
‘archaic law’ is the production of a sufficient variety of normative 
structures. It is possible to resolve this problem only in stratified 
societies with a differentiated hierarchical order. These are in a 
position to create a greater wealth of norms. However, one of the 
problems which besets the law of ‘pre-modern societies’ is the 
problem of selection. For functionally differentiated societies are 
characterized by a massive overproduction of norms. ‘Positive law’ 
may have got round the problem of selection by institutionalizing 
highly developed legal procedures. However, traditional dogmatic- 
conceptual structures have so far proved insufficient stabilizing 
mechanisms.
The problem with this model of interaction between endogenous 
and exogenous evolution is that it still works with the assumptions 
of open-systems theory. According to this rather over-simple view, 
the evolution of the environment has a direct effect on the legal 
system. As we might expect, therefore, this model offers no solutions 
to the above-mentioned problems of modern evolutionary theory: 
namely, ‘stasis’, system identity, and underdeterminacy.
Ill
Can the theory of autopoiesis solve these problems? As far as 
general evolutionary theory is concerned, some supporters of 
autopoiesis have claimed that it can.28 In their view, autopoiesis has 
a limiting effect on evolution. It defines the boundaries of every 
evolutionary change. ‘Stasis’ and the maintenance of the identity of
28 Roth, 1982; Wake et al., 1983.
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the system are dependent on the autopoiesis of the system: The 
system can undergo any change, provided the circular organisation 
is not interrupted.’29
In the general discussion of autopoiesis, people have become 
aware of the need to revise the concept of evolution under the 
conditions of autopoietic reproduction.30 These authors criticize an 
orthodox neo-Darwinism which understands the developmental 
process as the willingness of an informationally open system to 
respond to the demands made upon it by the environment. Against 
these external pressures, the importance of autopoietic organization 
for evolutionary selection is underlined. By organizing their self­
maintenance, self-reproductive systems define the limits of their 
tolerance of structural change. The most important feature of 
evolution is the maintenance of the system’s internal cyclical struc­
ture, not its ability to adapt to the environment.31
I would like to look further at this argument, and expand upon it 
somewhat. What has been said about selection will now be applied 
to variation and retention. I shall argue that the main impact of 
autopoiesis on law is to transpose the evolutionary functions to 
within the system itself, to internalize the mechanisms for variation, 
selection, and retention jQKis process of internalization shifts the 
dynamic of evolution from the environment into the system itself, 
and subordinates it to the logic of legal autopoiesis. What we are 
witnessing here is a shifting of the balance from ‘external’ social 
mechanisms of evolution towards ‘internal’ legal mechanisms. 
External evolutionary mechanisms can now have only a ‘modu­
lating’ effect on legal developments, as internal structural deter­
minants begin to play a key role in the evolutionary process. Or, to 
put it another way, only an autopoietically closed legal system is 
capable of evolution.
Indeed, it is principally the law’s capacity to evolve, defined as the 
interplay of specifically legal evolutionary mechanisms, that dis­
tinguishes it from the controversial economic theories of legal 
evolution. There are at least two versions of this theory. According 
to Hayek, the processes of variation and selection which charac­
terize cultural evolution guarantee the formation of spontaneous 
orders of appropriate legal rules. This is in sharp contrast to poli­
tical processes, in which rules are arbitrarily selected and imposed
29 Wake et al., 1983.
30 Maturana, 1982, pp. 3 7 ff.; Maturana and Varela, 1988, pp. 103 ff.; Roth, 
1982; Wake et al., 1983.
31 Roth, 1982.
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on a social order in a blatant act of interventionism.32 The second 
version can be viewed as a non-normative, positive version of 
Posner’s question: ‘Is common law efficient?’ According to this view, 
common law tends to result in the establishment of (Pareto) efficient 
legal norms as the inevitable outcome of the conflictual ‘relitigation’ 
process. A non-efficient distribution of property rights will continue 
to produce incentives for relitigation until a state of efficiency is 
reached.33
Both versions systematically underplay the autonomy of the legal 
system, which is equipped with its own evolutionary mechanisms. 
Legal norms are viewed entirely as the outcome of processes of 
economic selection. There is no attempt to deal with mechanisms of 
variation within the law which alter the substance of legal norms; 
nor is any consideration given to how these are selected by legal 
institutions according to their own criteria or to their stabilization 
in legal culture. In Hayek’s case, this leads to a grotesque over­
valuation of traditional customary law and similar ‘spontaneously’ 
formed orders and to a devaluation of political law making as 
‘constructivist’. In the case of Posner’s theorem, it leads to a sys­
tematic failure to note the capacity of the legal system to select 
economic input. If we are to find a way out of thie impasse, we must 
adopt models of the co-evolution of economic and legal processes 
(see section V).
In any case, the autopoietic closure of the legal system means that 
law cannot be seen simply as a product of social evolution as a 
whole. Nor is it possible to locate even one of the three evolutionary 
mechanisms outside it. Models of evolution which lump legal and 
social development together thus are only plausible for the legal 
system in its pre-autopoietic state.
If what autopoiesis means for evolution is the internalization 
of variation, selection, and stabilization, then only in law’s pre- 
autopoietic state are all three functions external to the legal system. 
Any changes in the law are brought about by changes in the social 
environment, particularly by the normative social structures gen­
erated by them. Social norms directly determine the extent to which 
legal norms can vary. The selection process of legal norms is carried 
out in diffuse social contexts. Norms are tried and tested in society, 
and gradually gain social recognition. What brings about the
32 Hayek, 1973; 1979, p. 167; Vanberg, 1986.
33 Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977; Goodman, 1978; Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980; for 
a critical view, see Hirshleifer, 1982, pp. 46 ff.
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retention of legal norms and thus the establishment of a legal 
tradition is a body of ideas widely shared in a society -  world-views, 
myths, dogmas, and ideologies. Any form of legal doctrine must be 
anchored in a wide variety of natural-law ideas.
After the emergence of autopoiesis, internal mechanisms take 
over the evolutionary functions. Legal evolution can be subject to 
external triggers, but it can no longer be directly ‘brought about’ by 
an outside agent. From now on it follows an internal logic of 
development, the logic of legal autopoiesis.
Variation within an autopoietic subsystem can take place only 
within the limits of ‘structural drift’.34 When the legal system is 
autopoietically closed, then Maturana’s ideas apply also to the law, 
so that at any moment of its operations the structure of law as an 
autopoietic system specifies the structural configuration into which it 
will be transformed as a result of structural change. This happens 
irrespective of whether it results from its own internal dynamics or 
from its interaction with the medium.35
Whyte expressed it in a similar way: ‘The conditions of biological 
organisation restrict to a finite discreet spectrum the possible avenues 
of evolutionary change from a given starting point. The nature of 
life limits its variation and is one factor directing phylogeny.’36 
Extra-legal processes can have only a ‘modulating’ effect on the 
production of variety in the law. Events in the outside world do 
not really have much effect on what goes on inside the system. 
Environmental factors act only as triggers for possible change within 
it.37 Social conflicts trigger processes within the law which formu­
late legally specific conflicts of expectations. It is these which are 
ultimately responsible for innovations in the law; but they have little 
in common with the social conflicts of the parties to the dispute. 
Social conflicts are not merely ‘translated’ into legal terminology; 
they are reconstructed as autonomous legal conflicts within the legal 
system. They become conflicts of diverging legal expectations or 
diverging statements of fact. The minor variations which the law 
undergoes from day to day and which make it evolve are thus not 
the direct product of social conflict, but are communicated from 
within the law itself in a form which is unrecognizable to the 
participants. Hence the complaint about the ‘expropriation of 
conflicts’,38 the idealistic demands of the de-legalization move-
34 Maturana and Varela, 1988, ch. 5.
35 Cf. Maturana and Varela, 1980, pp. 102 ff.
36 Whyte, 1965, p. 22.
37 Roth, 1982, p. 42; Willke, 1992.
38 Christie, 1977.
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ment,39 and the calls for ‘alternatives to law’.40 Similarly, in the 
legislative process it is not social interests which produce changes in 
the law; it is only those social pressures which are perceived on the 
screens of the legal system itself that can have this innovatory effect. 
The same applies to the processes of innovation in legal doctrine. 
Here the success of external innovations depends on the extent to 
which they can be formulated in terms of legal doctrine’s ‘criteria of 
relevance’.41
The prime locus of legal selection is also the system itself. Social 
acceptance is no longer the factor governing selection. Legal auto- 
poiesis ensures that this process takes place within the law. Social 
norms can no longer be transplanted directly into the law. An 
autonomous act of selection (for example, a legal standard or 
a judicial decision) is brought into play. It is this which decides 
whether a norm is valid or not. The main criteria for selection are 
whether the innovation fits in with the existing normative structures 
and whether it is compatible with legal autopoiesis (the legal code). 
At this point we can refer back to what was said on legal acts (see 
chapter 3, section V). Of the various claims arising from expecta­
tions which are created within the legal system, only a few are 
accepted as ‘valid’. The only ones which gain acceptance are those 
which are defined as changes in the law by legal acts which have 
themselves been defined within the law. Law itself defines the 
preconditions of a legal act and thus the preconditions of every 
change in the law.
Finally, stabilization mechanisms have to be created within the 
system itself to guarantee the retention of legal norms. They are to a 
diminishing extent embedded in broad social contexts, in the moral, 
political, and religious spheres, and are increasingly generated from 
within the law itself by reference to other rulings on conflict, sets of 
norms, legal principles, and relationships within the system.
IV
It seems to me important, particularly in the context of evolutionary 
stabilization, to incorporate the distinction between ontogenetic 
learning and phylogenetic development in the theory of legal evo­
lution.42 I consider this a useful distinction in a theory of the
39 Abel, 1982.
40 Blankenburg et al., 1980.
41 Cf. Wiethölter, 1986b, p. 53; Heller, 1985, pp. 183 ff.
42 e.g. Maturana and Varela, 1980, pp. 102 ff.; 1988, ch. 5.
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evolution of norms as introduced by Habermas.43 However, I 
believe that the ontogenetic unit must be defined differently. It is not 
the child or human beings themselves in their moral development 
that form the ontogenetic counterpart to social development. 
Rather, it is the individual interaction which makes social experi­
mentation possible. From the point of view of systems theory, 
Habermas’s attempts to relate the various stages of the moral 
development of the child to the development of social norms would 
be seen as a problem of the co-evolution of two systems which 
reciprocally influence each other, a problem which is unrelated to 
the notions of phylogenesis and ontogenesis.
The notions of phylogenesis and ontogenesis are thus applied not 
to the relationship between the individual and society, but to the 
relationship of a single interaction to society as a whole or to social 
subsystems. In law, this distinction is applied to the relation of a 
trial to the whole legal system. The locus of ontogenetic learning is 
in the interaction of the trial itself. There are effective mechanisms 
for variation and selection in the trial. Retention, on the other hand, 
is limited to the short ‘memory’ of the interaction itself. Phylogenetic 
development -  and hence evolution -  occurs only when mechanisms 
of retention intervene at the level of the legal system as a whole or 
at the level of functional subsystems. They ‘bequeath’ what has 
been learned in the process of interaction. A complex transitional 
mechanism needs to be devised to enable insights gained in one trial 
to be applied to legal doctrine, and thus to become part of the 
‘memory’ of the law.
Such an interweaving of episodes is essential if the law is to 
evolve, for it establishes principles of selection which extend beyond 
the individual legal episode. It is responsible for ensuring that 
evolution proceeds from learning.44
Even the individual legal episode represents a differentiated 
system. The individual trial, which is composed of interactions and 
other communications (written procedure), uses the legal code, has a 
procedural history, and develops its own structures. However, it is 
only transitory; it has a beginning and an end. The interweaving of 
transitory episodes provides the individual legal process with the 
necessary legal structures, and makes it possible to skim off the 
normative ‘surplus’ produced in the course of the procedure for 
future use in the legal system.
43 Habermas, 1976, pp. 12 ff.
44 For more on this, see Teubner, 1987b, pp. 432 ff.
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The combination of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development in 
the law -  that is, the interplay of legal culture and the individual 
trial -  must be conceived of as an interlocking of two communi­
cative cycles. Legal process is, as it were, the area in which legal 
hypotheses can be tested. It represents the interface between nor­
mative expectations as mechanisms of variation and legal decisions 
as mechanisms of selection. The second communicative cycle, the 
one concerned with the tradition of legal culture, decides which 
elements will be retained. It is precisely to the circular relationship 
between these two cycles of communication that the concept of 
‘legal validity’ refers. On the one hand, decision making in legal 
process refers back to traditional legal norms which have arisen 
through recursive reference to other decisions taken in particular 
legal transactions. On the other hand, it represents the starting-point 
for new developments in the law within legal culture.
V
Until now, our discussion of autopoiesis has given the impression 
that evolution is internalized in social subsystems, and takes place 
only as an isolated development within autonomous social spheres. 
It would indeed be misleading to exclude the environment from 
evolutionary processes. Autopoietic closure does not mean that the 
system is independent of its environment. Evolution’s relation to the 
environment is not brought about, however, by direct, causal, 
external influence on legal developments. Rather, it evolves through 
processes of co-evolution in which the co-evolving systems exert an 
indirect influence on each other. In co-evolutionary processes it 
is not only the autopoiesis of the legal system which selectively 
influences the development of its own structures. The autopoiesis of 
other social subsystems and that of society itself -  albeit in a much 
more indirect way -  also have an effect on the selection of legal 
changes.
The relationship between phylogenetic and ontogenetic devel­
opment is also of crucial importance for this ‘process symbiosis’.45 
Co-evolution revolves around the individual episode or, in the case 
of law, the individual trial. Social interactions do not as a rule 
participate in the autopoietic cycle of one subsystem only. They
45 Jantsch, 1981, p. 85.
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are involved in a variety of different systems. Expectations of the 
various subsystems coincide, complement, supplement, and conflict 
with each other in the individual trial, the decision-making process 
in a business concern, or the family dispute (see chapter 5, section 
VII below). It is in the individual interaction that it is negotiated, as 
it were, which expectations will succeed. The individual interaction 
determines whether or not elements of the various subsystems are 
compatible. For it is here that it will become clear whether, if at all, 
communication can be reproduced, given the pressures exerted by 
diverse sets of expectations.
The regulatory trilemma, which I have analysed elsewhere, 
becomes apparent in the individual interaction.46 In the absence of 
‘structural coupling’, we are faced with either the disintegration of 
one or other of the subsystems or their mutual indifference. In the 
case of totally divergent expectations, either interaction as a whole 
breaks down or it does not happen at all. Alternatively, individual 
elements of expectation are ruled out as incompatible and irrelevant. 
Thus true disintegration cannot occur at the phylogenetic level, or, 
at least, only in extreme borderline cases. It does occur at the 
ontogenetic level, however. The result is an interesting turn-about: 
what leads to disintegration at the ontogenetic level leads to in­
difference at the phylogenetic level.
Co-evolution can thus be thought of in the following way. Co­
variation is triggered by the impulses to variation which stem from 
the various subsystems. These must pass through the needle’s eye of 
the singular interaction, and can then exert pressure on each other 
for change as parts of the system \yhich reciprocally influence each 
other. Co-selection takes place in the following way: the structures 
which emerge in the course of interaction develop by being exposed 
to the process of selection by various autopoietic systems. Co­
retention occurs in such a way that the expectation which has been 
singled out in the process of interaction has to be fitted into the 
various ‘cultures’, world-views, and dogmatics of different sub­
systems. In the long term the cultures of the various subsystems will 
exert a reciprocal influence on each other. These do not become 
more like each other through direct comparison of world-views 
and engagement in cognitive exchange, but through having to be 
compatible with other expectations in actual interaction. This can 
mean that the world-views in different subsystems are thoroughly 
incompatible on the basis of their cognitive assumptions, but are
46 Teubner, 1987d.
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nevertheless compatible in the consequences of their expectations for 
individual interactions. One example would be the idealistic image 
of the legal subject who has the freedom to choose, on the one 
hand, and the image of a market-regulated economy, on the other. 
Although they do not necessarily share the same cognitive assump­
tions, their expectations have the same consequences: for example, 
contractual freedom and contractual loyalty.
In co-evolution it is often hard to reconcile the various subsystems 
at the level of concrete processes of interaction. It is in the processes 
of interaction that the demands of the various subsystems come into 
conflict. When these problems threaten the very existence of the 
system, they can lead to the conscious introduction of regulatory 
devices which mediate between systems and give fresh impetus to 
the process of co-evolution. What we are dealing with here, then, 
are systems of negotiation which operate between the systems and 
are aimed at reconciling divergent world-views and expectations. 
This brings us to the subject of regulated co-evolution, an issue we 
will deal with in more detail in the next chapter, when we look at 
social regulation through reflexive law.
5
Social Regulation through 
Reflexive Law
Can the regulatory goals of modern law be reconciled with hyper- 
cyclical closure and the ‘blind’ co-evolution of law and society? 
Are Nocke, Rottleuthner, and Tonnies right in thinking that legal 
autopoiesis is an organicist conception of society which is pitted 
against legislative mania, state activism, and constructivist inter­
ventionism?1 Does autopoiesis once again conjure up Savigny’s
* ‘silently operating forces’ which will free us from the feeling that the 
‘pursuit of legislation’ is the ‘vocation of our time’ ?
This would only confirm what critical observers have always 
known when they uncovered the political functions of legal 
autopoiesis in law.2 And protagonists of autopoiesis seem to confirm 
these ideological suspicions. Luhmann and Varela both claim that 
the paradigm change from open systems to autopoietic systems 
brings about shifts in emphasis from design and control to auton-
* omy and sensitivity to the environment. Put more concisely, they 
claim a shift from planning to evolution.3
I have doubts about this discussion of the political functions of 
autopoiesis. Who can decide in advance what political camp makes 
use of which version of autopoiesis and how! There are enough 
. points of contact: for the neo-conservative there is the principle of 
subsidiarity; for the neo-liberal there is self-regulation through the 
. market; for the neo-socialist there is the autonomy of democratized 
social subspheres; and finally there are autonomous networks for 
the neo-ecological theorists. Self-organization is at odds with the
1 Nocke, 1986, p. 378; Rottleuthner, 1987, pp. 112 ff.; Tonnies, 1987, pp. 107ff.
2 Reich, 1984; Nahamowitz, 1985, 1987; Bercusson, 1987; Treves, 1987, pp. 
313 ff.; Dimmel and Noll, 1988; Zolo, 1992.
3 Luhmann, 1992b, Introduction; Varela, 1981a, p. 14; 1981b, p. 36.
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. traditional political co-ordinates of the simple left-right model.4 An 
ideological critique which intends to reveal the theory’s political 
functions frequently falls short of the mark. It underestimates the 
autonomy of theoretical and political discourse, as well as the 
complex relationships between them.
I would like here to analyse the relationship between legal 
autopoiesis and social regulation. This is obviously related to a 
central characteristic of autopoietic systems: the relationship be­
tween closure and openness. We must attempt to shed some light on 
Morin’s enigmatic statement ‘L ’ouvert s’appuye sur le fermé’ as far 
as the legal system is concerned. How is it conceivable that the 
radical closure of legal operations also means its radical openness 
in relation to social facts, political demands, and human needs? 
As Zolo put it: ‘Does the organisational closure imply only the 
circularity of the self-productive process or does one have to postu­
late a sort of cognitive isolation which renders the relation between 
the system and its environment and vice versa non-informative?’5
My tentative answer is that social regulation through law is 
accomplished through the combination of two diverse mechanisms: 
information and interference. They combine operative closure of 
the law with cognitive openness to the environment. On the one 
hand, by generating knowledge within the system itself, law 
produces an ‘autonomous legal reality’. It orients its operations 
according to this, without any real contact with the outside world. 
On the other hand, the law is connected with its social environments 
through mechanisms of interference which operate between systems. 
The ‘coupling’ of the legal system with its actual environment and 
the reciprocal restraints that arise from this are the result of the ! 
overlapping of events, structures, and processes within and outside 
the law.
One way of describing the joint action of the two mechanisms of 
information and interference would be to say that law regulates 
society by regulating itself. This would be a variation on Piaget’s 
well-known aphorism ‘Intelligence organizes the world by organiz­
ing itself’.6 It is the theme of the regulation of others through self­
regulation that will be the main focus of this chapter.
There are two main questions to answer before we start. First of 
all, does autopoiesis help us understand better than previous theories
4 Nocke, 1986; Krohn et al., 1987, p. 458.
5 Zolo, 1992.
6 Piaget, 1976.
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the problems that social autonomy poses for legal regulation? 
Secondly, given the high degree of legal and social autonomy, is the 
legal regulation of society still possible, however indirect, com­
plicated, paradoxical, circular, or contradictory it may be? With 
these questions, I hope to contribute something to the elucidation of 
the new concepts of law that recent debates on the regulatory crisis 
have thrown up. At the moment, these do the rounds under a variety 
of exotic headings, such as post-modern law,7 post-interventionist 
law,8 proceduralized law,9 neo-corporatist law,10 ecological law,11 
mediating law12 -  or, as I have it, reflexive law.13
II
This debate is fraught with misunderstandings, for which I am 
partly responsible. Three misunderstandings tend to cloud the central 
issues. One is a technical legal matter, one concerns legal policy, and 
the third has to do with legal theory.
The term ‘proceduralization’ of law is easily misunderstood from 
a technical-legal point of view. To interpret it as a recommendation 
to a ‘post-interventionist’ legislator to do without substantive legal 
norms and rely exclusively on procedural law instead would be to 
miss the point. Of course there has been procedural regulation at 
many times and in many societies.14 It is also obvious that every act 
of procedural regulation has substantive premisses and consequences. 
Of course pure organizational law has a long tradition. Of course 
pluralistic representative constitutions and ombudsmen within the 
organization are no panacea for all social ills.15 But proceduraliza­
tion can be understood only in the context of its theoretical back­
ground. How does legal rationality respond to a high degree of 
functional differentiation in society? Or, as Wiethölter put it, can we
7 Frankenberg, 1989; Santos, 1987.
8 Brüggemeier and Joerges, 1984.
9 Wiethölter, 1982a,b, 1985, 1986a,b, 1988, 1989; D. Hart, 1984; Günther, 1988; 
Eder, 1986; Maus, 1986, pp. 297 ff.; 1987.
10 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Mayntz, 1983b, 1987; Traxler and Vobruba, 
1987.
11 Ladeur, 1982, 1983, 1984a,b, 1986a, 1987b, 1990.
12 Görlitz and Voigt, 1985.
13 Teubner, 1987d, 1992b.
14 Blankenburg, 1984, p. 280; Treiber, 1985, 1986.
15 Rehbinder, 1992.
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conceive of contemporary law as a basis for ‘ “ rational” practical 
actions under “ system” conditions’ ?16 This is where the core of the 
idea lies, not in the legislator’s commitment to procedural law. 
‘Proceduralization’ is thus less a technical-legal recommendation 
than a reaction to two theoretical developments. First, the theory 
of legal argumentation has lately turned from the ‘systematics 
versus topics’ confrontation to a ‘proceduralized’ conception of 
legal discourse.17 Secondly, in different theoretical contexts, the 
emphasis has been on how much can be achieved by proceduralized 
regulation18 or by planning (decision on the premisses of decision) 
or reflexivity (application of processes to processes).19 Proceduraliza­
tion can be understood as an attempt to bring the two developments 
together. As G. Schmid has pointed out, substantive legal norms 
remain indispensable. It is only that the process of their produc­
tion and justification has to give way to a ‘socially adequate’ 
proceduralization.20
‘Proceduralization’ is easily confused with procedural law, and 
‘materialization’ with material legal norms. For example, Hartmann 
observes a shift in labour conflict from the level of collective bargains 
to the level of firms and an increase in the case-loads of concilia­
tion agencies and labour courts.21 He takes both as evidence that 
that’s the end of reflexive law. In posing the issue as if procedural 
law were the alternative to material law, Hartmann gets it wrong. 
Tendencies towards juridification on a decentralized level are 
certainly not irreconcilable with the concept of reflexive law. The 
question is whether we are dealing with command and control 
regulation through state economic policy or with regulation through 
decentralized mechanisms of self-regulation. In the latter case, the 
law of the state regulates only the contextual conditions. If we look 
at Hartmann’s case-study in this light, we can place it in a line 
of development marking the beginnings of reflexive law. We can 
see decentralizing tendencies right down to the level of the firm, 
activities of conciliation agencies as new collective actors alongside 
others, increased involvement of lawyers in the legal programming 
of decentralized regulation, and at the same time increased case­
loads for labour courts as a result of that same legal programming.
16 Wiethölter, 1985, p. 247.
17 Alexy, 1989; cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987; Eder, 1978, 1986; Tugendhat, 1980; 
Günther, 1988.
18 Simon, 1978, 1983.
19 Luhmann, 1971; 1992b, ch. 11, sect. 9.
20 Wiethölter, 1988, 1989.
21 Hartmann, 1987.
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Ladeur has given an illuminating answer to the question of what 
type of substantive orientation could help us find our way around 
proceduralized legal discourse. At the same time he highlights some 
differences of opinion in the ‘proceduralist’ camp. Ladeur demands 
a ‘proceduralist understanding of the law’, which ‘is not based on 
sound judgement, consensuality, veracity and other primary virtues, 
but on specifically procedural secondary virtues like keeping a 
variety of options open, tolerating a variety of opinions (and not 
reaching a consensus), making a variety of language games mutually 
accessible and guaranteeing interchangeability among them by 
breaking up self-reinforcing discourses’.22
A second misunderstanding concerns legal policy. We can interpret 
the insistence on social autonomy normatively, and read it as a 
policy programme for ensuring social freedom. ‘Reflexive law’ can 
thus be equated with neo-liberal conceptions, strategies of deregula­
tion and pluralist self-regulation.23 Social autonomy, however, is 
first and foremost a cognitive problem for the law. As far as the 
law is concerned, we are dealing with the factual rather than the 
normative dimension of social autonomy. Social autonomy presents 
lawyers or politicians with the problem of knowing what it is they 
are actually trying to regulate. This is so irrespective of whether the 
aim is to unleash market forces through legal policy or subject them 
to political constraints. It also does not depend on whether law is 
used to safeguard the autonomy of alternative movements or impose 
discipline on them. To set it in the Italian context, if one wants to 
fight the Mafia, first of all one has to understand its organizational 
autonomy. So how does law understand the legal reality of autonomy 
in order to be able to regulate it -  in whatever direction? Or, as Buhl 
puts it, ‘Autopoiesis does not mean simply letting things run their 
course. What autopoietic control in fact means is arranging the 
interaction and the systems which are to be controlled and devel­
oped in such a way that they can more or less regulate themselves 
and control each other.’24
The final misunderstanding concerns the theoretical status of 
reflexive law.25 Are we dealing with an analytical theory of the 
developmet of law-in-society? or a normative conception? Should
22 Ladeur, 1986a, p. 273.
23 Macaulay, 1986; Reich, 1984; Nahamowitz, 1985, 1987; Bercusson, 1987; 
Dimmel and Noll, 1988.
24 Buhl, 1987, p. 247.
Ietswaart, 1983, p. 355.25
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legal developments be ‘talked into existence’ ?26 Should the analytic 
theory of evolution be used to guarantee ‘normative projections’ in a 
quasi-scientific way?27 In chapter 4 I have attempted to vindicate the 
contemporary theory of legal evolution. Here my aim is to defend 
the dual character of the idea of reflexive law as both normative 
and analytic. Reflexion in law means both empirical analysis and 
normative evaluation.
This does not mean that every theoretical debate within the legal 
system should be described as reflexive law. The concept needs to be 
qualified through two further limitations. First, we have to evaluate 
the current position of law in a functionally differentiated society. 
Second, we have to consider the operative consequences of such 
evaluation: that is, the way in which the choices made in law are 
oriented towards the self-defined legal identity. We can thus talk of 
reflexive law if, and only if, the legal system identifies itself as an 
autopoietic system in a world of autopoietic systems and faces up 
to the consequences. This highlights the three misunderstandings 
described above. All these approaches tend to focus exclusively on 
minor aspects of the central problem. They fail to give a complete 
picture of how the law deals with its own autopoiesis and with the 
autopoiesis of social subsystems.
Ill
Let us briefly recapitulate the central elements of autopoietic law, 
before going on to look at issues of regulation. Society is under­
stood as a self-regulating system of communication. It is made 
up of acts of communication which generate further communica­
tions. Specialized cycles of communication have developed out of 
the general cycle of social communication. Some have become so 
thoroughly independent that they have to be regarded as second- 
order autopoietic social systems. They have constituted autonomous 
units of communication which, in turn, are self-reproductive. They 
produce their own elements, structures, processes, and boundaries. 
They construct their own environment, and define their own identity. 
The components are self-referentially constituted, and are in turn 
linked with one another by means of a hypercycle. Social subsystems 
are operatively closed, but cognitively open to the environment.
26 Münçh, 1985, p. 23.
27 Blankenburg, 1984.
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The legal system in its present form can be viewed as a second- 
order autopoietic social system. It is constituted by specific com­
munications about legality and illegality which reproduce themselves 
as legal acts by means of legal acts.28 They are regulated by special­
ized legal expectations, and define the boundaries of the system 
through normativity. In its operations the legal system constructs a 
unique environment. This ‘legal reality’ is to be understood in a 
strictly system-relative way as the construction of an internal model 
of the external world. It represents the cognitive openness of the 
operatively closed legal system.29
Other cycles of communication have, like law, also achieved 
autopoietic closure. This is particularly the case with formal 
organizations viewed as operatively closed decision-making cycles30 
and with functional subsystems such as politics and the economy.31 
Here, too, the same relations prevail between self-reproducing 
elements, processes, and structures. Here, too, the systems construct 
their own environment, and once again we find the interplay be­
tween operative closure and cognitive openness.
Coping with this dual autonomy -  the autopoiesis of law and that 
of social subsystems -  sets the agenda for contemporary regulation. 
If autonomy is by definition self-regulation, how, then, is legislation 
as external regulation possible? This would not be so much of a 
problem if the law’s function were only resolving social conflicts. 
For the resolution of conflicts through law can be construed as legal 
self-regulation operating strictly within the system itself. The legal 
system detects the presence of conflict in its social environment with 
its internal sensors (roles, concepts, doctrines). It then reconstructs 
these conflicts in its own terms as conflicts of expectations, process­
ing them through norms, procedures, and doctrines. Finally, it 
produces a binding resolution of the conflict in the form of the ratio 
decidendi to which new legal communications can in turn be linked. 
All this takes place exclusively within the limits of legal communica­
tion as defined by the law itself.
Legislation is thus also to be construed as a process which takes 
place exclusively within the law. The production of norms in the 
strict sense of the word is divorced from judicial procedures of
28 See Luhmann, 1987e; Krawietz, 1984, 1987; Teubner, 1987c; Deggau, 1987a; 
Frey, 1989.
29 See also Dupuy, 1987.
30 Teubner, 1985b, 1986c, 1988a,b; Gomez and Probst, 1985; Luhmann, 1988a; 
Knyphausen, 1988; Clune, 1992; see ch. 7, sect. IV below.
31 Luhmann, 1983, 1984d; Baecker, 1988; Febbrajo and Teubner (eds), 1992.
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conflict resolution, and is subjected to a specialized legal procedure. 
In a legally constituted procedure which culminates in a legally 
defined legislative act, legally relevant information is selected, and 
then brought together into a binding proposition of law.
Difficulties arise when it comes to the enforcement of law’s claims 
in society, when the verdict is to be put into effect. The bailiff can 
no longer conduct his business solely within the confines of the law; 
he must at some stage go out into the big bad world. Things become 
even more difficult when the law is required to move beyond the 
individual case and exert a broader, more systematic influence over 
the environment, when it is required to introduce effective regula­
tion and control. This is precisely what is required of it in modern 
regulatory law.32 If politics specifically uses law as a means of 
control, then the legal system must develop links with social reality. 
But how can it do so if it is caught up in its own circle?
Social autonomy thus becomes a problem for legal regulation 
under the following three conditions:
1 autopoietic closure of the law,
2 autopoietic closure of the regulated subsystem,
3 interventionist claims exercised by the political system which is 
also autopoietically closed.
A truly closed society! There is no way out of the operatively closed 
legal system. Since legal actions always produce only legal actions, 
and normative quality is always conferred only on other acts or 
events, no legal output is conceivable.33 There is no way into 
the operative closure of the regulated subsystems. Organizational 
decisions are produced by organizational decisions, payments by 
payments. Neither can be regulated directly from outside. As von 
Förster put it, there is nothing but ‘order from noise’.34 For society, 
all legislation does is produce noise in the outside world. In response 
to this external disturbance, society changes its own internal order.
To sum up, then: social autonomy as a problem for legislation is 
a relation of twofold circularity. Flow are we to break out of the 
circle of the law through legislation and penetrate the closed circle 
of social worlds?
32 Voigt (ed.), 1980, 1983a,b; Simitis, 1987, pp. 121 ff.; Teubner, 1987d, pp. 
15 ff.; Görlitz and Voigt, 1985.
33 Luhmann, 1986c, pp. 20 ff.; 1991c. 
von Förster, 1981, p. 17.34
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IV
Before we look at regulatory strategies, we must first ask ourselves 
how this highly artificial construct helps us understand the prob­
lem. Does it help us describe the famous ‘regulatory failures’ more 
accurately? Does it help us see them differently from previous dis­
cussion of the obstacles to legislation, law, and social change; the 
regulatory crisis; and the problems of policy implementation?
Normally, the debate in law and sociology treats social autonomy 
as merely the freedom of the individual actor to deviate from the 
legal norm. Recommendations as to what regulatory strategy should 
be adopted are then made accordingly. Lawyers see norms being 
disobeyed and flouted, and react by introducing new norms; dis­
obedience and circumvention of norms is forbidden. Sociologists of 
law deal with the problem of autonomy as it relates to the individual 
by applying a model of the efficacy of the norm: norm, sanction, 
reaction. A classic example is Theodor Geiger, according to whom 
the extent to which a norm is binding is determined by the relation­
ship between conformity to it and the frequency of sanctions imposed 
upon transgression.35 More severe sanctions is the name of the game 
when autonomy, understood as individual defiance of the law, flouts 
legislation. The autonomy of social systems is not dealt with in these 
models.
However, the theme is taken up in the famous formula ‘law in the 
books’ versus ‘law in action’ which has had such an impact on the 
sociology of law.36 These two concepts are in fact related to our 
theme if book-law and action-law are construed as autonomous 
social spheres accessible to one another only through a process of 
mutual observation. But to take book-law seriously goes against the 
grain: ‘DOCTRINE? This is the big liberating move? You’ve got to 
be kidding!’37
Those who attribute ‘regulatory failures’ essentially to political 
power structures and interest constellations come closer to dealing 
with the problem of system autonomy.38 This is certainly a key issue; 
but power in this context is, if anything, merely epiphenomenal. The 
very fact that we are dealing with structural interests which, on the 
basis of system-conditioned power, can develop superior strategies 
for thwarting regulatory law indicates this. If one focuses merely
35 Geiger, 1964, p. 70.
36 Podgorecki, 1984, p. 83.
37 Gordon, 1984, p. 117.
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on power, the structural contradictions are no longer dealt with. 
Accordingly, recommendations for a regulatory counter-strategy 
are thought of in terms of power. These consist of strengthening the 
political power resources of the regulatory agencies and/or the 
opposing power of the interests concerned. But is that all there is to 
it?
Various filter models, contingency theories, and, of course, 
concepts of input and output are directly concerned with system 
autonomy. These deal with the structural contradictions between the 
various social spheres. On the one hand, there are theories about 
the ‘mismatch’ of regulatory structures and regulated structures. 
Selznick, for example, emphasizes the internal dynamics of social 
institutions, which can only be overcome if their ‘opportunity 
structure’ coincides with the ‘conceptual readiness’ of the law.39 
In the debate on regulation, ‘regulatory failures’ are frequently 
attributed to a ‘mismatch’ of regulatory instruments (for example, 
‘command and control’ norms) and the internal logic of the regula­
tory field (for example, an orientation towards economic utility). 
Appropriate regulatory instruments -  for example, transferable 
pollution rights -  are thus also called for.40 ‘Congruence models’ are 
similar. Taking the contingency theory of organization41 as their 
starting-point, these models deal with the congruency of political 
programmes, regulatory instruments, and structures in the fields of 
implementation.42
On the other hand, there are theories which emphasize the 
unavoidable transformation -  or indeed perversion -  of regulatory 
programmes when these impinge upon autonomous social struc­
tures. Podgorecki’s socio-legal hypothesis of the ‘three levels of the 
effectiveness of the law’ is well known in law-and-society circles.43 
According to this, law undergoes a crucial modification as it passes 
through three filters in the system: the global system, the subsystem, 
and the individual psyche. In her model of ‘semi-autonomous social 
fields’, Sally Moore emphasizes the conflict between state laws 
and mechanisms of social control which operate within social
38 Clune, 1983; Reich, 1984; Bercusson, 1987; Dimmel and Noll, 1988, pp. 391 ff.
39 Selznick, 1969, pp. 243 ff; See also Nonet and Selznick, 1978, p. I l l ;  see also 
Ott, 1972.
40 Mitnick, 1980, pp. 337 ff.; Breyer, 1982, p. 161; A. Schmid, 1986; Stewart, 
1988.
41 Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a,b, 1969.
42 Mayntz, 1983a; 1983b, p. 15.
43 Podgorecki, 1967, p. 271; 1984, p. 87.
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subsystems.44 Views that regard law and society as having internal 
logics of their own are similar in approach. These were developed 
in the debate on juridification, and are much more far-reaching 
in content. These theories attribute the pathological effects of 
juridification to the differences in organizational structures, motiva­
tions, and rationalities. The best-known example is Habermas’s 
‘colonization of the life-world’.45 Finally, the input/output models 
developed in the theory of open systems definitely belong in this 
category. According to these models, legal regulatory inputs are 
transformed by autonomous processes of conversion in the regulated 
system.46
V
Despite certain similarities in approach, the autopoiesis model 
differs from the models outlined above in three respects:
(1) The closure is radicalized. The above approaches take for 
granted the possibility of direct intervention. They stress only the 
more or less radical modifications of the regulatory inputs that this 
can bring about. Autopoiesis postulates the operative closure of the 
subsystems. This effectively makes it impossible for one system to
I have anything to do with the autopoiesis of another. The previous, ready assumption that law and social reality are in fact mutually accessible is, for autopoiesis, the key problem. For the theory as­sumes that, although the environment actually exists, it is inaccessible 
to the operations of the system. The system can deal only with its 
own internal construct of the environment.
This has far-reaching consequences. We can no longer see legisla­
tion in terms of input/output models or simply view it as an exchange 
of information between law and society. We must abandon notions 
of linear causality, where legal norms bring about social changes 
directly.47 These can be replaced by notions of an internal circular 
causality, subject to external ‘modulating’ influences, to ‘chocs 
exogènes’.48 We have to change our view of legislation, and cease to
44 Moore, 1973, pp. 720, 722.
45 Habermas, 1985; see also Offe, 1983.
46 Clune, 1983.
47 von Forster, 1984b, 1985.
48 Kerchove and Ost, 1988, p. 151.
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regard it primarily as a transmitter of information to social spheres. 
It is not legislation which creates order in the social subsystems. It is 
the subsystems themselves which deal selectively with legislation and 
arbitrarily use it, to construct their own order. This is what von 
Forster meant by ‘order from noise’ : ‘Thanks to the little demons in 
the box, in the long run only those components of the noise were 
selected which contributed to the increase of order in the system.’49
(2) The autonomy of the system is also qualitatively different. The 
structure and filter models mentioned above are often unclear on a 
vital question. What is it about social autonomy which makes the 
business of legislation so difficult? What do ‘the little demons in the 
box’ actually look like? Are idiosyncratic norms, values, rationalities, 
world-views, ideologies, vested interests, constellations of power, 
material relations of production, or a combination of all of these at 
work?
The autonomy of the regulated social domain has generally been 
understood as self-regulation which could be effected in two ways, 
through normative or non-normative mechanisms. In the autopoiesis 
model, on the other hand, the concept of autonomy takes on a quite 
different meaning. Autonomy is circularity. The narrower definition 
of autopoiesis locates it in the circular self-reproduction of the 
elements.50 On this view of it, the autonomy of the economy consists 
in the self-reproduction of acts of payment, and the autonomy of the 
organization in the self-reproduction of decisions. Another view, 
and one to which I subscribe, locates autonomy in the circularity of 
social self-reference as such. Social autopoiesis is then merely a 
special case of social autonomy. Wherever an operation, process, or 
system impinges upon itself in social reality (either as production or 
as observation), there arises a relation of self-determination which 
cannot be determined from outside. It is precisely this that we define 
as autonomy. Autonomy would be the emergent property, the new 
social quality necessarily arising in every case of social self-reference. 
The autonomy of the economy would then consist not only in the 
self-reproduction of its own elements (payments), but also in the 
self-generation of its own structures (prices), in the orientation of 
payments towards increasing the capacity to pay (profit), and in its 
forms of self-observation (economic theory and economic policy). 
The autonomy of organizations would thus consist not only in the
49
50
von Forster, 1981, p. 17. 
Luhmann, 1991.
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self-reproduction of decisions, but also in the establishment of 
formal and informal structures of organization (expectations), in 
self-limitation through membership (belonging plus being subject 
to rules), in their self-description as collectivities with capacity 
for action (legal persons), and in their corporate self-identification 
(corporate identity).51 As we can see, the little demons we came 
across before — norms, values, ideologies, and so forth, are cropping 
up again -  only this time we can recognize them by their (self- 
referential) horns.
Social autonomy as a problem for legislation is thus to be under­
stood as a question of degree. Here, too, there is no trace of the 
‘inflexible rigidity’ of autopoiesis which Maturana52 and Luhmann53 
rely on when they insist that a woman is either pregnant or she is 
not. Instead, we have to think of social systems as being autonomous 
to varying degrees. Systems of this type present legislation with a 
variety of quite distinct problems. Their nature is determined by the 
extent to which they form self-referential circles in their operations 
and observations.
(3) Finally, the autopoiesis model gives us a clearer indication of 
the nature of the resistance of social autonomy to legislation and 
other interventions from outside. It is not simply a matter, as in 
Sally Moore’s ‘semi-autonomous social fields’, of conflicting social 
and legal norms: ‘ [The small field] can generate rules and customs 
and'symbols internally, but . . .  it is also vulnerable to rules and 
decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by 
which it is surrounded.’54
It is far more a question of the maintenance of circularity, from 
the minor self-referential operation up to the autopoiesis of the 
entire system. This is more than, and different from, the resistance 
of, say, peasants to official legal centralism. Nor is it quite the old 
‘system maintenance’, which, as is well known, cannot cope with the 
problem of death.55 The resistance of social subsystems to attempts 
at external regulation, which is based on their self-referential closure, 
is expressed in two rather different phenomena: (a) in its ‘indifference 
with regard to its environmental adequacy’ and (b) in its ‘immunity 
to the political regulatory measures introduced in response to it’.56
51 Teubner, 1985b, 1986c, 1988a.
52 Maturana, 1982, p. 301.
53 Luhmann, 1991.
54 Moore, 1973, p. 720.
55 Habermas, 1971, p. 151.
56 Rosewitz and Schimank, 1988, p. 301.
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If it is to avoid the disintegration of self-referential relations, the 
resistance of social autonomy must force legislation to develop in 
a way determined by the twofold selectivity of legal and social 
autopoiesis.
We seem now to be somewhat nearer to finding a solution to these 
dilemmas. We have already made it clear that autopoieticists are a 
different breed from regulators, implementers, and other agents of 
change. We have already put a few obstacles in the form of social 
autonomy in the path of legislation. It is now time to show how 
legislation can take these obstacles in its stride by using the concept 
of reflexive law. But we are in for a bitter disappointment. The 
obstacles prove insurmountable. As usual, our only option is to get 
round the issue somehow. Even reflection serves only to make the 
obstacles more clearly visible and, perhaps, to show us a way of 
getting round the difficulty.
My thesis is that the autonomy of social subsystems, which is 
rooted in self-referential relationships, makes them inaccessible to 
direct legislative intervention. Only indirect intervention is possible, 
and this can have negative consequences. I would like to discuss 
feasible forms of indirect intervention under the following headings: 
reciprocal observation, coupling through interference, and com­
munication through organization.
VI
The law imposes a price freeze on the economy. This is normally 
understood as a clear case of the law intervening directly in the 
economy. From the point of view of autopoiesis, however, it is 
merely an act of observation. The law observes the economy through 
a legal ruling on price control. If we look more closely, then what 
was an ambitious piece of external regulation becomes mere self­
observation. Through the device of the price-control norm, the law 
is merely observing its own operations, imagining all the while that 
the economy functions in such and such a way.
This idea of a constructed environment is a well-known feature 
of epistemological constructivism.57 One of the most important
57 Piaget, 1976; von Glasersfeld, 1979, 1981a,b, 1985; Watzlawick, 1976, 1981; 
von Forster, 1981; Maturana, 1982, p. 301; Roth, 1987a; Hejl, 1985; S. Schmidt 
(ed.), 1987.
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and innovative features of this construction is that it is applicable 
not only to cognizing human subjects but to communicative social 
systems as well.58 However, the existence of the environment is not 
solipsistically denied, but presupposed. According to von Forster, 
there is such a thing as an environment, but cognizing systems have 
no direct access to it. They can only ‘observe’ it. Contrary to the 
common-sense view of it, observation is to be understood as a 
process which takes place within the system itself. It does not provide 
access to the reality ‘out there’ ; nor does it lead from outside the 
system to within it.59 Observation means only that a system intro­
duces distinctions into its internal operations and that it indicates 
something on the basis of these distinctions. This applies to every 
system of communication, including the legal system.
If we reconstruct the operations of the law on the basis of con­
structivism, the following picture emerges. Legal communications 
construct ‘legal reality’ in the facts of a legal rule.60 These contain 
distinctions which are specific to the law and which allow it to make 
a distinctive indication. In legislative acts the law ‘invents’ its social 
environment. The process of legal subsumption is not one where 
by information is relayed from the environment to the law and 
compared with data already stored there. Instead, a relationship is 
established between two differently structured internal operational 
processes: -  the interpretative processing of the norm, on the one 
hand, and the fact-generating processing of evidence, on the other. 
The law constructs reality according to its own principles precisely 
through this process of establishing evidence and the collection of 
‘hard facts’ under constraint of the rules of evidence. The ‘presence’ 
of a fact is ‘decided’ on the basis of conceptual distinctions, verifica­
tion procedures, and criteria of certainty which are all intrinsic 
to the law. The influence of the external world consists solely in 
triggering these types of internal selection processes.61 Following 
Baudrillard,62 we could say that social reality becomes sublimated; 
it becomes a ‘hyper-reality’ of society, which is reconstructed in legal 
communications.63 Once again we are dealing with ‘order from 
noise’ -  only this time it is society that is making the noise. From the 
moment it is promulgated to the moment it is implemented, our
58 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 12.
59 Richards and von Glasersfeld, 1979, p. 43.
60 Cf. Nerhot, 1987.
61 Cf. Powers, 1973, p. 78, and Richards and von Glasersfeld, 1979, pp. 43 ff.
62 Baudrillard, 1976.
63 Cf. Kreissl, 1987, p. 110.
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price control consists solely in cognitive and normative operations 
which are played out within the law and which cannot be transferred 
to the economy.
It makes no difference if you change systems and then observe 
how price controls work within the economy. Here too there is no 
way in which information can be brought in from the outside world. 
Information is produced within the system itself. There are only 
internal observations in the sense of distinctions and indications 
that are specific to economic communication. Legal norms are 
not considered, as they are in the legal system, in virtue of their 
normative validity. Where they figure at all in economic calcula­
tions, they are treated as items in cost-benefit calculations. It 
is economically rational to make the observance of legal norms 
dependent upon the severity of the sanction and the likelihood of its 
being imposed. State-imposed price freezes are regarded in this way. 
It is hardly surprising that such scant regard is paid to them when a 
sufficient number of actors is involved.
This kind of ‘economistic’ legal consciousness has penetrated 
economic (and legal) theory under the banner of ‘efficient breach of 
contract’64 and ‘optimal sanctions’ :
Managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory 
laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance 
of these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a 
measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to 
the rules: the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition 
that managers not only may, but also should [sic!] violate the rules 
when it is profitable to do so.65
From the constructivist point of view, the interventions of law in the 
economy have to be regarded as reciprocal observations between 
two autonomous, hermetically sealed communication systems. The 
law ‘invents’ an image of the economy, and formulates its norms 
by reference to this image. The economy ‘invents’ an image of the 
law and processes its payment procedures by reference to it. These 
internal models of the outside world can be constantly refined as in 
today’s economic analysis of law.66 However, this procedure does 
not lead from legal conceptions of the economy to the reality of the 
economic system itself.
64 Posner, 1986, ch. 2; Harris and Veljanovski, 1986, pp. 114 f.
65 Easterbrook and Fischel, 1982, p. 1177.
66 Deggau, 1989, p. 125.
80 Social Regulation through Reflexive Law
We can take this refinement of the internal models of the outside 
world further, and move from observation to Verstehen. In the law 
of unfair competition, for example, it has been felt for some time 
that lawyers, and especially judges, should show more ‘understanding’ 
of economic problems. In the United States nowadays, a great deal 
of emphasis is put on the systematic training of federal judges in 
economic analysis. However, Verstehen in a system-theoretical sense 
is a particular form of observation which is characterized by the fact 
that the observing system also reconstructs the self-reference of the 
observed system.67 Thus even Verstehen, understood in this way, 
does not lead out of the cycle of observation, but only deeper and 
deeper into the famous hermeneutic circle. The fact remains that 
information is produced exclusively within the system, and is not 
‘relayed’ from subsystem to subsystem.
Changing perspective to that of an outside observer, we can also 
see that the reciprocal observations of the social systems do not 
vary arbitrarily with respect to each other. Even though there is 
no direct contact between them, they evolve similar patterns of 
variation. The observer can determine the presence or absence of 
the ‘structural coupling’ of legal and economic operations. The 
‘structural coupling’68 of the autopoietic system and its ‘medium’ 
takes place between different empirical domains which are mutually 
inaccessible. As we saw in chapter 4, the law and the regulated 
subsystem can develop only in isolation from each other. This is 
a process over which the legal system has essentially no control. 
This ‘blind’ process of co-evolution is apparently regulated by the 
twofold selectivity of the autopoiesis of the law and that of the 
social system concerned. Legal acts must ‘stand up’ to the autopoiesis 
of both systems. Therein lies their regulatory success.
Can a ‘reflexive’ legislative policy learn anything from this ‘blind’ 
development of two systems engaged in self-observation? Can the 
law adjust to the fact that its regulations are merely self-regulations 
which vary, in some obscure way, with the self-referential opera­
tions of other subsystems? Perhaps we should take a leaf out of 
Lindblom’s book and look at regulation in terms of interaction, 
rather than knowledge.69 The prevailing ‘knowledge strategy’ is that 
if there are any doubts as to the social adequacy of law in relation 
to the regulated field, then the ‘mechanism’ must be made ‘more
67 Luhmann, 1986d, pp. 79 ff.
68 Maturana, 1982, p. 20.
Lindblom and Cohen, 1979, p. 58.69
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intelligent’.70 The law must improve its knowledge of the processes, 
functions, and structures within the field of regulation. It must 
develop scientifically grounded models of the surrounding systems, 
and tailor its norms accordingly. This is the approach adopted by 
sociological jurisprudence or the economic analysis of law.71
However, we have just seen that even a ‘knowledge strategy’ 
cannot step outside the bounds of the legal system. It is, therefore, 
perhaps a better idea to latch on to the process of ‘interaction’ itself, 
to the blind co-variation of legal system and economic system. In 
this way we can seek to influence the mechanisms of co-variation 
through the system’s internal operations. How is this conceivable?
In chapter 4, section III, we looked briefly at a model of the 
evolutionary processes of law and economy that is very popular in 
legal economics. A legal situation which is considered unsatisfactory 
is taken up by economic agents and brought as a lawsuit before 
the courts. This does not in itself determine the decision taken. 
However, the legal decision has repercussions on the economy, and 
sets the process of relitigation in motion. This goes on until we have 
a Pareto optimum of the legal norms formulated in the decisions.72
This evolutionary model is based on grand assumptions, and is 
particularly unrealistic in relation to the rationality of the agents. It 
also pays inadequate attention to the selective mechanisms of the 
legal process (see chapter 4, section III above). Nevertheless, it 
remains helpful for us as a general model. It implies that the legal 
system is, as it were, driven by the disorder outside. The noise of the 
economic agents forces it to make minor modifications in its internal 
order until relative peace is restored. It also implies that the legal 
system can deliberately make itself more sensitive to noise from 
outside. This is not a question of consciously altering law’s concepts 
of the economy, but of exposing these concepts to the evolutionary 
mechanisms of variation.
This becomes clearest in the variation of the conditions of ‘access 
to justice’. Among these are the increase in the number of possible 
types of suit and their extension to particular collective interests and 
to organizations (for example, class and collective actions).73 More 
generally, the opening-up of the two-party adversary procedure to 
collective interests thus appears as a deliberate attempt to influence
70 See Mayntz, 1987, p. 97.
71 Cf. Daintith and Teubner, 1986, p. 3.
72 Priest, 1977; Rubin, 1977; Goodman, 1978; Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980; for 
a critical view, see Hirshleifer, 1982, pp. 46 ff.
73 Cappelletti and Garth, 1978; Feldman, 1988.
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the way in which the law and the regulated subsystem vary along­
side each other. It is not enough to apply this model to a particular 
subsystem like the economy. The way in which the law varies along 
with other subsystems also has to be taken into account. The ‘variety 
pool’ of the legal system in relation to other systems would then also 
have to be increased. An interesting starting-point here would be the 
State’s furtherance of interests which are not protected by strong 
organization. Joerges’s concept of ‘procedural discovery praxis’74 
provides us with an interesting theoretical concept for analysing 
these types of legal mechanisms of variation.
Influencing co-evolutionary processes between systems by deliber­
ately increasing the possibilities for variation within the law is, of 
course, a highly indirect form of regulation. However, it follows 
naturally from the general insight that self-referentially closed 
systems can only regulate other systems by regulating themselves.
VII
Legislation as ‘regulation of others through self-regulation’ seems 
compelling from a constructivist point of view. It leads writers 
inspired by systems theory, such as Bechmann, to ‘suspend’ all 
claims that society can be regulated by law and to treat regulation 
by reflexive law as a contradiction in terms. According to this view, 
law cannot be an instrument of control or regulation for other social 
systems: ‘Systems observe systems, nothing more.’75 Luhmann puts 
the same finding rather more cautionsly.76 There is yet no theoretical 
explanation, he says, of how autopoietic systems, which are essen­
tially self-regulating, can regulate other systems. He traces this prob­
lem back to a ‘dilemma’ facing the theory of self-referentially closed 
systems.77 On the one hand, there can be no access to reality out­
side the system, since the system cannot perform operations in 
the environment. On the other hand, we have to assume that the 
environment, which imposes limits on the system, is not contingent, 
given the rate at which the structure is built up. How are we to 
resolve this dilemma? ‘Order from music?’
Naturally critics seize upon this problem in order to demonstrate
74 Joerges, 1981, 1984, 1986.
75 Bechmann, 1984, pp. 200 ff.
76 Luhmann, 1991.
77 Luhmann, 1987b, p. 338.
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the inability of systems theory to come up with any answers to 
regulatory problems. It can allegedly only conceive of society as a 
group of monads which are indifferent one to another. Unable to 
influence each other directly, they can adapt to each other only 
instrumentally.78 It seems as if systems theory is falling into a trap of 
its own making, and now finds itself caught up in the self-referential 
closure of its own conceptual framework.
We might try to resolve the problem through inter-system rela­
tionships. For example, can we not view neo-corporatist negotiation 
as communications between the major functional subsystems of 
society, politics, the economy, and law? The legal system and 
the economic system both form specialized frontier posts which 
can communicate with each other, thus making law and economy 
mutually accessible.79 However, this does not lead us out of our 
difficulties, for two reasons.
First, it is not feasible to construct the relationships between 
functional subsystems according to the pattern of interaction between 
ego and alter. The legal system and the economic system do not 
as such have the capacity for action. It is a common mistake of 
corporatist and socialist theory to think of functional subsystems of 
society as large formal organizations with the capacity for action. 
In differentiated societies, it is only a section of the functional 
subsystems that is formally organized (for example, firms, political 
bureaucracy, court organization). Vast areas within the func­
tional subsystems are ‘spontaneous’ orders, and hence not formally 
organized spheres of action (for example, the market, the political 
public, and the legal public). This makes it impossible for ‘the’ 
economy, politics, and law to communicate with each other as 
collective agents.80
Secondly, taking this on board and construing inter-system com­
munication through inter-organization communication merely com­
pounds the problem. We now have to deal with not one relationship 
of reciprocal observation between law and economy but five: between 
legal system, legal frontier post, communication system as inter- 
organizational system, frontier post of the economy, and economic 
system. The question remains as to how, despite this increase in 
complexity, these systems of negotiation have proved to be relatively 
successful regulatory mechanisms.81
78 Münch, 1985, p. 27.
79 Hutter, 1989a, pp. 112ff.; 1992.
80 Cf. Schimank, 1985, p. 430.
81 Cf. Marin, 1982; sect. IX below.
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Another way of getting around the problem is by exploiting 
the difference between operative closure and cognitive openness in 
autopoietic systems. After all, do the autopoietic authorities not 
claim that operatively closed systems become open by interacting 
with the ‘medium5?,82 that the legal system is ‘normatively closed5 
and ‘cognitively open5, and that it adjusts to its environment through 
its ‘cognitive quality5?83 Is the economy not closed as a system of 
payment, on the one hand, but open in relation to social demands, 
on the other?84 Can this ‘openness5 not then be used to establish 
direct contact with the environment, allowing external conditions to 
be channelled into the internally determined operational cycles? It 
would then be a question ‘only5 of reconciling the selectivity of the 
various system filters. Regulatory intervention would be possible 
through a ‘transformational grammar5.85
This is a tempting route to take, but in the end it is not possible. 
It leads to contradictions with central assumptions of autopoiesis. 
Organisms draw matter and energy from their environment. They 
thus set up real exchange relationships with it, even if their selection 
is determined by the system. Cognitive systems, on the other hand, 
despite being open to the environment, have no direct contact with 
it.86 Instead of being filtered through cognition, information is 
produced within the system itself.87 As shown above, systems 
of communication, including the legal system, interact only with 
realities of their own creation. All the operations are generated 
within the system itself. This is particularly so in the environmentally 
open dimension of operatively closed autopoietic social systems. Or, 
to put it another way, cognition =  computations of computations 
o f . . . . 88
Luhmann puts forward another solution.89 If information can­
not be obtained from outside the system, then contact has to be 
established through what Maturana described as the ‘medium5 of 
the system. Once again we are starting from a strictly constructivist 
viewpoint. Systems cannot operate upon their environment. On this 
level there is no input and output of structures and no exchange
82 Varela, 1981a, p. 16.
83 Luhmann, 1987e, pp. 19 ff.
84 Luhmann, 1983, 1984d.
85 Willke, 1992.
86 Maturana, 1982, p. 19.
87 Richards and von Glasersfeld, 1979, p. 39.
88 von Forster, 1981, p.296.
89 Luhmann, 1987b, pp. 339 ff.
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relationship with the environment. However, this kind of strict 
constructivism does not exclude the possibility of social systems 
being founded on a ‘materiality continuum’. Indeed, it is pre­
supposed as a basis of system operations. Social systems presuppose 
physical and chemical processes, organic life, and psychic cognitions 
as their materiality continuum. These environments have very real 
contact with the social systems. They exercise massive constraints on 
communication. All social life has to be compatible with them. To 
this extent the environment is not merely an internal construct, but a 
reality capable of affecting things itself.
So far, so good. It becomes a problem only when Luhmann 
also applies the idea of the materiality continuum to the relation­
ship between society and its subsystems. As soon as he does this, 
inconsistencies and contradictions begin to appear in his argument. 
He sees society as part of the materiality continuum of law.90 The 
result is that social communication ‘supports’ legal communication, 
‘furnishes’ it with general structures, particularly language, and 
‘guarantees’ its participation in the social construction of reality.
The parallel between physical/chemical/biological and psychic 
materiality continua and the social ‘substructure’ of the legal system 
holds good only on a superficial level. Social communication pays 
just as little heed to the boundaries of the legal system as do other 
materiality continua. Social, psychic, and organic processes are 
within and outside the law. It is at this point, however, that the 
parallel breaks down. It is inconsistent with the concept of the 
materiality continuum to assume that the system develops com­
ponents (operations, structures) which emerge from the continuum. 
The system and the materiality continuum can have no operations 
or structures in common. This is generally accepted by Luhmann.91 
However, he disregards it when he assumes that in the case of law 
the general social structures (language, construction of reality) are 
‘communicated’ to it.92 This goes against the definition of the general 
relationship between the system and its materiality continuum. 
Obviously, the relationship between law and its social ‘substructure’ 
is of a special kind, and must be conceptualized separately. It cannot 
be subsumed under the general relationship of system to materiality 
continuum.
Is there no way out of these closed circles of (self-)observation? I
90 Ibid., p. 340.
91 Ibid., p. 339.
92 Ibid., p. 340.
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think it is possible to break through this circularity in a way that 
extends beyond the system itself. The key to this lies in a peculiar 
feature in the make-up of second-order autopoietic systems like 
law, politics, and the economy. In my view, this feature has been 
somewhat overlooked in the past. There is a degree of interference 
between homogeneous autopoietic systems which have resulted from 
differentiation of an encompassing autopoietic system. Since law, 
politics, the economy, and other judicial subsystems are the product 
of an internal differentiation process of society, their ‘structural 
coupling’ takes on certain specific qualities which I will deal with 
under the heading of ‘interference’. My suggestion is that it is this 
interference which enables social systems to come into direct contact 
with each other in a way which extends beyond mere observation. 
We must immediately add one qualification to this suggestion, 
however: the advantages of real contact with the social environment 
are gained at the expense of problems of information and motivaton.
In the case of social systems, one must distinguish between their 
contacts with the environment within society and those beyond it. 
The only types of relationships which are possible with the external 
environment, which also includes people, are those of cognitive 
observation described above (and of course ‘structural coupling’ 
with the ominous materiality continua). Social systems communicate 
only about man and nature, not with them. On the other hand, a 
kind of direct contact with the environment within society does 
seem possible. Interference is a bridging mechanism whereby social 
systems get beyond self-observation and link up with each other 
through one and the same communicative event. There are three 
reasons for this. First, they use the same basic stuff, ‘meaning’. 
Second, they all develop their systems on the basis of the same 
elementary operations -  that is, communication. Third, and most 
important, all forms of specialized communication in any social 
subsystem -  interaction, organization, functional subsystem -  are also 
at the same time always forms of general societal communication.
These three reasons constitute the essential differences between 
society and Luhmann’s materiality continua (matter, energy, life) in 
relation to law. They make it clear that society as the substructure of 
specialized subsystems is closely connected with them -  so much so 
that the analogy to the material substructure does not hold. In order 
to avoid misunderstandings, it must be emphasized that this does 
not amount to a retraction of the thesis of operative closure.93
93 Nahamowitz, 1987, pp. 209 ff.
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Interference does not mean that information is conveyed between 
social systems through a straightforward input/output relation. 
Information is generated anew in every social system. In the case of 
interference, however, there is an added dimension. Information is 
generated simultaneously and on the basis of the same communica­
tive event in the subsystem concerned.
To put it more abstractly, higher-order autopoietic systems come 
into existence when an autopoietic system becomes so differentiated 
internally that its components develop their own autonomy in the 
sense of self-referential closure (on the hypercycle; see chapter 
3). The interesting point is that although these subsystems in turn 
constitute emerging elements, these elements are made of the same 
‘stuff’ as first-order autopoietic systems. ‘Emergence’ in the society/ 
subsystem relationship is then quite different from the emergence 
which characterizes the relationship of an autopoietic system to its 
materiality continuum.94 Normally, what emerge as the elements of 
a new autopoietic system are completely new units (for example, 
communications in relation to the biological or psychic base). 
These have nothing in common with the elements of the materiality 
continuum, and are not even partially identical with them. They 
belong to another phenomenological domain. Thus they cannot 
have any structures or any other system components in common. In 
the particular case of social subsystems, new elements do indeed 
emerge, in the form of legal acts, payments, and so forth. Neverthe­
less, they remain essentially social communications. They belong to 
the same phenomenological domain: society. Whereas normally a 
system is closed vis-à-vis its materiality continuum and cannot ‘use’ 
its elements and structures directly, this is not the case here. Social 
subsystems permeate downwards, as it were. It is tempting to use 
the metaphor of one-sided ‘osmosis’ or the philosophical concept of 
‘monistic epiphenomenalism’.95 Social subsystems use the flow of 
social communication, and extract from it special communications 
as new elements. They use social structures (expectations) for the 
construction of legal norms and social constructions of reality for 
the construction of ‘legal reality’. They do not need to create these 
from scratch, merely to imbue them with new meaning. This is what 
was meant by the legal hypercycle; although units of communica­
tion, structures, and processes are constituted anew and linked 
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If this is the case, then it follows that subsystemic and societal 
elements coincide in a single act of communication. In this way 
law and society are still linked together. In social subsystems com­
munications take part in at least two different cycles at once: in 
general social communication and in a separate cycle which forms 
p arto f the social subsystem.
To put it more precisely, every specialized legal communication is 
always at the same time an act of general societal communication. 
Communication consists of the unity of information, utterance, 
and understanding.96 Legal communication differs only in two 
respects. First, the information it transmits relates to the legal/illegal 
distinction. Second, the legal system, drawing on the flow of com­
munication, constitutes the components of its system according to 
criteria that are different from those of society: that is, actions 
which produce changes in the legal situation. This means that one 
and the same act of communication is attached to two different 
cycles, one pertaining to society, the other to law. We can also put it 
as follows: what actually constitutes the act of utterance is the same 
in both law and society, whereas the elements of understanding and 
information vary according to which system the utterance refers to, 
law or society. The process of selection is the same, but the con­
text of selection varies. The meaning of the judicial locution ‘The 
defendant is fined £x’ is, first, that of legal communication. It alters 
the legal situation, and is used as a starting-point for further legal 
communications -  for example, giving notice of appeal. However, it 
is at one and the same time a social communication. It is understood 
differently, perhaps misunderstood; and in a particular social con­
text it can produce the exasperated response ‘I don’t know what 
you’re talking about!’ The mutual interference of systems makes it 
possible not only for them to observe each other but for there to be 
real communicative contact between the system and the life-world.
The mutual interference of systems in the sense described above is 
not the same as interpenetration.97 If it is used in a precise sense, 
rather than on every occasion on which systems overlap,98 then 
the following distinctions can be made. Interfering social systems 
share the same world of meaning. The fact that their elements 
are constituted in a similar way means that they can be coupled 
together. They are not restricted, as are psychic and social systems
96 Luhmann, 1986d, p. 94; 1992b, ch. 4, sect. 2.
97 Cf. Parsons, 1971, pp. 5 ff.; S. Jensen, 1978; Luhmann, 1981a.
Münch, 1980, 1982.98
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with their different basic elements (thoughts and communications), 
to reciprocal observation. Interpenetrating systems present each 
other with a picture of unintelligible complexity, an internal Babel. 
Interfering systems, on the other hand, present each other with a 
degree of order imposed on their elements. This makes the process­
ing of meaning across system boundaries possible in more than a 
metaphorical sense. It should not be understood as the relaying of 
one piece of information, however, but as the linking of independent 
pieces of information through one and the same communicative 
event.
The concept of interference allows us to distinguish at least 
four different types of selective openness to the environment. The 
cognitive openness of operatively closed systems (which is not, in 
fact, openness at all) marks one extreme. Here we have the internal 
construction of an environment unique to the system, with no real 
contact with the world outside (for example, reflections on external 
objects, communication about the non-social environment, and the 
imposing of a legal norm on a state of affairs). The other extreme is 
marked by real exchange processes between the system and its 
environment, which are selected by the system in a variety of ways 
(for example, the way in which the organism absorbs food and 
energy). The interpenetration and interference of systems lie between 
these two poles. In the case of interpenetration, no direct contact is 
possible, since the elements of the system are so different — even 
though they overlap to some extent. With interference, on the other 
hand, direct contact is possible, because the elements are essentially 
similar.
These different types of environmental openness can be explained 
by the ‘ontological’ quality of the relationship between system and 
environment." If the system and its environment are on the same 
‘ontological’ level, then real contact between them is possible. The 
only thing which varies is the degree of selectivity, depending on 
whether we are dealing with an input/output relationship or with 
interference. If they are on different levels, however, then ‘openness’ 
is a matter only of interpenetration or of an entirely internal con­
struction in the system.
We will also have to distinguish between various types of inter­
ference. Event-interference is a phenomenon which Luhmann 
describes as the simultaneous presence of events.100 This makes it
99 Cf. Roth, 1986.
100 Luhmann, 1987b, p. 342.
90 Social Regulation through Reflexive Law
possible for systems to link up immediately, to respond, as it were, 
‘tangentially’, only to go their own way again immediately after they 
have come into contact. We will deal with this in the following 
section. Structural interferences describe the point at which general 
social expectations intersect with legal expectations. Legal expecta­
tions are distinguished by the fact that they have the quality of being 
legally valid. Another important example of structural interference is 
the assumption of social constructions of reality by the law. The 
legal system can, as it were, adopt social constructions of reality for 
its own operations without testing them out first. However, they are 
always there with the proviso that they be reconstituted according to 
the law’s own criteria. An important special case is the ‘overlapping 
membership’ of persons. This can be described as role-interference, a 
mechanism which, as is well-known, is used to resolve many inter­
system conflicts. In conclusion, we can say that the phenomenon of 
interference applies not only to elements, but to all components of 
the system.
VIII
The joy of an interventionist-minded legislator disillusioned with the 
constructivist approach is somewhat muted, however. For he still 
has to consider the implications of system interference as a way of 
influencing systems. What is gained, in terms of direct communica­
tive contact, over mere observation of systems has to be paid for 
with problems of motivation and information in the interfering 
worlds of meaning.
One of the advantages of law is precisely that it dramatically 
increases the probability of a communication being accepted. In the 
legal system, a norm is either valid, or it is not. Intermediate degrees 
of validity are not admissible. The question of the legal validity of 
an expectation is thus unambiguous. But matters are not so clear 
when it comes to the social validity of the simultaneously formed 
social expectation. The social validity of a (legal) norm can be 
a matter of degree. The interference of legal and social norms 
transforms their validity from a question of ‘either-or’ to one of 
‘more or less’. This entitles Geiger101 to speak of a calculus of 
obligation and Blankenburg102 of law as a question of degree. The 
price of interference between law and life-world is thus a loss of
101 Geiger, 1964, pp. 277 ff.
102 Blankenburg, 1980, p. 83.
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motivation. Legal communications reliably motivate only legal com­
munications. It is well known that their capacity to motivate general 
social communication is relatively limited. This has to be reinforced 
by other means of communication, such as moral pressure, persua­
sion as to the rightness of the law, and above all through sanctions, 
the use of power based on force.
The problems of motivation are even greater when the law not 
only colonizes the life-world but expands into other functional 
subsystems or into formal organizations. Then it has to reckon 
with the resistance of system-specific sources of motivation. These, 
although not preventing communication altogether, none the less 
make it extremely unlikely that the message will be accepted. As 
Renate Mayntz points out, ‘Regulation by law cannot in principle 
motivate behaviour which is dependent upon personal initiative, 
innovation and positive commitment.’103 The law has little chance 
of being obeyed when it comes into direct conflict with the profit 
motive. It has no chance at all when bankruptcy threatens the very 
survival of the organization.
Mutatis mutandis, there are corresponding problems with 
information when there is interference between the law and social 
fields. The loss of motivation and of information is a real head­
ache for regulators. According to Bardach and Kagan, ‘site-level 
unreasonableness . . .  arises from an inescapable tension between the 
virtues of equal treatment and accountability required of govern­
ment officials and the opposite virtues of diversity and spontaneity 
that are the essence of our social and economic life.’104 They 
recommend a greater degree of flexibility in order to be able to deal 
with the conflicts of motivation and information in a reasonable 
manner. In short, ‘Going by the book is unreasonable.’ The injunc­
tion to be flexible in the application of law is hardly new. And, for 
all its motivational and informational advantages, it cannot get rid 
of one of the grave disadvantages of interference, unfortunately. It 
has no permanent impact on the structure of the regulated system. It 
always homes in on the individual case, starting from the disjunction 
between structure and event. It is beset with the problem that affects 
all ‘command-and-control’ regulations and that cannot be solved 
merely by advocating greater flexibility. This involves establishing a 
communication link. However, this can be achieved only by means 
outside the system, including power-based sanctions, persuasion, 
moral pressure, an appeal to obey the law, and so on.
103 Mayntz, 1987, p. 98.
104 Bardach and Kagan, 1982, p. 25.
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A much more elegant solution to the same problem is offered by 
the old institutions of contracts and rights. They do not use system 
interference to motivate compliance in the legal environment. On 
the contrary, they avoid the problem of motivation. They can do 
this because they directly produce the interference between law and 
economy. Not two but three actions -  namely, legal, social and 
economic -  coincide in the institutions of contracts and rights. A 
contract is always economic communication, since it is an economic 
transaction; but it is also always a legal action, since it not only 
alters the legal position, but produces new legal norms. At the same 
time, as an exchange, it still remains part of the general social 
communication.
We are not concerned here with contract as an expression of 
classical individual autonomy, in the sense of the contractual freedom 
of the individual. The distinctive feature of contract that concerns us 
is the structural coupling of the law’s autonomy with that of the 
economy. The link between law and economy need not be produced 
ad hoc, as in the case of the bailiff and the regulatory agency. 
Rather, this relationship is produced by the economic processes 
themselves. Admittedly, this is linked with the delegation of substan­
tive law-making power: the will of the parties becomes law. How­
ever, this is only a partial externalization because the society exerts a 
not inconsiderable influence over the non-contractual elements of 
contract.105 By imposing constraints on itself, the economic system 
is at the same time exposing itself to external constraints. This 
mechanism has been deliberately exploited for political and legal 
ends, through the regulation of the non-contractual elements of 
contract, the creation of mandatory contractual rules and exclusive 
types of contract, and the control of contracts of adhesion. Can we 
get any further ‘reflexively’ ?
A similar mechanism is at work in the case of rights. Their 
exercise is at the ‘discretion’ of the legal subject; or, to put it 
more accurately, the application of the law is made dependent 
upon economic processes. But when the logic of the economy has 
triggered the mechanism, it finds itself caught up in the logic of the 
law. This involvement has been used in an attempt to use rights as 
a means to public ends. This has been made possible through the 
idea of the essential two-sidedness of rights, the combination of 
individual and institutional protection, and the harnessing, for the 
public good, of the individual’s autonomy to exercise his rights.106
105 Durkheim, 1933, p. 206.
106 Cf. Raiser, 1963, p. 145.
Social Regulation through Reflexive Law  93
Among the approaches adopted are attempts to use the notion of 
‘abuse of rights’ to redirect the exercise of rights towards social 
responsibility. More interesting are attempts to instrumentalize 
rights directly for regulatory purposes. Subject to certain modifica­
tions, these can exercise some degree of regulatory control. The 
relationship between innovation and imitation, for example, has 
been influenced by the way in which the rights of patent-holders 
have developed, particularly with regard to the duration of the 
right of exclusive use.107 The debate on copyright in the areas of 
computer software and genetic engineering amply demonstrates that 
powerful economic interests are using the law to their own ends. But 
it shows at the same time how the definition of rights creates 
opportunities for both political and legal regulation.
In my view, one can go a little further in both these areas — 
contracts and rights -  by linking observation and interference. Law 
can increase its regulatory interference by developing an ‘option 
policy’ based on the knowledge of the regulated subsystem in its 
capacity as an outside observer.
Unlike ‘command-and-controP regulation, in the cases of both 
contracts and rights, the law can only make certain options avail­
able. One may choose to exercise the option or not. If, however, the 
option is exercised, then one is bound by its conditions. These 
conditions are subject to variation, but only to a limited extent, after 
which the costs of the conditions exceed the benefits of the option. It 
is at this point that the law can learn from economics. Jurists 
should not hesitate in accepting what is offered by the economic 
analysis of law and exploiting it for their own regulatory purposes.109 
One can reject the imperialist claims of the criterion of ‘efficiency’110 
and at the same time use economic knowledge in order to under­
stand what happens when the logic of legal structures and that of 
economic structures impinge upon each other. In particular, it can 
help us learn something about how and to what extent contracts 
and rights are open to political and legal regulation. Allan Schmid’s 
work provides one example of how economic effects are used in 
the formulation of legal norms aimed at the exercise of political 
control.111
If this is extended beyond contracts and rights, then it is possible 
to expand the concept of reflexive law further by implementing an
107 Walz, 1973.
108 Cf. Deggau, 1989, p. 125.
109 Cf. e.g. Schanze, 1986.
110 e.g. Buxbaum, 1984, pp. 539 ff.; 1986, pp. 282 ff
111 A. Schmid, 1986, p. 132.
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‘options policy’. This in effect would mean diminishing the power 
of the law in certain domains and making it abandon its claims 
to comprehensive regulation. Instead, it would merely produce 
optional regulation, which those concerned could use or not, as they 
saw fit.112 What are the consequences of this flexible legal policy 
that can be adapted to a variety of situations? The law is used only 
when it meets social needs, otherwise not. However, to stop taking 
legal rules seriously as authoritative behavioural expectations has 
serious consequences for our understanding of law. The validity of 
legal rules is at the discretion of those who are subject to the law. 
This kind of interpretation appears frequently in legal economics, 
where legal rules are seen merely as a cost factor. Compliance occurs 
only in cases in which what is to be gained is outweighed by the 
costs of the sanctions imposed on forbidden conduct. Indeed, this is 
not only what happens; it is also regarded as entirely correct (for 
example, efficient breach of contract, see section VI above). This 
calls into question the authority of law itself, and to that extent 
undermines the role of the law in securing expectations. We can thus 
no longer proceed on the assumption that the rule or the proposed 
regulation is used to stabilize expectations. Law has to be seen as 
contingent from the outset, not only as to its observance, but even as 
to its validity. In addition, optional law is of no use in the case of 
conflict regulation. Optional law thus fulfils law’s classical functions 
only as far as regulating behaviour is concerned. However, it loses 
law’s role to secure expectations and regulate conflict.
On the other hand, the advantages of optional regulation must 
not be overlooked. If the law — in some domains at least — abandons 
its claim to regulate and contents itself with offering options, then it 
is counting on evolution in the regulated system. If the optional 
regulation is attractive to other systems, it is taken up; if not, it will 
remain a dead letter. The obvious objection, that the law is merely 
preserving the status quo or enabling those who are already powerful 
to become more so, is offset by the fact that optional regulation 
may in turn be conditioned by other mechanisms of intervention. 
We have shown this in our example of contracts and rights. One 
possibility is to offer various regulatory options, but at the same 
time to stipulate that one of these options must be chosen.113 A 
second possibility is to link the options with attractive entitlements.
112 Luhmann, 1992c.
113 As in the proposed EEC directive on joint decision-making models in Europe; 
cf. Abeltshauser, 1990.
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One could couple the granting of privileges to associations with the 
regulation of their internal order;114 for instance, one could intro­
duce limited liability, but only in cases where particular social forms 
and structures are accepted. This is the option currently favoured in 
the law on group enterprises (Bundesgerichtshof 95, 330 -Autokran). 
A third possibility is to link the regulatory impulses which belong 
to different system logics. Thus one can link economic incentives 
to legal regulations by, for example, granting subventions under 
specific legal conditions and obligations.
IX
Let me recapitulate what has been said so far. We started from the 
impossibility of direct legal intervention occasioned by the twofold 
autopoiesis of law and society. We tried to get round this problem 
by looking first to the mutual observation of systems. This process 
ultimately led to the ‘blind’ co-evolution of law and society. This 
could be reflexively strengthened by deliberately influencing the 
internal variation mechanisms of law -  access to justice. Our second 
strategy was to produce communicative contact via interference. 
The drawback, however, is a marked shortfall in information and 
motivation. A legal ‘options policy’ provided us with the opportunity 
to extend this strategy into the domain of reflexive law. In con­
clusion, we shall briefly turn our attention to a third way of getting 
round the problem: coupling through organization.
We have already seen (section VII above) the roundabout way in 
which channels of influence can be created between functional sub­
systems. The major subsystems of society -  politics, law, economy, 
science -  are not, as such, capable of collective action. In order 
to communicate, they need formal organizations with capacity for 
collective action. However, these organizations cannot hope to be 
representative. They lack the capacity to bind politics, the economy, 
or the law. They compensate for this through mechanisms of formal 
organization, which give them some power over their members, and 
through political rhetoric. Formal organizations can, as collec­
tive actors, communicate with each other across the boundaries of 
functional subsystems.115 In this process a system of inter-system
114 Cf. Teubner, 1978, pp. 208 ff.
115 Hutter, 1992.
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relationships emerges, which in turn becomes autonomous. This 
includes discussion groups, collective bargaining, interrogation 
procedures, and concerted action. This interlocking structure 
multiplies — as we have already said — the operatively closed rela­
tionships of mutual observation.
Here, too, the whole thing is based on mechanisms of interference 
which operate in principle in the same way as those between func­
tional subsystem and general societal communications. Formal 
organizations also use communications as elements, in the form of 
organizational decisions. Organizations can be coupled with law 
if organizational decisions coincide, through one and the same 
act, with legal communications. The same is also true of economic 
communications. Admittedly, here, too, there is a considerable loss 
of information and motivation, which has to do with the different 
system contexts.
What makes this roundabout way of looking at it an attractive 
solution, by contrast with ‘command-and-control’ regulation, is 
that it opens up access — albeit indirect access — to the central 
mechanisms of self-regulation. Politics gains access to the central 
control mechanisrfis of firms, trade unions, and interest groups. The 
advantages and disadvantages of regulation through negotiation have 
been described in detail in the literature on neo-corporatism. The 
interpretations and evaluations are numerous and controversial.116 
One interpretation regards neo-corporatist negotiations as the 
mutual adjustment of the constructs of the outside world held by 
the governing bodies of different subsystems. This view rightly 
emphasizes the self-limitation on the potentialities of anyone system 
on account of the working of other systems.117
The role of law in such processes of adjustment is rather limited. 
It is described as ‘procedural regulation’ in the literature on neo­
corporatism.118 As explained in more detail elsewhere,119 it is limited 
to providing forms of organization, procedures, and competences 
for relationships within and between organizations. Here, too, one 
can, to a certain extent, think in terms of reflexive law, when legal 
norms are specifically enlisted to further the presuppositions of these 
systems of negotiation.120 Thus the law on collective bargaining and
116 Cf. Vardaro, 1988.
117 Scharpf, 1979; Willke, 1983; Marin, 1992.
118 Mayntz, 1983a; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; G. Schmid, 1986.
119 Teubner, 1987d.
120 e.g. Baudenbacher, 1985, pp. 69 ff.; 1986.
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co-determination has rightly been viewed as a way of promoting 
systems of negotiation through the law.121
In my view, the institutionalist analyses of neo-corporatism122 
could lead most fruitfully to further research into the development 
of this type of ‘reflexive’ legislative policy. According to Maus, the 
goal of such policy would be ‘to guarantee social autonomy in the 
area of substantive rule-making by granting negotiating positions 
through the law, by a very indirect form of state regulation which 
is simultaneously subject to democratic control and to public 
attention’.123 This would be the new ‘magic formula’ of modern 
law: ‘Find a form of law which leaves the autonomy of social 
discourses undisturbed but which simultaneously encourages them 
reciprocally to take heed of the basic assumptions upon which each 
is based.’124
X
To sum up, information and interference are the two mechanisms /K  
which ensure that operationally closed social systems remain cogni­
tively open. The law produces internal models of the external 
world, against which it orients its operations, through information 
produced internally and not brought in from outside. This informa­
tion consists essentially of the operative facts of legal rules and 
doctrinal theories. Interferences of law and its social environment 
are responsible for the relationship of ‘structural coupling’ between 
them. It is the combination of the two winch makes socfarregulation 
through law possible -  even if, as has been shown in this chapter, 
this takes place in an extremely indirect and rather uncertain way. If 
law becomes ‘reflexive’ in the sense that it orients its norms and 
procedures to a theory of social autonomy and structural coupling, 
it can increase its regulatory potential to a certain extent. How­
ever, despite all ‘reflexivity’, law is still a closed autopoietic system 
operating in a world of closed autopoietic systems. It is impossible 
to break down the barriers which result from this double closure.
This line of thought has been criticized by Renate Mayntz. She 
puts forward the opposing view:
121 e.g. Ronge, 1983; Kettler, 1987.
122 Cf. esp. Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Traxler and Vobruba, 1987.
123 Maus, 1987, p. 404.
124 Blanke, 1988, p. 200.
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The indisputable fact that systems are hard to regulate has less to do 
with the essentially autopoietic character of social subsystems than (1) 
with the particular dynamics of complex societies and (2) with the 
capacity of well-organised fields of regulation to resist. However, it 
is precisely the organised capacity of social actors under certain 
presuppositions which can promote political regulation, as well as 
provide a solution to the very real problems which arise out of the 
fact that society is so complex.125
What appears here as the ‘reversal of the thesis of the greater degree 
of resistance to political regulation of highly-organised fields of 
regulation’126 turns out, on closer examination, to complement, 
rather than oppose, my view. For Mayntz does not maintain that 
there is a positive correlation (under certain presuppositions) between 
the autopoietic closure of a subsystem and the extent to which it can 
be regulated politically. This would be the opposite of the view 
presented above. She claims, rather, that there is a relationship 
between the ‘organised capacity of social actors’ and the capacity 
to be regulated politically. However, this corresponds precisely to 
our third way round the problem of regulation, communication 
through formal organization (see section IX above). In fact, formal 
organization provides political regulation through law with an ideal 
. ‘opportunity structure’. This point, taken up in detail by Selznick,127 
plays an important role in the concept of ‘reflexive law’. Mayntz 
prudently and rightly does not extend this particular ‘legal affinity’ 
which characterizes formal organizations to all (second-order) 
autopoietically closed social systems.
I have no quarrel with Mayntz in so far as she attributes some 
problems of regulation to complex networks and to phenomena 
of organized power. My only disagreement is in respect of the 
autopoietic closure of subsystems as such and their ‘medial 
incompatibility’. Do they represent additional problems for political 
regulation? Mayntz does not think so; and, in my opinion, unjustly 
so. Autopoietic closure is essentially circular, and it is this circularity 
which poses the additional problem for political regulation. One 
cannot see it as mere unintended consequences or impenetrable 
causal processes. Rather, the problem is how to regulate processes of 
circular causality, a problem described above as one of how to exert 
an external influence on ‘non-trivial machines’. If it is true that
125 Mayntz, 1987, p. 106; emphasis original.
126 Ibid., p. 105.
127 Selznick, 1969, pp. 243 ff.
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they are synthetically determined, but not analytically determinable, 
dependent upon the past, but unpredictable,12® how are these types 
of machines to be directed towards a particular goal? Mayntz still 
owes us an answer to this question.
‘Medial incompatibility’ -  that is, the impossibility of translating 
the specific code of one system into another -  should not, according 
to Mayntz, be a problem for regulation, because ‘people speak the 
“ languages” of various subsystems’.129 In fact, Mayntz has touched 
upon one of the most important mechanisms of interference described 
above (under VII). Role-interference makes inter-system com­
munication possible despite operative self-closure. But what does 
this mean for regulation? Mayntz herself attaches great importance 
to understanding regulation as ‘structural change’ as opposed to 
mere ‘ad hoc interventions’. However, the mechanism of role- 
interference which Mayntz describes is incapable of bringing about 
any structural change. It can trigger individual events, but not struc­
tural change. For this reason, interference through multiple member­
ship is a rather weak form of system-interference. Certainly it is 
regarded by some as the ‘stroke of genius of modern social orders’,130 
and is frequently used in ‘interlocking directorships’ and in other 
forms of internalization of external interests (supervisory councils, 
co-determination, works director). However, it allows no structural 
solutions, and therefore necessitates, as Mayntz rightly claims, the 
analysis of the ‘presuppositions and limitations of state action which 
reside in the systemic peculiarity of a regulatory field’.131
128 von Forster, 1984a, 1985.
129 Mayntz, 1987, p. 102.
130 Lutter, 1982, p. 567.
131 Mayntz, 1987, p. 107.
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Intersystemic Law of Conflict
How relevant is all this for legal doctrine? Can doctrine become 
‘reflexive’ in the strict sense of the word, by constructing law as an 
autopoietic system in a world of autopoietic systems? Not by rushing 
headlong into an attempt to ‘sociologize’ law. The self-referential 
character of legal doctrine would prevent the unmediated reception 
of sociological knowledge.1 However, by continually redefining its 
perception of problems, its mode of argumentation, and its style of 
justification and by assimilating them to a new social situation, legal 
doctrine takes on a reflexive character. This situation is best seen 
as a perpetual conflict between the unique internal logic of social 
subsystems. What is at issue here is the way in which legal doctrine 
deals with indeterminacy. I shall argue in this chapter that legal 
indeterminacy is related to conflicts between autonomous social 
subsystems. Legal doctrine seems to respond by developing a new 
‘law of conflict’. Examples will be drawn from the general clauses of 
private law.
I
Legal indeterminacy is as old as the law itself. God has always 
laughed at the fundamental legal paradox that flows into legal 
indeterminacy. However, some types of legal indeterminacy have 
little to do with that paradox or with the mere difference between 
structure and event. Typical modern phemonena in law such as
1 Cf. Teubner, 1982, pp. 96 ff.; Luhmann, 1991c; Heller, 1985, p. 186.
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the balancing of interests, the increased use of general clauses, the 
spread of sociological jurisprudence, legal economics, and other 
developments aimed at making law more ‘scientific’2 are examples. 
They are creating a new, disturbing form of legal indeterminacy.3 
Here we must look to authors like Franz Neumann and Max Weber 
and, in the narrower domain of legal doctrine, to Justus Wilhelm 
Hedemann and Franz Wieacker.4 For Neumann, this new legal 
indeterminacy which manifested itself in the proliferation of gen­
eral clauses, was the result of the development of capitalism into 
monopoly capitalism.5 A calculable formal legal order, as in the 
days of early capitalism, was no longer required: discretionary state 
interventions were now needed to support the self-created order of 
the economy. Max Weber had already identified the economic and 
social interests which were likely to imbue the formal rationality 
of the law with utilitarian, ethical, and political elements.6 Legal 
scholars like Hedemann were alarmed by ‘the flight into general 
clauses’, considering them a ‘softening of the bones of the law’.7 
Wieacker attempted a theoretical definition of the indeterminacy of 
general clauses by appealing to the tradition of judge-made law.8 
This has not so much solved the problem of legal indeterminacy as 
moved it to another level.
Nowadays attempts are being made to get away from the 
backward-looking approach of a ‘logic of decadence’. Instead, the 
goal is to interpret this disturbing new indeterminacy as the begin­
nings of a possible new legal rationality. Here we need mention only 
Wiethölter’s thesis of a new ‘proceduralization’ of law,9 Ladeur’s 
idea of ‘ecological’ law,10 Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s vision of a 
new legal pluralism,11 and Preuss’s view of the law as the ‘institution 
of societal self-mediation’.12
Ladeur has ascribed the new indeterminacy of law to the trans­
formation from a society based on individuals to one based on
2 Cf. Teubner, 1987d, pp. 15 ff.
3 Cf. esp. Maus, 1986, pp. 277ff.; Joerges, 1987b; Joerges and Trubek, 1989; 
Günther, 1988, pp. 335 ff.
4 Neumann, 1957; Weber, 1978; Hedemann, 1933; Wieacker, 1956.
5 Neumann, 1957.
6 Weber, 1978, pp. 882 ff.
7 Hedemann, 1933.
8 Wieacker, 1956.
9 Wiethölter, 1982a,b, 1985, 1986a,b, 1988, 1989.
10 Ladeur, 1982, 1984a,b, 1986a, 1987b, 1990.
11 Santos, 1987.
12 Preuss, 1989.
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^^gin ization s, which entails the replacement of universalistic law by 
 ̂ N ^ r  a <$rrategic’ law. For him, the theoretical models of ‘order through 
^4/Nftfiuctuation’ and ‘dissipative structures’13 seem appropriate tools for 
grasping this notion of law. I would shift the emphasis somewhat, 
and see the contemporary dominance of formal organization as only 
one aspect of a more general phenomenon. This would be the 
closure of social spheres, including formal organizations, into self- 
referentially operating autopoietic systems. This closure gives rise to 
a new conflict -  and an insoluble one at that -  between information 
and interference. In this conflict, the systems’ own constructions of 
the reality of the surrounding systems collide with their operative 
reality. The original systems can actually experience this opera­
tive reality, but not reproduce it within their own operations. The 
result of this conflict is either the disintegration of the system’s 
unique construction of its world or else a high level of operative 
indeterminacy.
The whole thing is primarily a question of second-order 
autopoiesis.14 The new indeterminacy only arises when, on the basis 
of general social communication (first-order autopoiesis), some 
subspheres, like formal organizations, politics, law, economy, and 
education, become autonomous. As we saw in chapter 3, in the 
course of social evolution these subspheres self-referentially con­
stitute their own components -  elements, structures, processes, 
relationships with their environment -  which differ from those of 
general social communication. A relative end-point is reached when 
these components are in turn hypercyclically linked, elements 
producing structures, and vice versa. The effect of this hypercyclical 
closure is that systems become exceptionally adept at dealing with 
their environments. As we saw in chapter 5, despite their lack of 
direct contact with the environment, they construct for themselves 
their own unique environment. This means that their cognitive 
openness to the environment is based on their operative closure. 
This increases the potential of the system, but also makes increasing 
demands on it, especially in respect of precision, formalization, 
internal consistency, and operational determinacy.
The economy, for example, constructs its ‘society’ through the 
language of prices. Law features in economic calculations not as a 
binding guide to conduct, but as a cost factor (the severity of the 
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constructs its ‘public’ through the language of power, law its ‘legal 
reality’ through the distinction between legal and illegal, and so on.
The disturbing feature of this apparently harmonious interplay of 
diverse discourses is what we called in chapter 5 ‘interference’.15 
Inevitably, external influence contradicts internal information. Social 
spheres cannot be seen as isolated islands lying alongside each other. 
Interaction in the form of interference can occur because com­
munications simultaneously take part in several autopoietic cycles 
and people can act in a variety of social contexts. A third, as 
yet unclarified area of interference -  namely, the ‘overlapping’ of 
subsystem and society (see chapter 5) — can provisionally be termed 
structure- or system-interference. The consequence of such inter­
ference is not -  as Frankenberg assumes -  that an invisible hand 
guides the harmonious relationship between the inner and outer 
worlds.16 Rather, there are very real conflicts between information 
and interference. External description of the surrounding systems 
necessarily conflict with the way in which a system actually operates. 
This is no mere ‘academic’ point. We are not dealing with the 
conflict between descriptions coming from outside and inside a sys­
tem. It is not, for example, a question of whether the law’s image 
of the economy corresponds to the economy’s self-image. We are 
concerned with the more acute conflict between the law’s image 
of the economy and actual economic processes — or, to put it 
more generally, with the way in which the system constructs its 
own environment and the way in which the surrounding systems 
actually operate.
Due to the operative closure of a single system, the real opera­
tions of the surrounding systems are not accessible to it. It produces 
internally, rather than receiving externally, information about the 
environment. It regulates this information with its own codes and 
programmes. At the same time, however, the system is exposed to 
the operations of the surrounding systems by reason of the inter­
ference between them. These other systems also function according 
to their own code, and make their presence felt by producing dis­
turbance, interference, and noise. The concept of ‘order from noise’ 
is of no help to us here. For since order can be produced only 
from within the system, it always reacts in the same way to noise. 
This serves only to increase the disturbance generated, creating a 
resonance which amplifies the problems still further.
15 Cf. Jensen, 1978, p. 116; Münch, 1980, 1982; Luhmann, 1981a; 1987b; 1992b, 
ch. 6; Teubner, 1987b; Willke, 1992.
16 Frankenberg, 1989, p. 337.
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There is only one way in which the system can avoid this cata­
strophic positive feedback. It can attempt to vary its own fre­
quencies. It can do this by, for example, reconstructing its description 
of the surrounding system, using that system’s own self-description. 
However, this leads to another, equally serious problem. Taken to 
its logical conclusion, the adoption of an alien code for operations 
which are unique to a particular system means the ‘disintegration’ 
of that system. It signals the end of the operations based on its 
own specific code. For this reason the only possible solution takes 
the form of the rather unsatisfactory compromise of leaving the 
system’s own code untouched but adapting the programme to 
the self-descriptions of the other system, as far as possible within 
the limits of the code. This presupposes that there is a clear distinc­
tion between code and programme.17 But there is a price to this 
solution. The programme becomes highly indeterminate. It must try 
to meet the actual demands of the social environment, yet remain 
compatible with its own code. All that remains is to adapt to 
particular situations in an ad hoc way which makes universalization 
impossible.
Applying this theoretical model to law, one very quickly comes 
up against the economic and political instrumentalization of modern 
formal law which is the underlying source of the new legal indeter­
minacy. M ax Weber is on the legal side of this dichotomy. In 
contemporary terms, Weber’s formal legal rationality is the expres­
sion of the hypercyclical self-referentiality of law. As discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, it is distinguished not only by self-constituted 
legal transactions, ‘secondary norms’, reflexively regulated legal 
procedures, and an internally constructed ‘legal reality’, but by the 
hypercyclical linking of these components through the reciprocal 
production of elements and structures, identity and processes. 
This creates pressure for internal consistency, for the thorough 
conceptualization of doctrine, and for legal certainty. And, ironi­
cally, formal legal rationality only provokes the critique of legal 
indeterminacy.
Franz Neumann is to be found on the legal-environment side of 
the dichotomy. The closed, self-referentially produced versions of 
reality constructed by formal law come into conflict with the actual 
operations of its surrounding institutions. The developments from 
early capitalism to monopoly capitalism, which Neumann discusses, 
can be seen as but one of the environmental changes which bring
17 Cf. Luhmann, 1992a.
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about legal indeterminacy. The contemporary way out of the prob­
lems of indeterminacy is to incorporate political and economic self­
descriptions in the law, to introduce political expediency and 
economic utility. If the legal/illegal code is indeed being replaced by 
political expediency or economic utility, then this implies a form of 
‘khadi justice’. Legal conflicts are decided in a fashion which is 
arbitrary from the law’s viewpoint, according to criteria drawn from 
outside the legal system. ‘Efficient breach of contract’18 and the 
criterion of ‘optimal regulation’ developed by Easterbrook and 
Fischel19 are good examples of how the legal code can be directly 
replaced by another code. The same would have to be said of a 
thoroughgoing application of ‘policy’ arguments not only to rules, 
but to individual cases.
However, the solution generally adopted in legal practice is of a 
different order. The legal code remains intact, but the programme is 
altered. The programme is thus made to adapt, as far as possible, to 
the self-descriptions of the surrounding systems. Policy considera­
tions and consequentialist arguments do not in practice make them­
selves felt directly on the level of individual cases. The validity of a 
decision, once taken, is not dependent on the consequences of or the 
success of the policy in that particular case.20 Instead, a separation 
of levels occurs, as in rule- and act-utilitarianism. The programme is 
determined partly by a general balancing of the consequences, policy 
considerations, and criteria of efficiency. It is then subjected to the 
legal code as a legal norm, treated as valid law, and converted into a 
decision by use of the legal/illegal distinction. The result of this 
precarious compromise is a dramatic increase in the indeterminacy 
of law. But that price must be paid if the law is to be remotely 
successful in dealing with conflicts between autonomous social 
spheres.
Thus, the most painful sacrifice that formal law has to make 
at the altar of responsiveness21 is the diminution of internal con­
sistency. Modern responsive law develops legal categories in dealing 
ad hoc with the various social subspheres. And these, of their nature, 
can no longer claim universal legal consistency. They vary from 
context to context. The internal differentiation of law, running 
parallel to the functional differentiation of society, has long since 
moved beyond the traditional broad distinctions between public
18 Posner, 1986, ch. 2; Harris and Veljanovski, 1986, pp. 114 ff.
19 Easterbrook and Fischel, 1982, p. 1177.
20 Cf. Luhmann, 1987e, p. 25.
21 Nonet and Selznick, 1978.
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law, private law, and criminal law. The fragmentation of private law 
into a multitude of special fields has even destroyed the conceptual 
dogmatic unity of private law.22 With some justification, Zöllner 
criticizes these lines of development under the following headings: 
‘ (1) chiselling away of doctrine, (2) growth of casuistry, (3) increased 
specialization, (4) the gradual drifting apart of fields of private 
law, (5) increasing restrictions placed on freedom of action, par­
ticularly for professionals, and increasing restrictions on individual 
autonomy’.23 However, against the background of social differentia­
tion, the repeated calls for reintegration24 appear hopelessly out of 
step with reality. For it is ‘the prevailing conditions in the social 
domain concerned which entail the specific differentiation of private 
law and lead to the fragmentation of the private law doctrine and 
legislation’.25
Even key areas within private law, such as tort law, can no 
longer be integrated by means of unified normative principles. The 
‘compartmentalization of the classic “ general” law of delict into 
a law of specialized delicts’ is an irreversible state of affairs, to 
which the law can only react by providing differentiated ‘solutions 
for specific interests and social fields’.26 Ambitious doctrinal 
systematization used to go in for the conceptual refinement of the 
operative fact in legal norms. Nowadays, however, the work is in 
terms of theories of tort for differentiated social fields, and this is no 
accident.27 Extrapolating from these findings, it appears as if the 
practice of the courts is organizing ‘Law’s Empire’ anew. The courts 
destroy the unity of law guaranteed by doctrine, and replace it by a 
multiplicity of fragmented legal territories.
II
Does this not faintly recall Pascal’s lament: ‘Plaisante justice qu’une 
rivière borne! Vérité au delà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà’ ?28 Could 
it not be said that law today is just as much dependent upon 
arbitrary lines of demarcation? Instead of rivers and mountains
22 See Joerges, 1981, pp. 123 ff.; 1983, pp. 64 ff.; 1987a,b.
23 Zöllner, 1988, pp. 86 ff.
24 e.g. Wolf, 1982; Jakobs, 1983.
25 Joerges, 1987b, p. 181.
26 Brüggemeier, 1982a; 1986a, pp. 82 ff.; 1986b.
27 Brüggemeier, 1986a, pp. 313 ff.; Mertens, 1986.
28 Pascal, 1964, p. 151.
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marking the boundaries of the system, symbolic media, codes, and 
programmes do so. Not only is the problem similar, but the way 
in which such problems were dealt with in the past can inform 
our own approach. The law has a long history of dealing with 
specific types of conflict between systems. This includes conflicts 
of jurisdiction between territorially differentiated legal orders. 
Highly sophisticated mechanisms for resolving these conflicts have 
been devised by international private law.29 Is it possible to learn 
from these experiences? Can one extrapolate from conflict between 
territorial subsystems to conflicts between social subsystems? Does it 
make sense to develop principles and norms of an ‘intersystemic5 
law, a law of conflict between different discourses in society?
Indeed, one can see that world-wide, autonomous social fields 
such as science, technology, the economy, public communication, 
and travel have gradually increased their interaction. The boundaries 
between them thus become more important than the boundaries 
between territorial systems. Does this not mean that law must focus 
on other areas of conflict? Should it not concentrate on resolving 
conflicts between systems rather than between nations? Historically 
and sociologically, it is perfectly plausible to speak of a universal 
shift in emphasis from territorial, political, and national conflicts to 
conflicts between global functional subsystems.30 Indeed, the most 
recent developments in legal doctrine in Germany have spurred 
interdisciplinary-oriented observers into developing a new con­
ceptual framework. We might even call this a new conflict of laws.31
Those more concerned with cultural analysis, such as Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, see things in a similar way. He describes 
‘interlegality5 as the dominant feature of post-modern law:
Legal pluralism is the key concept in a post-modern view of law. Not 
the legal pluralism of traditional legal anthropology in which the 
different legal orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in 
the same political space, but rather the conception of different legal 
spaces superposed [sic], interpenetrated and mixed in our minds as 
much as in our actions, in occasions of qualitative leaps or sweep­
ing crises in our life trajectories as well as in the dull routine of 
eventless everyday life. We live in a time of porous legality or of
29 Cf. e.g. Kegel, 1987, pp. 98 ff.
30 Wallerstein, 1979; Giddens, 1979, pp. 34 ff.; 1987, pp. 225 ff.; Luhmann, 
1982b,c; Willke, 1983, pp. 49 ff.
31 See e.g. Raiser, 1971, pp. 29 ff.; Kübler, 1975, pp. 48 ff.; Wiethôlter, 1977; 
1982a,b, 1985, 1986a,b, 1988, 1989; Walz, 1980, pp. 211 ff.; Joerges, 1981, 1983, 
1987b; Ladeur, 1984a; Preuss, 1989.
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legal porosity of multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to 
constant transitions and trespassings. Our legal life is constituted 
by an intersection of different legal orders, that is by interlegality. 
Interlegality is the phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism 
and that is why it is the second key concept of a post-modern 
conception of law. Interlegality is a highly dynamic process because 
the different legal spaces are non-synchronic and thus result in uneven 
and unstable mixings of legal codes.32
To return to more doctrinal authors: here, because of the strong 
link with the conflict of laws, Wietholter is the first person to spring 
to mind. His concept of proceduralization is very closely linked with 
the development of ‘collision rules’. Wietholter ‘supports. . .  a view 
of proceduralization which sees it as a problem of how to justify 
“ rational” practical actions under the conditions which prevail in 
the “ system” (=  the justification of rules of conflict by exercising 
judicial competence)’. He draws on the full conceptual armoury of 
the classical conflict of laws to work out the new dimensions of the 
problem:
In the higher-order legal principle of proportionality I have attempted 
to determine the most influential mechanisms of transformation for 
the osmosis, for the translations, for covariances of law and society, 
as the supreme and most general principle of production of an 
admittedly tacit and ineluctable justification of rules of conflict for 
resolving conflicting rights, interests and needs. Legal relations are in 
fact (and have been in Germany since the days of Savigny!) neither 
pure objects of evaluations nor pure evaluations of objects. They 
are always premediated general decisions about the way facts are 
assigned to a particular law in the process of being introduced as a 
qualification of the legal response to social questions.33
But he remains remarkably vague: which units clash? Judging 
from Wiethólter’s texts alone, one could think that he was referring 
to conflicts of political interests, ideological camps, socio-legal 
models, general principles of law, legal subsystems, programme 
structures, social subsystems, subrationalities, or political strategies.34 
If one asks the man himself, his reply is often cryptic. So why not try 
systems theory and its approach to conflict? It would be interesting
32 Santos, 1987, pp. 293-4.
33 Wietholter, 1986b, p. 66.
34 See esp. Wietholter, 1977, 1985, 1986b, 1988.
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to combine it with the refinement of conflict of law doctrine as 
it emerged after the crisis induced by the American Revolution 
(‘governmental interest approach’).35
Cryptic answers are all too understandable when one considers 
the major analytical difficulties that systems theory gives itself here. 
This needs, as Joerges rightly sees, a ‘system-theoretical reconstruc­
tion of the manifold links between politics and the economy and the 
effects of this upon the legal system’.36 And work of this type has 
scarcely begun. Even identifying the colliding units between which 
conflicts are to be regulated is not easy -  to say nothing of providing 
a solution. I would tentatively suggest differentiating between the 
following areas of conflict: (1) those between social subsystems, (2) 
those between state law and social quasi-legal orders, and (3) those 
between legal sub-orders within state law.
(1) What is the role of law in conflicts between various social 
subsystems, be they functional subsystems (politics, economy, family, 
religion, science, culture), formal organizations, or specific forms of 
interaction? Here the major problem is whether a translation of the 
conflict into the legal code is desirable at all. We do not always see 
this as a problem because of the ban on the denial of justice. But 
recent experiences with the phenomenon of juridification37 should 
have alerted us to the difficulties. Should not conflict rules be devel­
oped in order to counter the homing instinct of lawyers, their natural 
inclination towards their own legal order? Nonet and Selznick’s 
proposal that civil disobedience be dealt with according to the 
‘political paradigm’ belongs here. They urge that it be treated as the 
object of political negotiations rather than according to formal legal 
criteria: ‘Forgiveness for rule breaking is readily negotiated in the 
interest of reconstituting a framework within which co-operation 
can go forward.’38 Simitis and Zenz and Habermas likewise set 
great store by the paradoxical capacity of the law to keep certain 
domestic and educational spheres of life free from juridification.39
The question, then, is this: When faced with the conflicting 
rationalities of social systems, can the law develop conflict rules 
which counteract juridification through the process of juridification
35 Cf. Joerges, 1971.
36 Joerges, 1983, p. 66.
37 Voigt (ed.), 1980, 1983b; Voigt, 1987; Teubner, 1987e.
38 Nonet and Selznick, 1978, pp. 92 ff.
39 Simitis and Zenz (eds), 1975, p. 51; Habermas, 1984, ch. 8, sect. 3.
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itself? Can it defer to ways of resolving conflicts in other social 
contexts? Can it develop rules regarding the application or non­
application of its own code?40
There is a further problem here. Can the law content itself with 
‘formal’ norms which refer the disputes to the rationality of one or 
other of the conflicting systems? Or does the ‘transsystemic’ nature 
of the conflict mean that it has to develop ‘substantive norms’ of 
its own? Ladeur’s ideas seem to point in the first direction: the 
model of legal regulation should concentrate rather on making self­
regulation possible, on preventing dominant values from reinforcing 
their own positions and providing a buffer against the consequences 
of social relations and networks becoming increasingly flexible.41 
My ideas on general clauses (‘good faith’ and ‘public policy’ clauses) 
_^)tend more in the direction of developing substantive norms. In 
this way they can reconcile the rationalities of different social 
subsystems.42 However, this does not mean that socially autonomous 
orders are overtly politicized. Quite the contrary: what takes place 
here is a reciprocal process of reconciliation between more than one 
autonomous discourse. The aim of this is, among other things, to 
safeguard the civilizing achievements of that discourse’s relative 
autonomy.
Finally, we have also to consider intersystemic agreements. 
Resemblances to international agreements concerning conflict of 
laws are not merely superficial. Here, as in the above case, conflicts 
of expectations are resolved through negotiation rather than a 
referral to either side via formal collision rules or a substantive legal 
institution. The oft-quoted ‘neo-corporatist’ negotiating institutions 
are the most spectacular example to date of how inter-system con­
flicts are dealt with by ad hoc specialized formal organizations, with 
no recourse to legal rules. Formal organizations specifically designed 
for the purpose are involved instead.43 Yet this technique does not 
truly ‘bypass’ law;44 instead, co-existing alongside it, law comes 
in with a ‘secondary wave of juridification’ involving these self- 
regulatory processes. It latches on to their organizational and pro­
cedural premisses rather than to their substantive results.45 From a 
policy point of view, ways have to be found of using the law to
40 Luhmann, 1992a.
41 Ladeur, 1986a, 1987b.
42 Teubner, 1979, pp. 729 ff.; 1980, pp. 44, 84 ff.; 1983b.
43 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Traxler and Vobruba, 1987; Vardaro, 1988.
44 Ronge, 1980.
45 Simitis, 1987, pp. 140 ff.; Teubner, 1987d, p. 37.
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endow social self-regulation with an organizationally and procedur- 
ally appropriate learning capability.46
It is an open question whether the law should limit itself to the 
attempt to reconcile conflicts between systems. Can it go further and 
introduce a universal interest into the process of mediation? This is 
what Preuss considers
the structural singularity of the law as the institution of societal self­
mediation which embodies its ‘rationale’ : not just to make compatible 
heterogeneous social subsystems in order to organize their mutual 
exchange of performances, but to integrate them into body politic, 
a commonwealth. This is clearly a normative quest; but the de­
moralization of the modern law indicates that it is to be realized 
by institutional arrangements and not by some sort of ‘value 
community’.47
(2) The conflict between state law and various social quasi-legal 
orders, or conflict among the latter, is another area of concern for 
the new law of conflict. Legal sociologists and anthropologists have 
recently highlighted phenomena of an ‘indigenous law’ in modern 
societies, indicating lines of conflict among them.48 These are differ­
ent from the conflicts discussed under (1) above, in which functional 
subsystems come into conflict with their different codes, pro­
grammes, and rationalities. Here conflicts arise within the legal 
system itself, albeit the legal system in the ‘pluralist’ sense of the 
term. Conflict resolution in enterprises, associations, and cultural 
organizations takes on a genuine legal character if conflicts of interests 
are defined in terms of clashing expectations and are decided by 
distinguishing binding expectations (see chapter 3, section IV 
above). To that extent the State, with its ‘official’ legal order, has no 
monopoly on law: rather, ‘Societies contain a multitude of par­
tially self-regulating spheres or sectors, organised along spatial, 
transactional or ethnic-familial lines ranging from primary groups in 
which relations are direct, immediate and diffuse to settings (e.g. 




48 Moore, 1973: ‘semi-autonomous social fields’; Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1978/ 
9; ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’; Galanter, 1981: ‘justice in many rooms’; 
Cotterell, 1983: ‘juridical pluralism’; Henry, 1983, 1987: ‘private justice’; 
Fitzpatrick, 1984: ‘law and societies’; Nelken, 1984, 1986: ‘law in action’; Griffiths, 
1986: ‘legal pluralism’.
49 Galanter, 1981, pp. 163 ff.
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With the emergence of multinationals and the increasing 
internationalization of economic activity, the conflict between state 
and societal law has taken on yet further, more dramatic dimen­
sions. International arbitration and the ‘codes of conduct’ of inter­
national organizations represent the first tentative steps towards 
resolving the conflict between the international lex mercatoria and 
the law of individual nation states.50
On the other hand, there is an established tradition of legal 
solutions. When mediating between these sectors, courts have 
reviewed standardized terms of trade, articles of association, and 
corporate by-laws. Modern judicial review has long since moved 
beyond the purely formal. This had struggled to set the ‘limits of 
acceptance’ of a particular legal sub-order. It was characterized 
by efforts to formulate clear norms which precisely delineated the 
respective spheres of validity for state law and for the legal sub­
order. Review consisted in formally referring a decision to the 
appropriate order. Later, as courts recognized the asymmetric nature 
of these agreements, judicial practice showed a more substantive 
form of review. It recognized these sub-orders as ‘private legislation 
subject to discretionary review’, considering and changing the con­
tents of standardized agreements. It thus attempted to work out 
substantive rules of its own, rather than merely deciding which is the 
appropriate sphere of validity. The question is only what the criteria 
are to be. Can an ‘intersystemic law of conflict’ offer something 
which extends beyond mere notions of ‘appropriateness’, ‘fairness’, 
something more than ad hoc considerations of equity?
The answer lies in a shift in the ‘balancing of interests’, which 
is the inevitable consequence of substantive judicial review, from 
individuals to social spheres. The interests to be balanced should not 
be seen from the point of view of the individual or the collective 
actor. Rather, they should be seen from the point of view of social 
systems as communicative networks. What would be the implica­
tions of a switch from balancing individual and group interests 
towards the ‘network’ approach? In the former, interests are balanced 
by extrapolating from the legislation which is seen as having within 
it an appropriate balance. But justice is done not by uncritical 
application of the law but by a ‘critical obedience’ to it. The latter 
would involve the courts in a substantive review of quasi-legal 
orders. The point here would be to bring out into the open the 
intrinsic logic, functional requirements, and guiding principles of the 
conflicting social fields and to balance them.
50 e.g. cf. Wallace, 1982; Schanze, 1986.
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This seems to be the direction in which Joerges is heading.51 His 
analyses focus on how private autonomous orders (general terms of 
trade, long-term contracts) are controlled by the law. He seeks to 
counteract the one-dimensional view, either market orientation or 
consumer orientation. Joerges insists on a conflict-law viewpoint, 
which can be mastered only by balancing competition policies, state 
planning, and consumerist policies. I have certain reservations with 
the orientation to state policy. Does the control of private orders 
have to do only with the conflict between the State’s policies on 
competition and on consumer protection? Is this not of secondary 
importance compared to the original conflict between the institu­
tional requirements of the market, economic organization, and 
the demands of private life? But these are mere quibbles. The most 
important thing is to realize that conflicts apparently between 
individuals are in fact conflicts between systems.
A similarly institutional approach is also to be preferred when the 
matter is not one of ex post facto substantive review, but rather of 
legal control over the constitutive conditions of quasi-legal orders. 
In the cases of safety-standard committees, codes of practice for 
advertising, competition rules, or disciplinary practices in firms and 
associations, legal controls should aim at securing procedures and 
organizations for ensuring that external interests are sufficiently 
represented within the system.52
(3) Finally, a law of conflict would have to deal with conflicts 
within the law. As explained above, the internal differentiation of 
the legal system is merely a reflection of functional differentiation 
within society. The legislature and the courts have attempted, 
in a reactive and ad hoc manner, to establish a precarious com­
promise between various external social demands, the requirements 
of political regulation, and the need for consistency within the 
law. This has resulted in a variety of specialized and highly separate 
legal fields and a correspondingly specialized cohort of experts. 
The latter indentify with their particular field, rather than with 
the legal profession as a whole. Conceptual conflicts and conflicts 
of value between such legal fields are the order of the day, and 
create considerable problems of legitimacy. Policy conflicts are 
unavoidable: ‘Free trade favours the consumers but endangers 
labour interests; full comparability of prices favours market trans­
parency, but endangers trading through small businesses etc.’53 The
51 Joerges, 1981, 1983, 1987a,b.
52 Joerges, 1983, p. 65.
53 Ibid., p. 64.
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contradictions between the concepts of contract in civil law and 
competition law can be tolerated by the experts concerned. The 
general public, however, finds it hard to accept that tax law can be 
indifferent to criminal law, that income from prostitution, bribes, 
and payments to extortionists should be tax-deductible. Despite 
such anomalies, the demands for the restoration of the ‘unity of the 
legal order’54 are, of course, merely rhetorical in character, or are 
used tactically when the occasion arises. Attempts to establish a 
conceptual or axiological unity through legal dogmatics are doomed 
to failure. This is as true for areas within the law such as private law 
as it is for the law in general.
The opposing strategy, which supports the empirical tendency 
towards increasing specialization within the law, deserves to be 
taken more seriously. It insists that the principles of specialized legal 
fields should remain pure, uncontaminated by external influences. 
We can see this in the refusal of competition lawyers, when deal­
ing with general clauses in competition law, to take account of 
recognized legal principles from other areas of the law. These 
tendencies to autarchy fail to prevent the occurrence of conflicts 
within the legal system. Instead. The handling of these is left to 
chance: individual cases address contradictions as they crop up, with 
no meaningful basis in a doctrine of conflicts.
By contrast, Walz’s idea of the ‘relative autonomy of legal 
fields’55 seems to be both realistic and normatively acceptable. 
Although this principle was originally developed in relation to tax 
law, it can be generalized. Walz explicitly borrows concepts devel­
oped in international private law. His starting principle is that 
specialized legal fields are essentially independent, and are subject to 
limitations in situations only where ‘ordre public’ happens to be 
relevant. Each legal field will develop its doctrinal structures accord­
ing to the demands of the social segment involved, but in cases 
where problems of ‘ordre public’ arise, the particular legal field must 
respect the fundamental principles and policies of the other legal 
fields. It must incorporate them into its own autonomous doctrine as 
a limitation on its activities. This seems to me to be the only realistic 
way of reformulating the old idea of the unity of the legal order. In 
a legal system characterized by a high degree of differentiation, 
integration through concepts or values is no longer possible. We 
need instead to achieve a measure of compatibility between the
54 e.g. Wolf, 1982; Jakobs, 1983.
55 Walz, 1980, pp. 211 ff.
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doctrines of autonomous legal fields and the mutual reflexive adop­
tion of their fundamental principles.
Ill
We can view the general clauses of private law as a paradigm 
example of collision rules in action. Indeed, their high degree of 
indeterminacy makes them all the more likely to assume that role.56 
The way in which the role of general clauses has earned such a 
reputation is a prime example of the ‘materialization of private 
law’.57 This change, whereby the ‘observance of statute and contract’ 
is exchanged for ‘regulatory, controlling and ultimately browbeat­
ing judicial power’ is described by Esser as ‘judicial interventionism 
run riot’.58 But this is too narrow an understanding, and tends to 
hide the role of general clauses in collisions between systems. It 
would also be too narrow to see materialization as describing state 
interventionist compensation for any market failures. Rather, we 
have here an attempt to use the resources of the law to deal with 
problems arising from a high degree of functional differentiation 
within society. In effect this means balancing and co-ordinating the 
contradictory social demands which are made on the contractual 
relation from within contract law itself. Materialization in this sense 
means making visible the dependence of contractual expectations on 
a variety of non-contractual social expectations, including state 
interventionist ones, and their co-ordination within the contract. 
Here, then, the law is applied not ‘formally’, in the sense that it 
determines which of the social subsystems should be used to solve 
the problem, but ‘materially’, in the sense that substantive legal 
norms are developed to deal with collision between functional 
subsystems.
This requires a reformulation of our understanding of contract 
from the point of view of autopoietic theory.59 The simple consensus 
model found in the classic theory of contract must be modified. The 
traditional view of the contact as emerging from ‘the meeting of 
minds’ must be jettisoned in favour of contract as the legal form of a 
social relationship. Classical conceptions of the system as a totality
56 See Teubner, 1980.
57 Assman et al., 1980.
58 Esser, 1956b, p. 556.
59 See Deggau, 1987a,b, 1988.
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consisting of elements and relationships have laid the groundwork 
for this reappraisal. Thus ‘institutional’ definitions of contract have 
drawn attention to the connection between legal norms and social 
structures.60 ‘Organicist’ conceptions have contributed by describing 
contract as a living whole, composed of the meaningful interaction 
of its elements.61 Understanding contractual obligation as ‘structure 
and process’62 highlights two central aspects of the contract as a 
system. Finally, focus on the purposive organization of contract 
emphasizes its ‘programmatic’ character. It thus requires to be 
‘executed in a more complex way’ than a more simple process of 
exchange would be.63
Theories of ‘relational contract’ point in a similar direction.64 
As against the simple consensus model, the idea of a ‘relational 
contract’ focuses on ‘interaction and co-operation among the par­
ticipants, on the resulting values and needs, on contract as process, 
on the marginality of formal contract law in relation to actual 
behaviour, on the ambivalence of “ juridification” of contract 
via numerous state interventions’.65 According to Kondgen, the 
‘relational’ theory in contract law argues for ‘distancing oneself 
from the dogma of the final quasi-codificatory validity of con­
tractual consensus’. This includes not only a ‘ “ microscopic” analysis 
of the particular expectations and ideas of reciprocity of the parties 
involved, but also a “ macroscopic” analysis of grand scale expecta­
tions in the modern social state’.66
Such ideas, which evoke the flexibility peculiar to ‘the contractual 
relation in dealing with social reality’67 have been developed further 
into a concept of contract as a social action system open to the 
environment. Seen in this way, contract achieves the goal of con­
sensus between parties, but still has certain additional problems to 
solve. It solves them by responding to demands from its environ­
ment, while maintaining its own integrity.68 The contractual relation 
is defined as a normatively ordered complex of meaningful actions 
whose internal structures can be explained not only by the norm-
60 Raiser, 1963, p. 147.
61 Siber, 1931, p. 1.
62 Larenz, 1987, p. 92V.
63 E. Schmidt and Esser, 1984, p. 81.
64 MacNeil, 1980, 1983; Kondgen, 1981; W. Schmid, 1983, pp. 108 ff.; Daintith, 
1986; Joerges, 1987a, pp. 211 ff.
65 Joerges, 1987a, p. 211.
66 Kondgen, 1981, pp. 12, 128.
67 Gernhuber, 1983, p. 53.
68 Cf. Parsons and Smelser, 1956, pp. 104 ff., 143 ff.
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creating effect of the consensus between the parties involved but 
just as much by the external demands of quite different social 
subspheres.69 This prefigures the problem of conflict when the 
contractual relation is placed under contradictory structural 
requirements.
J. Schmidt also sees contract as a system in the sense understood 
by sociological systems theory. He rightly rejects an individually 
oriented concept of system, in which creditor and debtor appear as 
elements. Instead, he puts forward the following definition: ‘The 
system no longer comprises (empirical) people or role segments from 
the set of roles of empirical people, but social interactions, that is to 
say rationally-ordered complexes of action.’70 This move highlights 
the relationship of system to environment, and shows how con­
tractual relationships evolve as a particular response in relation to 
politics, economics, and the law. This does not take us beyond the 
theory of open systems, however; neither does a ‘contingency theory 
of contract’.71 The way in which contracts develop is thus dependent 
upon the way in which the system functions in the environment.
In moving beyond open systems theory, an autopoietic reformula­
tion would have to modify this model along constructivist lines72 
and build in additional levels of observation.73 On this view, the 
contractual relationship would be a self-reproducing system of 
communicative interaction between contractual partners. It develops 
its structures by interacting with the ‘contractual environment’, 
which, however, it constructs itself. This would be the system- 
subjective form of contingency theory which Deggau rightly calls 
for. Thus, external regulatory impulses cannot have an unbroken 
influence on contract. They manifest themselves in the conflict 
between information generated from within the contract itself and 
external interference. As we saw in section II above, this leads to 
a high degree of indeterminacy. The good faith formula is then 
applied to diminish the degree of indeterminacy, by reconstructing 
the external demands within the contract itself and weighing them 
against each other.
The ‘non-contractual elements of contract’74 are thus nothing
69 Cf. Teubner, 1979, pp. 729 ff.; 1980, p. 44.
70 J. Schmidt, 1985, pp. 184 ff.
71 This is based loosely on the ‘contingency theory of organisation’: Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967a,b, 1969.
72 Cf. S. Schmidt (ed.), 1987. 
von Forster 1981.
Durkheim, 1933, pp. 206 ff.
73
74
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more than the internal contractual reconstruction of the social 
demands of the environment on the specific contract. They sur­
face as expectations in the ‘contractual system’ on three different 
levels: (1) the level of personal relationships between the contractual 
partners (the interaction level); (2) the level of market and organiza­
tion, which extends beyond the individual contract (the institutional 
level); and (3) the interplay of ‘politics’, ‘the economy’, and ‘the 
law’, which encompasses the whole of society (the societal level). 
These levels do not interrelate hierarchically; rather, they are 
fundamentally distinct modes of system development which become 
increasingly independent of one another.75 Nevertheless, contract, 
because it is interwoven with all three, is an action system that is 
common to them all. Returning to our original quest for an internal 
mechanism for resolving intersystemic conflicts, the general clause 
can now be understood as a collision rule which refers to these three 
levels of system formation as a way of balancing their contradictory 
demands.
The current debate on the ‘materialization’ of general clauses 
centres on precisely this issue: how to reconcile contradictory social 
demands with the actual contractual relation. It is in this sense that 
we can talk of the ‘socialization’ of law in general clauses and the 
intrusion of ‘social facts’ into contract law.76 The contemporary 
task of the general clause is that of ad hoc intervention to resolve 
conflicts between systems which, from the point of view of contract 
law, appear to be ‘contingent’ and thus not subject to formal and 
general rules.
By distinguishing between the three levels which each make their 
own demands upon the contract, we are now able to reformulate the 
problem of legal indeterminacy which we addressed above. If we 
identify the levels at which the ‘non-contractual elements of contract’ 
operate, we can develop criteria for different types of indeterminacy. 
These will, of course, vary according to the level with which we are 
dealing. Expectations come to be integrated at a level of abstraction 
which has always to be determined according to how the require­
ments of the contractual relationship evolve. This can come about 
from the concrete interaction of the partners (persons and situations), 
the division of labour in market or organization (roles and norms), 
or from guide-lines of a general social or particularly political kind 
which have to be incorporated into the individual contract (purposes
75 Cf. Luhmann 1982a, pp. 76 ff.
76 Struck, 1982, p. 259.
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and values). In the temporal dimension, the variable balance be­
tween normative consolidation and cognitive flexibility appropriate 
to that particular level has to be more precisely determined. In 
the social dimension, we must ask ourselves what degree of institu­
tionalization can be presupposed for each of the levels. For each 
of the levels it must be determined whether self-regulatory social 
mechanisms (‘standards’) are working or whether a ‘failure’ of self­
regulation makes it necessary to come up with some rule which 
compensates for the failure (‘directives’).77 The extent to which, if 
indeed at all, self-regulation functions on any particular level will 
determine whether the social norms which are referred to in the 
‘standards’ should be taken as given or whether legal requirements, 
taking their place, should be drawn up.78
At the level of interaction, the general clauses refer to informal 
expectations about conduct; but in the case of ‘interactional failure’, 
the ‘objective’ purposes of the contract are defined by judges. 
Similarly, at the institutional level, when there is a ‘market failure’, 
the assumption of the ‘ethics of commerce’ and ‘trade usages’ is 
replaced by the formulation of duties of disclosure and professional 
standards. Finally, on the societal level, the general clause refers to 
the legal policies made binding in legal norms. In the case of a 
‘breakdown’ of the political mechanisms, it is left to the judges to 
decide how ‘public policy’ is to be defined.
IV
Let us look at the implications of this in more detail.
(1) At the ‘level of interaction’ we are dealing with the conflict 
between the contractual consensus as legally defined and the norms 
which stem from the informal expectations of the parties. The latter 
evolve from the personal interaction of the contractual parties. 
How do we legally interpret these norms of a specific ‘contractual 
morality’ ? To what degree should they be legalized? How do we 
deal with the conflict between them? To be sure, the contractual 
norms formalized in the explicit act of legal agreement need to be 
complemented by a set of informal expectations. Certainly, these are
77 Cf. Teubner, 1971, pp. 65 ff.
78 Cf. E. Schmidt and Esser, 1984, pp. 136 ff.
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not derivable from the explicit declaration of wills. At the same 
time, they cannot simply be derived from the contract law of the 
state, ex lege. Ex lege does indeed point to the derivation of these 
norms from factors which are diametrically opposed to the explicit 
declaration of wills. At the same time, it also rightly points to how 
contract law develops through judicial precedents.79 However, it 
gives the erroneous impression that it is possible to consolidate such 
particularistic norms of conduct into a series of general rules, while 
masking the actual grounds of validity: the judicial sanctioning of 
social norms.80
Legal sociology has provided some subtle analyses of the genesis 
of social norms in dyadic contractual relationships. The reciprocal 
co-ordination of behaviour and its stabilization over time leads to 
the development of fixed patterns of expectations. These deter­
mine the behaviour of the parties to no less an extent than do the 
formalized agreements.81 Complementarity and reciprocity of 
expectations and the demand for consistency in behaviour are 
essential mechanisms for the formation of norms which influence the 
legal definition of contractual obligations.82
(2) At the ‘institutional level’ we are dealing with the conflict 
between contract and social institutions like market and organiza­
tion. Contracts are embedded in a broader institutional context. 
This gives rise to structural constraints which contract law also has 
to take into account. By imposing additional contractual obliga­
tions or by limiting contractual rights, the general clause figures 
as a collision rule for the ‘external relation’ of the contracts which 
cannot be handled by classical contract and tort law. The indeter­
minacy of general clauses is narrowed in the following ways. In the 
social dimension, the reference to social standards of commercial 
morality is replaced by the formulation of legal directives. When the 
judiciary diagnoses a market failure, it follows that merely com­
mercial standards, which function to complement the market, are no 
longer accepted. Legal instances, not commercial interests, now 
determine the consensus requirements. In the material dimension, 
this brings about a change in level of generalization. Universal 
norms are no longer used as the basis for the determination. Rather,
79 Canaris, 1971, p. 432.
80 Kondgen, 1981, pp. 167 ff.
81 Cf. Weber, 1967, p. 80; Geiger, 1964, pp. 46 ff.; Luhmann, 1985c, ch. 2, sect. 
4; Kondgen, 1981, pp. 167 ff.
82 Cf. Kondgen, 1981, pp. 233 ff.
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one adjusts to particular role expectations. New dogmatic concepts, 
such as contractual purpose, role, and organization are employed 
to achieve this. These regulate how requirements of conduct are 
substantively defined. In the temporal dimension, the general clause 
becomes more flexible, and takes on a more cognitive hue: role 
requirements can be redefined according to the situation. At the 
same time, however, they can be counterfactually established even 
against the parties’ own consensus.
(3) Conflicts between the contract and other social spheres appear 
on the ‘societal level’. By ‘other social spheres’ is meant functional 
social systems such as politics, the economy, the family, culture, and 
religion. The individual ‘private’ contract is interwoven into these 
in a complex way. As their function becomes increasingly dif­
ferentiated, so they become increasingly autonomous. At the same 
time, however, they become increasingly interdependent. The more 
they regulate themselves, the more they are riven by tensions, con­
tradictions, and conflicts. This obviously has an impact on con­
tractual systems. Contracts, by normatively defining what the 
risks will be for the future, stabilize the tensions caused by this 
interdependence. They act as islands of stability in troubled waters. 
However, beyond a certain point, disturbances in the environment 
cease to be acceptable, and mechanisms of adjustment are necessary 
in order to resolve conflicts between contractual orders and their 
social environments. The unbounded priority of the individual 
consensus between parties cannot be insisted upon, whether one 
is dealing with matters of individual conscience, strict religious 
prohibitions, political regulation, or economic controls. The general 
clause is particularly suited to reconciling unstable social environ­
ments with constantly shifting and conflicting requirements, because 
of its high degree of indeterminacy.83
V
Such attempts to mediate in cases of conflict between social systems 
constitute a real challenge to the reflective capacity of legal doctrine. 
Is doctrine able to combine the legal discourse’s own need for 
consistency with the material demands of autonomous social 
subsystems?
83 See Teubner, 1983b; Deggau, 1988.
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This question builds on Luhmann’s reformulation of the concept 
of justice. He refers to the ‘twofold contingency of social require­
ments for law to exert a stabilizing influence in life on the one hand 
and the level of expectation within the legal system on the other’.84 
The open question, however, is whether law, as Luhmann clearly 
supposes, can take account of ‘social requirements’ only in an ad- 
hoc way, evolving blindly from one political scandal to another? Or 
is the legal discourse in a position systematically and ‘reflexively’ to 
develop legal criteria for the requirements of the autopoietic social 
systems that surround it?
Would this be the contemporary vision of iustitia mediatrix?85 
Justice would no longer mediate ‘vertically’ between ratio and 
aequitas, between divine and positive law,86 as it did in stratified, 
hierarchical societies. Instead, in response to functional differentia­
tion, it would have to establish a ‘horizontal’ balance, precariously 
weighing the requirements of consistency imposed by positivized law 
and the demands of a multiplicity of autopoietically closed social 
systems.
84 Luhmann, 1973a; 1974, p. 49.
85 Placentius, 1192, p. 53.
Cf. Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 107 ff., 110.86
7
U n ita s  m u ltip le x : Corporate 
Governance as an Example
i
We saw in the last chapter that self-reference and autopoiesis are not 
only issues for legal theory, but have an impact on legal doctrine as 
well. Doctrine is faced with a new agenda in having to respond to 
the enduring conflicts between the particular logics of autonomous 
social systems. It thus needs to adjust its pattern of principles and its 
mode of argumentation to the new social situation. But does the 
theory of autopoiesis also have an impact on the way lawyers go 
about their daily business? Does it inform the construction of legal 
concepts? Does it contribute something to the discussion of doc­
trinal questions and to the decisions of the courts? According to 
Heldrich, the addition of a bit of autopoiesis has thrown legal 
dogmatics into a ferment: ‘But whether what comes out of it will 
illuminate the senses or dim them further, we are not yet in a 
position to judge.’1
The forays of legal dogmatics into this domain to date can be 
summed up briefly. Luhmann discusses questions of the legal con­
cept of action and also of the political right of disobedience to 
law from the point of view of autopoiesis.2 He remains sceptical, 
however, when it comes to sociological jurisprudence as a whole.3 
Deggau reformulates issues in contract law, such as mistake and 
frustration, and takes a generally optimistic view of what auto­
poiesis can bring to legal doctrine.4 Breuning and Nocke, as well as 
Graber dealing with constitutional issues of the freedom of art, 
develop a legal concept of the autonomy of art on the basis of
1 Heldrich, 1986, p. 105.
2 Luhmann, 1984c.
3 Cf. Luhmann, 1969, 1974.
4 Deggau, 1987b.
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autopoiesis.5 Kargl redefines fundamental doctrinal concepts in 
penal law.6 Schluep reviews issues of economic regulation from the 
perspective of self-reference.7 It is Ladeur who has ventured furthest 
into the territory of legal dogmatics. With the conceptual apparatus 
of self-organization theories, he tackles a variety of issues in public 
law, ranging from regulation of nuclear power to medical-legal 
matters, law and the media, and environmental questions. In this 
context, he has developed a strategy of law’s ‘dealing with uncer­
tainty by using the (self-)organised capacity to learn’.8
For my part, I have the impression that a kind of ‘middle-range’ 
dogmatics can benefit substantially from the theory of autopoiesis 
when it comes to constructing legal realities in a different way. By 
reformulating doctrinal theories on ‘contract’, ‘organization’, ‘legal 
person’, and ‘responsibility’, we have a chance, it seems to me, of 
countering the adhocracy of ‘case-law positivism’, or, as Zöllner 
puts it, somewhat more polemically, the ‘cult of precedent’, which is 
already something of a spent force.9 My previous attempts at this 
have concerned the general clause ‘good faith’, contractual duties of 
information, issues of contractual frustration, the legal concept 
of the corporation, the social substratum of the legal person, the 
interest of the corporation as a whole, questions of corporate 
governance, the social responsibility of companies, and civil liability 
of franchising networks.10 To test this approach further, I would 
like to continue this review of private law concepts from the point of 
view of systems theory. More specifically, I will try to develop the 
legal concept of the corporate group as an autopoietic system. 
What implications does this have for group regulation, particularly 
for issues of corporate governance, including questions of worker 
participation in complex organizations?
What does autopoietic theory suggest vis-à-vis the potential 
role of theories of the firm in group organization and corporate 
governance? Despite widespread expectations of comprehensive 
technocratic solutions, translatable into legal instruments, auto­
poiesis starts off with a double disclaimer. It is sceptical in respect 
of both law and theory. This is related to the reorientation of the 
theory of self-referential systems discussed in chapter 2, a reorien-
5 Breuning and Nocke, 1988; Gräber, 1991.
6 Kargl, 1991.
7 Schluep, 1990.
8 Ladeur, 1983, 1984a, 1986a,b, 1987a, 1988.
9 Zöllner, 1988, p. 88.
10 Teubner, 1980, 1983a, b, 1985b, 1986a, 1988a, 1992a.
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tation from planning to evolution, from regulation to autonomy.11 
Autopoietic theory suggests that law plays a modest role in the 
dynamics of the processes of evolution of industrial organization. 
And, given the internal dynamics of legal practice in corporate 
groups, the possibilities of guidance from theory are also rather 
limited.
One can regard the recent history of industrial organization as a 
process of ‘blind’ evolution: that is, as the uncoordinated interplay 
of the mechanisms of variation, selection, and stabilization.12 
Accepting this view, it appears that, in the decisive phases, law has 
only rarely been the driving, innovatory force which has advanced 
the course of evolution. The process of variation and selection 
was regularly carried out by non-legal elements. The great legal 
innovation of the nineteenth century, the organization and liberation 
of the business corporation as a legal person,13 was initially nothing 
but the legal form given to newly emerging industrial action centres. 
This in turn accelerated the dynamics of capital concentration by, 
for example, making possible the formation of corporate groups. 
Indeed, one of the features of the great legal reforms of the twentieth 
century, the increasing separation and autonomy of executive and 
supervisory boards, was merely the ultimate expression of the 
process of separation of ownership and control which had been 
under way for some time. Co-determination in corporate gover­
nance as well, hailed as a legal policy innovation, should more 
realistically be regarded as being merely a reflection of the changed 
relations between capital and labour, between business concerns and 
unions, and, within the enterprise itself, between traditional hier­
archy and functional democratization.14 This does not mean, 
however, that one should underestimate the repercussions of legally 
formalized power relations on the fluctuating situation in the market 
and on the forces within organizations.15 As a consequence, gauging 
the controlling capacity of corporate law depends in great part on 
which evolutionary model is used to interpret events.
The law of corporate governance has, on the whole, always acted 
as a stabilization mechanism on organizational forms which have
11 Varela, 1981a, p. 14; 1981b, p. 36; Luhmann, 1992b, Introduction; Willke, 
1992.
12 See e.g. the evolutionary approaches adopted by Alchian, 1950; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Witt, 1987; Hutter, 1989b.
13 e.g. Ott, 1977, pp. 43 ff.
14 Cf. Krause, 1985, pp. 154 ff.
15 Cf. Wilpert and Rayley, 1983, p. 95.
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evolved through other mechanisms of variation and selection. 
However, the role of stabilizing mechanisms should not be under­
estimated. Stabilization always has repercussions on the dynamics of 
the economy, since a level of development stabilized by legal norms 
in turn opens up previously unforeseen possibilities of development. 
At the same time, however, this makes it possible for the law 
to exert some influence and control on the ongoing process of 
evolution. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the effect of the 
current legislation on co-determination.16 As a consequence of this, 
gauging the regulatory capacity of corporate law depends in large 
part on which evolutionary model is used to interpret events.
This is the point at which theory should start. Nevertheless, 
theoretical reflection which accompanies such developments is also 
subject to clear restrictions. For all Savigny’s and Gierke’s grandiose 
schemes for the autonomy and reality of the legal person, for all the 
novelty value of the ‘enterprise per se \  separation of property and 
control and ‘private government’, theory has always had to leave the 
‘invention’ of regulatory patterns to legal practice. The real business 
of theory is not to come up with specific proposals for regulation, 
but to construct legal reality in another way. The challenge which 
confronts theory, and which also imposes its limitations on it, is 
to develop a new perspective on what constitutes a corporation. 
Theory can also cast light on the internal problems which beset 
organizations. And if practice accepts what theory has to offer, then 
there is the possibility that these new insights will lead to the 
development of a different and perhaps better law of corporate 
governance.
Against the background of these two restrictions, law and theory 
have the opportunity to choose a perspective on organizational 
evolution that offers law the possibility of stabilizing efficient forms 
of industrial organization. It also allows law to have some impact 
on the process of industrial organization itself. A brief glance at 
competing theories shows that what we have here is indeed a choice 
of models of evolution. There is a bewildering range of possible 
ways of constructing the reality of the corporation. With regard 
to the problem of corporate governance in group enterprises, the 
theory of autopoiesis offers quite a different view of the organ­
ization from, say, economic theories of the firm or political theories 
of private government. Economic theories tend to see the corpor-
16 Cf. Streeck, 1984, pp. 391 ff.; Krause, 1985, pp. 147 ff.; Teubner, 1986b, 
pp. 261 ff.
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ation in terms of a contractual nexus of resource-holders and make 
participation in corporate governance dependent upon transaction- 
cost considerations. Political theories focus on power relations in 
economic organizations, and pose the question of legitimation. 
Autopoiesis, on the other hand, locates problems of corporate 
governance at the point of intersection of two evolutionary pro­
cesses. One is the gradual shift within neo-corporatism from macro- 
corporatist to micro-corporatist arrangements. The other is the 
development of the corporate group as a hybrid form of industrial 
organization. The latter is characterized by a mixture of market and 
organizational structures which is subject to strategic planning. 
If corporate governance resides at the intersection of the decen­
tralization of corporatism and the centralization of industrial 
organization, then the law of corporate governance is concerned 
with the legal stabilization of micro-corporatist arrangements so as 
to take account of the hybrid nature of the group enterprise as an 
‘organized market’. The emphasis is not on the protection of sub­
sidiaries or the regulation of the corporate group hierarchy. Rather, 
it is on the governance of the ‘poly-corporatist network’ itself, 
the flexible network or semi-autonomous administrative centres. 
Thus the question facing legal policy is as follows: Is the legal 
governance of a coalition of producers within the network of the 
unitas multiplex possible?
II
Before we go on to examine the poly-corporate network thesis in 
more detail, it is worth taking a brief look at some other theories. 
What vision of reality does the economic theory of the firm offer, 
which could serve as a basis for legal corporate governance?17 
Within economic theory Oliver Williamson has produced the most 
ambitious scheme to date.18 His starting-point is the dissolution of 
the organization into a nexus of exchange relationships among 
resource-holders. This makes it possible to view the corporation as 
one end of the spectrum of various types of contractual relation­
ships. These can range from the spot market transaction to the
17 Cf. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1986.
18 Williamson, 1975, 1985.
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multinational group. They are distinguished only by the fact that 
they exhibit ‘governance structures’ of varying quality and intensity. 
The choice among the various contractual arrangements is deter­
mined by the criterion of efficiency: ‘minimize transaction costs’. 
There are three factors which are decisive for the choice of gover­
nance structures: uncertainty, opportunism, and ‘asset specificity’. 
Of these it is the last which is most important in differentiating 
between forms of organization.
This theory is relevant for the law of corporate groups, because it 
helps to overcome the reservations of company and antitrust law 
towards these hybrid forms of organization. If Williamson can show 
that particular forms of group organization, especially the decen­
tralized form of multi-divisional organization, serve to minimize 
transaction costs and hence increase efficiency, he would challenge 
the traditional legal view. More precisely, he would challenge the 
legal assumption that the formation of a corporate group is either 
to the detriment of a dependent company in the interest of the 
dominating one or is a clear expression of a tendency towards 
concentration and monopolization.
Of similar relevance are the consequences of the transaction- 
cost approach to corporate governance in the narrower sense. 
Williamson asks whether resource-holders should be allowed 
to participate in internal decision-making processes. For him this 
depends on ‘asset specificity’. With low ‘asset specificity’, the com­
bination of contract and market controls is appropriate; with high 
‘asset specificity’, additional governance structures are necessary 
in order to control the opportunistic exploitation of temporary 
advantages (‘opportunism with guile’). For an economic theory, 
this has the somewhat surprising effect of putting the employees’ 
relationship with the firm on more than a mere contractual basis. 
Indeed, Williamson demands the integration of particular groups of 
employees into the governance structure of the firm -  not perhaps in 
supervisory boards but rather in grievance procedures and similar, 
more resource-specific, organizational mechanisms.
Both the strength and the weakness of transaction-cost theory 
lie in its contractualistic approach. The dissolution of economic 
organizations into a complex contractual nexus makes sense only in 
respect of members’ recruitment and the utilization of individual 
motivation for organizational purposes. However, as soon as the 
contractual mechanism is universalized, as soon as the whole of the 
organization is reduced to exchange relationships between resource- 
holders, it is doomed. The corporative and collective elements of
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organization are thus systematically underexposed, if not totally 
eclipsed.
Sociological theory suggests that contractualism amounts to an 
unjustified privileging of certain basic forms of social action over 
others. A theory which starts from the initial condition of double 
contingency19 juxtaposes three types of social action which are in 
principle equally valid: exchange, competition, and co-operation.20 
But the contractualist approach proceeds on the assumption that 
exchange and competition are the normal conditions of social 
action. Co-operation appears only as a compensation for market 
failure: that is, exchange failure and competition failure. Accord­
ingly, Williamson conceives of governance structures only as com­
pensatory mechanisms which intervene when high asset specificity 
makes it impossible for contractual mechanisms and market controls 
to function normally. In a remarkable narrowing of perspectives, 
governance is seen merely as a means of securing transaction-specific 
investments against unfair advantage (‘opportunism with guile’). He 
thus portrays governance structures as a way of overcoming unfair 
advantage. But does this not mean drastically underestimating the 
preconditions and consequences of co-operation as a basic form of 
action?
Williamson’s approach systematically fails to take into account 
many aspects of formal organization: decisions as elementary 
operations of organization, governed by internal organizational 
structures; goal-orientation of members towards the purpose of the 
organization; adjustment of resource-holders’ contracts towards 
the goal of the organization and its internalization in contractual 
relationships; subjection of the actors to the norms of the organ­
ization; membership as a combination of belonging and subjection 
to rules; the boundaries between organization and market and 
between the members of the organization and market partners, 
which are determined by the specific features of the organization; 
power as a medium of communication of the organization and 
corresponding forms of the co-ordination of action; informal 
relationships within the organization.21
To be sure, the contractualist viewpoint allows the ‘transaction’ 
to be viewed as the basic unit which is common to both contract 
and organization. However, this masks certain fundamental dif-
19 Parsons and Shils (eds), 1951, p. 16; Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 3.
20 Luhmann, 1992b, ch. 9, sect. 6.
21 For a critique of Williamson, cf. Granovetter, 1985; Kay, 1987; Knyphausen, 
1988, pp. 202 ff.; FitzRoy and Kay, 1990.
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ferences not taken into account by the theory. The basic unit of 
the market is the (financial) transaction, whereas that of the or­
ganization is the decision. Action in the market is primarily oriented 
towards prices, whereas action in organizaion is oriented towards 
expectations generated within the organization itself. Finally, the 
calculation of action in the market depends on the self-interest of the 
individual; whereas within the organization the calculation depends 
primarily on organizational interest.22
This brings us to the second fundamental criticism. A contrac- 
tualist approach systematically underestimates the role of the 
‘corporate actor’. Certainly Williamson describes in some depth the 
differences between contract and organization against the back­
ground of a ‘fundamental transformation’. Although market con­
trols are effective before a contract has been concluded, after 
conclusion, in the case of contracts with high asset specificity, a 
bilateral monopoly emerges. Unless some corporate governance 
precautions are built in, the fate of the contractual relationship is 
entirely at the mercy of the contractual partners. However, these 
analyses fail to take into account a second ‘fundamental trans­
formation’ which occurs when the contractual nexus becomes an 
autonomous collective actor. Lawyers speak of corporate elements 
and the legal person, sociologists of the corporate actor and the 
collective.23 And it is indeed true that some economists see the firm 
as a unity which can be compared to an individual actor. However, 
economists who adopt a contractualist approach have, up to now, at 
least, been blind to the phenomenon of the social imputation of 
action to collective actors. Williamson’s economic organization is 
nothing but a multiplicity of long-term contractual relationships 
between natural persons. However, those theorists who are com­
mitted to methodological individualism cannot evade entirely the 
logic of the collective.24 Accordingly, even in Williamson, collective 
units make an appearance, albeit in a rudimentary fashion. Witness, 
for example, references to ‘unified corporate governance’, ‘common 
profit-seeking’, and the firm as a partner in resource contracts. 
However, they are introduced only on an ad hoc basis in a theory 
that remains individualistic and contractualist.
Here we shall merely list briefly what gets lost in the process: the 
‘corporate actor’, as opposed to the individual contractual partners, 
as a new, different point of attribution for maximizing profit and
22 Luhmann, 1988a.
23 For further references, see Teubner, 1988a.
24 For a recent study of this with a detailed bibliography, see Galeotti, 1988.
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minimizing transaction costs; the criterion of ‘corporate interest’ as 
an independent criterion for resolving conflict between resource- 
holders -  that is, something which amounts to more than a mere 
balancing of interests against a background of real or fictitious 
market mechanisms; the corporate actor as a new contractual party 
for pooling resources; the collective binding effect of the corporate 
actor on the actions of the corporate agents; and the effect of the 
corporate actor on the outside world, which makes possible a new 
type of relationship between the firm and its environment.25
As far as corporate governance in groups is concerned, there are 
two consequences of the contractualists’ disregard for the corporate 
actor which are particularly important. First, the tension between 
unity and diversity in group enterprises26 cannot be grasped ade­
quately by looking at it only in terms of decentralization and the 
incorporation of market elements into the organization, as William­
son does. What is missing is the multiplication of corporate actors in 
an organized network -  and this is something that cannot be recon­
structed by theorists of contract (see section VII below). Secondly, 
the principles of corporate governance are looked at one-sidedly 
from the point of view of the resource-holders as contractual 
partners. They are seen as a protection against unfair advantage on 
either side. There is, of course, something to be gained from looking 
at things in this way. However, certain decisive elements of cor­
porate governance are overlooked. For it can be seen as oriented 
towards the collective interests of the corporate actor, to the 
advantage, in terms of efficiency, of the organization as a whole and 
its universal social functions and performances.27
In sum, the price of the transaction-cost approach to analysing 
the choice among organizational forms is a myopic view of the 
corporate and collective aspects of the company. This severely limits 
the value of this theory for a doctrine of corporation law.
Ill
No less deficient is the tunnel vision of those political theories which 
tend to treat industrial organizations as ‘private government’.28
25 For more on this, see Teubner, 1988a, pp. 143 ff.
26 Raiser, 1964; Balz, 1974, 1985; Assmann, 1990.
27 Cf. Buxbaum, 1984; Teubner, 1983a; 1985b, p. 470; 1988a.
28 Mason, 1959; Selznick, 1969; Dahl, 1973; Ott, 1977; Ulrich, 1977; Steinmann, 
1985; Bercusson, 1990.
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Their lasting merit lies in having discovered private economic 
organizations as para-political systems29 which build up organ­
izational power in order to produce collectively binding decisions 
throughout the organization. This puts the phenomenon of power 
in the forefront of the analysis. Theories of private government 
highlight the phenomenon of political power in economic organ­
izations which are allegedly geared only towards market efficiency. 
They thus enrich that analysis by drawing parallels with larger 
political systems. A whole range of political phenomena in the 
economic firm is thereby opened up to analysis: hierarchy, bureau­
cracy, accumulation of power, division of powers, group competi­
tion, political coalitions, negotiating systems, and log-rolling, to 
mention only a few.
Group enterprises, too, are essentially interpreted as a phenom­
enon of economic power.30 From the inside they appear to use 
company law to construct mega-hierarchies in industrial empires. 
From the outside they appear to build up power in the market and 
in the political arena.31 Correspondingly, legal policy is concerned 
with the critique and dismantling of economic power, or at least 
with attempting to limit it by subjecting it to the rule of law.
The problem is the abhorrence associated with power, especially 
when it is seen as absolute. In the political sphere, legitimized power 
is accepted as the mode through which regulation operates. It is 
evaluated by its ability to bring about positive social change.32 
In economic organization, however, power is looked upon in an 
overwhelmingly critical light. A sociological approach to power, 
which defines it as a medium of communication like money and law, 
is less likely to adopt an overtly moralistic approach. It is more 
likely to take a detached view of power in the economic sphere, 
without necessarily dismissing it as harmless or defending it as 
‘functional’. Even more problematic is the tendency to see power as 
the only driving force in the dynamics of economic organization. 
This has the effect of making hybrid forms of economic organization 
— such as the phenomenon of the corporate group -  appear solely as 
instruments of economic power, as forms of organization which are 
suited to drawing economic activity away from governmental and 
social controls. This approach fails to take account of both the
29 Easton, 1965, p. 51.
30 Hadden, 1983, 1984; Bercusson, 1990.
31 Cf. Sapelli, 1990.
Cf. Bercusson, 1987, p. 58.32
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positive social effects of such forms and the gains in efficiency they 
engender.
Even the company constitution itself, the core of the legitimation 
of ‘private government5, is pushed slightly to one side by this view. 
The emphasis in this theory is on workers5 participation, the legi­
timation of power in the firm through the participation of those 
directly involved. However, this means that the aspects of economic 
organization which affect society as a whole are lost. Corporate 
governance, then, is no longer oriented towards the primary aspect 
of any organization: namely, the social function of the corporation 
and what it does in relation to social subsystems. It is more con­
cerned with a secondary aspect, the general welfare of the members 
of the organization.33
IV
In section II we saw how the economic transaction-cost approach 
regards industrial organization as merely a network of contractual 
relations, albeit a complex one. In section III we saw how the 
political theory of ‘private government5 regards industrial organ­
izations as quasi-political power structures. The theory of auto- 
poietic systems, on the other hand, sees the emergence of organiza­
tion as an internal process through which the economic system 
differentiates itself into an organized and a ‘spontaneous5 domain.34 
Autopoiesis does not see the opposition between contract and 
organization in the corporation as one of degree, distinguished 
only by differing governance structures. Rather, it insists on the 
fundamental difference between contract and organization.35
According to this view, contracts serve to formalize the processes 
of exchange which organize the autopoietic reproduction of the 
economic system -  that is, the reproduction of acts of payment by 
acts of payment. They build upon a basic form of social action: 
namely, exchange against a background of competition.36 Organ­
izations, on the other hand, formalize co-operation as a third basic 
form of social action. Contrary to the view of Grossman and Hart,37
33 Cf. Teubner, 1983a, 1986b, 1988a.
34 Luhmann, 1981b, p. 393.
35 Cf. Teubner, 1979, pp. 719 ff.
36 Luhmann, 1964.
37 Grossman and Hart, 1986.
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organizations are not to be seen merely as contracts, strengthened by 
governance structures or decision rights over non-contractables, 
whereby payments continue to flow as before. Rather, they represent 
a fundamentally different form of system formation within the 
economy. They, too, are autopoietic systems, the elements of which 
comprise not payments but decisions. Organizations are systems 
which comprise decisions and which themselves produce the de­
cisions which comprise them.38 At the same time, they use their 
self-organized structures in order to specify expectations which 
guarantee that within the system every action can be treated as a 
decision.39
This is not to underestimate contracts between resource-holders 
or simply to reinterpret them in toto in terms of organizational 
structures. It is, however, to relegate them to the environment of the 
organization. Resource-holders -  that is, owners of capital—workers 
and management, as well as suppliers and customers, are not part of 
the organization; rather, they constitute its environment. Contracts 
between them or with them are thus ways of regulating the en­
vironmental relationships of the organization. Lawyers are quite 
familiar with this distinction between contract and organization, 
even if the legal construction varies according to the various re­
source-holders concerned. In the case of workers, for example, 
German law makes a distinction between their labour contract and 
their integration into the organization; in the case of management, 
between the employment relationship and the agency relationship.40 
The distinction is less clear in the case of shareholders. Their con­
tractual relations with the firm and their individual rights of mem­
bership can, however, be separated from their actions as organs of 
the company.
Autopoiesis treats organization and contract in terms of system 
and environment. The contractual network of the resource-holders 
governs the external relationship between the environment of the 
organization and its members. The organization itself constitutes an 
independent, autonomous system of action, reproducing itself not 
through contractual transactions, but through the recursive linkage 
of organizational decisions. The logic of the contractual network 
is profoundly different from that of the decisional network. Ad­
mittedly, Williamson attempts to grasp one aspect of this distinction
38 Luhmann, 1988a, p. 167; cf. also Teubner, 1985b, pp. 471, 477; Gomez and 
Probst, 1985, p. 22; Knyphausen, 1988, pp. 238 ff.; Hutter, 1989b; Clune, 1992.
39 Luhmann, 1988a, p. 168.
See e.g. K. Schmidt, 1986, pp. 312 ff.40
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with the help of the distinction between high-powered and low- 
powered incentives.41 But the conceptual apparatus used is not 
complex enough to take into account the different dynamics of 
self-reproduction. The contractual network is concerned with 
motivation; it is through the contract that the motivation for 
resource-holders to make effective contributions is generated. 
The decisional network, on the other hand, is oriented towards 
organizational rationality. This means primarily towards autopoietic 
reproduction and secondarily towards the rationalization strategies 
adopted -  that is, toward the goals of the organization, the rela­
tionship between end and means, hierarchic instructions, informal 
expectations, and so forth. To subsume both in the concept of a 
comprehensive contractual nexus would make motivational and 
purposive structures coincide. It would mean revoking the dis­
tinction between motive and purpose which is characteristic of 
modern, flexible organizations. To put it polemically, it would 
effectively downgrade industrial organization to a private club.42
Contrary to the view of economists, with the exception perhaps 
of Nelson and Winter,43 the boundary between the economy’s 
spontaneous and organized spheres, between ‘market and hier­
archy’, is not constituted by rational choice but by evolution. Faced 
with the choice between contract and organization, economists tend 
grossly to overestimate the role of rational actors in evaluating 
decisions for their consequences on the basis of their order of pre­
ference. The various ‘chaos theories’ of organization (Simon, 
March, Olsen)44 which have been on the go for years have thus had 
little impact on economic theories of industrial organization. In 
addition to the time-honoured ‘bounded rationality’, the key con­
cepts of chaos theories include ‘loose coupling, disorderliness, non­
decisions, problematic attentions, learning, and garbage-can decision 
processes’.45 Certainly, Williamson’s emphasis on decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty and on ‘bounded rationality’ is a 
forcible example of this. However, there is a certain reluctance to 
draw the logical conclusion from this and acknowledge ‘that the 
semantics of rationality is practised as if it were singing and whist­
ling in the dark in order to drive out uncertainty and fear.’46 The
41 Williamson, 1988.
42 On the separation of goal and motive, see Gehlen, 1956, pp. 31, 35 ff.; 
Luhmann, 1973b, pp. 128 ff.; Teubner, 1978, pp. 60 ff., 262 ff.
43 Nelson and Winter, 1982.
44 Cf. March, 1988.
45 March and Shapira, 1982, p. 94.
46 Luhmann, 1984b, p. 602.
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radical consequence of this is a shift from rational action towards 
blind evolution.47 It is the uncoordinated interaction of mechanisms 
of variation and selection that in fact determines the choice of 
market and hierarchy. Put more precisely, what we have here is the" 
interplay of the trial-and-error strategies of economic actors and the 
interaction of competition and power processes on the market, 
together with stabilization mechanisms -  that is, the institutional­
ization of organizational arrangements. That the decisions of actors 
claiming to be rational play some role, particularly in the case of 
variation, is not disputed.
The sole criteria of success are the survival advantages of the 
specific institutional arrangements. We have the more recent 
economic theories of the firm to thank for pointing out that among 
these institutional arrangements transaction costs certainly play a 
significant role. However, there is some doubt as to whether it is 
possible to do complete justice to the relevant differences between 
market and hierarchy using this category. Systems theory, for 
example, works with the distinction between redundancy and 
variety, which can be allied to the dichotomy between hierarchy and 
market.48 ‘Redundancy’ means the structural limitation of decision­
making contexts, which results in concentrated power for the 
organization, albeit at the expense of other, better, decision pos­
sibilities. ‘Variety’, on the other hand, means increasing the range 
of options open and being able to adopt a flexible response to 
turbulent environments. This is far more likely to be achieved 
through decentralized contractual co-ordination than through 
hierarchical organization. Other criteria for successful evolution 
have to do with economies of scale, the advantages of co-ordinated 
behaviour, the synergetic effects of joint venturing, differences in 
motivation, and the effects of bureaucracy. These work partly for 
and partly against formal organization. This bipolar effect is at the 
same time the explanation of the unlikelihood of the economy as a 
whole developing into a huge formal organization. The interplay 
of redundancy and variety prevents the merger of market and 
hierarchy.
V
So far, I have briefly sketched how the relationship between firm and 
market has been reinterpreted in the light of autopoiesis. This has
47 Cf. Aldrich, 1979; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Weick, 1979; Hutter, 1989a.
48 Luhmann, 1987c, 1988a.
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been necessary to prepare the way for a new approach to corporate 
governance in group enterprises. Once the evolution of markets 
and firms had stabilized the differentiation of the economy into a 
spontaneous and an organized sphere, the further development of 
the economy was characterized by a variety of attempts to seek 
evolutionary advantage by engaging in a process of trial and error. 
The way this was to be achieved was by combining (not fusing) the 
two forms of institutional arrangement. In the history of industrial 
organization, many experiments with hybrid forms have taken 
place, experiments with the organization of markets and the mar­
keting of organizations. There is no need to enumerate the various 
movements towards market concentration and the attempts at 
decentralization in large organizations. In the present context we 
are primarily interested in two lines of development within which 
relatively stable institutions have formed: neo-corporatist arrange­
ments, on the one hand, and the decentralization of large corporate 
hierarchies, on the other. The problem of corporate governance in 
group enterprises is to be located at the point of intersection of these 
two developments.
Of the many attempts at the organizational penetration of mar­
kets in recent years, it has been neo-corporatist arrangements which 
have attracted most attention.49 This new ‘voluntary’ symbiosis of 
capital, labour, and state seemed to offer certain advantages over 
previous corporatist experiments, as well as other forms of social­
ization, collective economy, and state planning. It could build upon 
the historically evolved hierarchies of employers’ associations, the 
trade unions, and the state bureaucracy, and use them to the full in 
order to formulate and implement policy. Neo-corporatism thereby 
acquired a procedural flexibility which made it more compatible 
with the structures of the economic system than other political 
arrangements of political interest mediation.50
It is worth noting that corporate arrangements developed on three 
levels. Certainly, the main focus was macro-corporatist institutions 
(social and economic councils, Konzertierte Aktion, Social Contract, 
Paritätische Kommision, patto sociale) which show varying degrees 
of formal organization and juridification. The aim of these was to 
reach an accord on a national level between corporate policies, trade 
union strategies, and state economic policies.51 At the same time, 
however, such meso-corporatist arrangements as the co-ordination
49 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Vardaro, 1988.
50 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985.
51 Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979.
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of collective agents at branch and regional level gained increasingly 
in importance.52 Finally, micro-corporatist arrangements at the 
level of industrial organizations were also part of the corporatist 
syndrome. This includes not only models of co-determination as in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, but also cogestion à la 
française and more informal workers’ participation rights which 
have developed out of collective bargaining, as in Italy.53
In the mid-1970s, the high point of the ‘new corporatism’, its 
two main proponents, Philip Schmitter and John Winkler were not 
concerned merely with establishing this concept in the academy. 
They were also concerned with its definition and prospects of 
success in the world outside. Schmitter described it as a new-style 
‘mode of political interest mediation’, and saw it as a way of over­
coming the governability crisis.54 Winkler, on the other hand, 
viewed ‘neo-corporatism’ as the successful new form of political 
regulation of the economy, as an ‘economic system of private 
ownership and state control’.55 Despite their various differences, 
both authors put the main emphasis on macro-corporatist struc­
tures. Others saw the future of corporatism in an interweaving of 
the various levels. Wassenberg predicted that corporatism would 
develop in the following way:
Corporatism seems to be developing increasingly towards an inter- 
organisational strategy for seeking out groups which are capable of 
adapting to each other’s needs while at the same time remaining 
highly dependent upon each other. The strategy adopted by these 
groups is to transpose conflicts of identity or interest that cannot be 
resolved on the meso-level either on to the micro-level of individual 
firms or the macro-level of parliamentary debate.56
Today we know better. The development of the corporatist ex­
periments proved none of the three authors right, but resulted in a 
shift in emphasis: an involution from macro-corporatism towards 
micro-corporatism.57
52 e.g. Esser and Fach, 1981; Wassenberg, 1978.
53 On the corporatist interpretation of co-determination, cf. Wassenberg, 1978, 
p. 8; Panitch, 1979, p. 123; Erd, 1982, p. 148; Dittrich, 1985; Teubner, 1986b, 
1988a; Sciarra, 1990.
54 Schmitter, 1974, 1977.
55 Winkler, 1976, p. 109.
56 Wassenberg, 1978, p. 8.
57 Cf. Sciarra, 1990.
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After the economic crisis and the thorough restructuring of in­
dustrial organizations and regulatory systems in Western Europe,58 
things have become rather quiet as far as macro-corporatist ar­
rangements are concerned. These have to some extent been caught 
up in the wake of deregulation and de-institutionalization. Although 
they continue to exist in a formal sense, their real importance has 
diminished. In any case, they have been removed from the economic 
policy agenda for the time being.59 However, this does not mean 
that corporatism has disappeared: it has merely undergone a shift in 
emphasis. Unlike macro- and meso-structures, micro-corporatist 
arrangements have survived a period of crisis and reorganization. 
They have emerged as stable coalitions of producers, at the level 
of large corporations, and as state-backed units oriented towards 
efficiency and success, on the world market.60 Micro-corporatist 
arrangements at the level of the firm have emerged as an interesting 
alternative strategy for increasing industrial flexibility.
Macro-corporatist strategies are no longer in vogue. On the 
contrary, they appear rigid, centralist, and inflexible in a period 
of rapid market change, heightened competitive pressure, and 
weakening or failing governmental regulatory regimes.61 Decen­
tralization and increasing flexibility through contractual arrange­
ments is the new motto. And this applies equally to methods of 
financing, technologies, the product range, customer relations, and 
labour relations.62 The goal of the new industrial policy is flexibility 
as an end in itself: ‘a general capacity of enterprises to reorganize in 
close response to fluctuations in their environment’.63
While flexibility through contract is generally what is called for 
nowadays, micro-corporatist arrangements can offer an alternative 
in the heated debate on ‘Americanization’ or ‘Japanization’. We may 
call this ‘flexibility through organization’.64 Flexibility cannot 
only be established through contractual arrangements; it can also 
be established through decentralization of the micro-corporately 
governed organization. In addition, a policy based on organization 
can make use of the advantages for productivity of a ‘coalition of 
producers’ (capital, management, labour, state framework), which
58 Cf. Sugarman and Teubner (eds), 1990.
59 Cf. Streeck, 1987.
60 Streeck, 1984, 1990.
61 Cf. Simitis, 1987, pp. 124 ff.
62 Piore and Sabel, 1984; Strauss, 1984.
63 Streeck, 1987.
64 Gutchess, 1985; Streeck, 1987.
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are increasingly required under the conditions of the new industrial 
divide.
This industrial policy position comes very close to the ideas 
developed here. In fact, the attempt to use contractual arrangements 
to gain flexibility by favouring one group of resource-holders, 
whether shareholders, labour, or management, would not be in 
the best interests of the organization. Certainly, the advantage of 
contractual arrangements lies in the way they are able to respond 
quickly and at short notice to the fluctuating demands of the en­
vironment. They do this by building up and dismantling systems of 
action. Their disadvantage, however, lies in the fact that contractual 
solutions cannot exploit ‘organizational surplus value’ to the full.65 
‘Organizational surplus value’ arises from three sources: (1) long­
term relationships of co-operation which would continually be 
destroyed by contractual flexibility; (2) ‘commitments’ in the 
organization, which, by contrast with rigid, narrowly circumscribed 
contractual obligations, make the situation far more flexible; and 
(3) the orientation of the actors towards the interests of the organ­
ization, which has more pulling power than a purposive view of the 
contract.
This suggests a legal conception of corporate governance based 
upon a micro-corporatist coalition of producers. According to 
this view, none of the resource-holders -  neither capital, labour, 
management, nor even the State — has a natural claim to ‘sover­
eignty within the group’. In principle, the connection between 
resource holding and controlling rights is broken, and all controlling 
rights over all resources are assigned to the ‘corporate actor’.
The idea of ‘organizationally bound property rights’66 is dia­
metrically opposed to the idea that the firm constitutes a mere 
‘contractual nexus’. The distribution of control rights within the 
firm is not governed by the priority of one resource interest or by the 
logic of exchange in the contractual nexus. Rather, it is governed by 
considerations of efficiency oriented towards the interests of the 
‘corporate actor’, which do not coincide with the interests of any 
participants.
Even if one recognizes the integrative and motivational effects 
of micro-corporatist arrangements, the external disadvantages of 
producers’ coalitions require examination. Chief among them is that 
the coalitions reach their agreements at the expense of third parties
65 Cf. esp. Selznick, 1969, pp. 54 ff.; Streeck, 1987.
66 Krause, 1986, pp. 219 ff., 225.
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and the public interest.67 From the point of view of legal policy, this 
is the weakness of corporatism within the firm in the sense of a 
simple coalition of producers. However, it is the emergence of 
the corporate actor, whose social existence flies in the face of all 
methodological individualism, that shows the way for legal policy. 
The way ahead lies in reinforcing the institutional position of the 
corporate actor in order to make an impersonal context of action 
autonomous. It is this which imposes effective constraints on the 
range of action of individual participants in the interests of the 
organization, defined in broad social terms.
VI
Above, we have discussed the tendencies towards the involution of 
neo-corporatism from the macro-level of co-ordinated economic 
policy to the micro-level of the coalition of producers in the large 
corporation. If these tendencies have been described accurately, then 
we may presume that the corporatist triangle has chanced upon its 
ideal field of application at the level of company organization. In the 
hierarchy of company organization, it has found the highest possible 
point at which strategic planning in the economic system still 
appears effective. Here it can employ its mechanisms of interest 
aggregation and of policy implementation to good effect.
We are left wondering, however, whether it has not in fact started 
one level too far down in the hierarchy, whether it has not made use 
of developments which have long since shifted the strategic planning 
centre of industrial organization to a higher level.68 This brings us 
to a second trend of interest in the combination of market and 
organization: the development of group enterprises as ‘organized 
markets’. Here, micro-corporatist negotiating practices already play 
an important part effectively, but the law of corporate governance 
has been unable to track them adequately.
The interesting thing about corporate groups is not so much 
that they are part of a general movement towards economic con­
centration, which makes it possible to build huge business empires 
by using the instruments of private law, such as membership and
67 Cf. the discussion of empirical material in Hopt, 1984; Streeck, 1984; Krause, 
1985.
68 Eisenberg, 1976, pp. 277ff.; Herman, 1981, pp. 187 ff.; Sapelli, 1990.
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contract, but rather that there is competition between institutional 
arrangements. This competition among institutions is a feature of 
the history of group enterprises, the gradual evolution of which can 
be described through the following ideal types:
Historically, from the prevalence of the ‘patrimonial group’ we 
have passed to that of the ‘financial group’, then to the ‘industrial 
group’ and, finally, to the ‘managerial’ and ‘network’ group. It is 
the latter group which is functional in the context of present-day 
competition.69
The group enterprises with which economic practice experi­
mented can be subdivided into three broad categories: the H-form 
(‘holding form’) as a loosely organized form of the pure adminis­
tration of assets, the U-form (‘unitary form’) as the strictly con­
trolled hierarchical form of the unitary group, and the M-form 
(‘multi-divisional form’) as the largely decentralized form of group 
enterprise, in which the sub-units appear as autonomous ‘profit 
centres’ on the market. The M-form has proved the most efficient 
form of organization, and one which combines considerable con­
centration with a high degree of decentralization.70
From the point of view of systems theory, there are three things 
here which are worthy of note.
(1) Contextual regulation o f autonomous systems
The M-form is a clear demonstration of the fact that once organized 
social systems reach a particular size, direct hierarchical regulation 
runs into difficulties. This issue has been discussed in detail in 
systems theory under the heading of the regulation of autopoietic 
systems.71 In such situations, direct hierarchical control must be 
replaced by ‘contextual regulation’.72 The only way of regulating 
complex organizations from the outside is to grant them a high 
degree of autonomy and to lay down only general structural guide­
lines to regulate the context of action.73 Strategic planning of the
69 Sapelli, 1990: 195; cf. esp. Dioguardi, 1986.
70 Chandler, 1966, pp. 382 ff.; Williamson, 1981, pp. 1555 ff.; Hedlund, 1981; 
Jacquemin, 1987, pp. 139 ff.; Jarillo, 1988.
71 Cf. e.g. Probst and Scheuss, 1984; Knyphausen, 1988, pp. 317 ff.
72 Willke, 1992.
73 For empirical material see Hedlund, 1981, pp. 21 ff; van den Bulcke, 1986; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988.
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overall policy of the group enterprise, co-ordination by determining 
management and personnel policy, and indirect profit regulation, 
which are the forms of regulation frequently used in the M-form, 
mirror this postulate precisely.74
(2) Re-entry o f the market
Decentralization is frequently seen as the decisive element of the 
M-form.75 The fact that the M-form, within the limits of the group 
enterprise itself, replicates the internal differentiation of the economy 
into a formally organized sphere and a spontaneous one is even 
more important, however. This amounts to the ‘re-entry’ of the 
distinction between system and environment into the system itself.76 
The distinction between market and organization is repeated once 
again within the organization. The ‘market principle’ penetrates 
the ‘organizational area’.77 The group enterprise uses the interplay 
of redundancy and variety to its own ends. This means that ‘the 
more large incorporated organisations determine the course of 
events in politics and the economy, the more important it is for 
them to repeat this interplay of variety and redundancy within 
their own structures and not to commit themselves too heavily to 
redundancy’.78 Markets are organized within the organization. 
Attempts are made to simulate a kind of capital market in the 
relationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries. This is 
paralleled by the development of labour markets, manager markets, 
and resource and product markets within the group enterprise itself.
The proportions in this blend of market and organization in the 
group is not fixed for all time, but can be altered for strategic 
reasons.79 The enterprises within the group can either act auto­
nomously or engage in co-ordinated action as they see fit. This 
is a feature of the group enterprise as a multi-stable system.80 
As Kirchner puts it: ‘Market and hierarchy are available to the 
company organised as a group enterprise as complements or as
74 Williamson, 1981, pp. 1555 ff.; Scheffler, 1985, pp. 2009 ff.; 1987.
75 Cf. e.g. Hommelhoff, 1982, pp. 231 ff.
76 Spencer-Brown, 1972.
77 Imai and Itami, 1984, p. 285.
78 Luhmann, 1987c, p. 48.
79 Cf. Assmann, 1990; Sapelli, 1990, p. 198.
80 Pausenberger, 1975, p. 2243.
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alternatives to one another.’81 The choice between market and 
hierarchy does not follow blind selection as the economy develops. 
Rather, it is the object of planned decision making. More important 
still, these decisions are subject to constant change. As Vardaro 
puts it:
The same group can adopt both the hierarchical model and the 
contractual model, not only according to the changing internal and 
external conditions, but also according to the degree of its functional 
diversification. With regards to some aspects, it can appear as a 
hierarchy, totally conditioned by the decisional power of the holding, 
while with regard to others it can appear as a network of equal 
companies. The relationship between contract and organisation, as 
well as that between centralisation and decentralisation, is therefore 
flexible.82
Group organization thus correponds to the general insight that as 
far as redundancy and variety are concerned, there is no general 
preference for one or the other and no ‘optimal mix’ of the two. The 
proportions have to be constantly adjusted to match the ever- 
shifting relation between the system and its environment.
Depending upon what kind of noise is being experienced in the 
system, what irritation perceived and what changes have taken place, 
one or other pole will take the lead. If the system is to maintain its 
rationality (if we can call it that), it is of crucial importance that it 
retain the ability to switch the lead between redundancy and variety. 
The system ought with a fair amount of certainty to be able to see a 
high degree of redundancy as one way of ensuring that it has more 
variety. Conversely, it should be able to perceive tendencies towards 
ad  hoc and situational dependent decision making as a reason for 
tightening up decision-making procedures — whether by strategic 
planning, exploiting the potential of the network or via personnel 
policy.83
In the decentralized group enterprise, a ‘navigational rule’ becomes a 
principle which is built into the hybrid organizational form. The 
chameleon-like quality of an organization which is constantly 
changing its form is the main distinguishing feature of corporate
81 Kirchner, 1985, p. 226.
82 Vardaro, 1990, p. 239.
83 Luhmann, 1988a, p. 181.
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governance. Choosing a colour which blends in with the environ­
ment is one of the main tasks of group management.
(3) Internal dynamics o f a self-observing process
The third feature has to do with the autonomy of the sub-units 
vis-à-vis the apex of the hierarchic group. It is this autonomy 
that provides the group enterprise with an internal dynamic which 
guarantees it certain evolutionary advantages over purely hier­
archical or market-type co-ordination.84 This internal dynamic 
means that the process becomes self-referential; that is, it observes 
itself, and on that basis regulates itself.85 Defined in this way, 
the internal dynamic of pure hierarchy is limited in that the ob­
servational centre of the process is located at the apex. Inasmuch 
as other observational centres develop within the hierarchical 
organization, they are, in a certain sense, dysfunctional, because 
they develop their criteria of observation and regulation only to 
a sub-optimal level as against the organization as a whole. The 
situation is different in group enterprises which are decentralized 
through profit centres. These are characterized by the multiplication 
of observational centres whose criteria of observation and regulation 
are oriented towards the success of the organization as a whole.
VII
What legal consequences emerge from this view of the group? 
Which of the various ‘legal images’ of the group that underlie legal 
regulations appears most suitable for our reconstruction in the 
framework of autopoietic theory? What follows from our recon­
struction for the group’s regulatory problems, in particular for the 
tasks of future corporate governance in group enterprises?
I would argue that the legal debate up till now has been based on 
a false opposition between two legal images: namely, the ‘dependent 
company’ on the one hand and the ‘hierarchical unity of the group 
enterprise’ on the other. Possibilities of other types of corporate
84 Hommelhoff, 1982, p. 229.
85 For recent sociological debate on internal dynamics, cf. Mayntz and Nedelmann, 
1987; Teubner, 1988c.
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governance would open up if we were to opt for a third image, that 
of a ‘poly-corporate network’.
‘The dependent legal person’, the title of Kronstein’s famous 
work, gvies a clear image of how the group enterprise appears in 
law. It has had a decisive influence both on the way in which group 
problems have been perceived and on the instruments for regulating 
group enterprises. Its starting-point was the historical liberation of 
the legal person and the emergence of the joint-stock company as 
the typical large-scale organization; in other words, it was con­
cerned with the autonomy of the corporation vis-à-vis its environ­
ment and its shareholders. This was diametrically opposed to 
the new tendencies towards group formation. These reduce the 
autonomy of the legal person to a mere semblance of autonomy, 
transfer the sovereignty of the association from the corporate agents 
to a third party, and destroy the internal balance of power of 
corporate governance.86
The legal image of the ‘dependent company’ furnishes a view­
point based on a comparison between the legal constitution of an 
autonomous business enterprise and the position of a subsidiary 
which has become dependent through the process of group forma­
tion. If this comparison shows that the subsidiary’s loss of auto­
nomy has detrimental effects, then, it is argued, the law has either to 
effect a return to the status quo or to provide for compensation for 
any disadvantage incurred.
The paradigmatic example here is ‘piercing the corporate veil’. 
The normal case is one of the separateness and autonomy of the 
legal person. In exceptional cases, particularly in instances in which 
the parent company exerts tight control over the subsidiary, direct 
action can be taken against the parent company in accordance with 
the ‘reality of life’. Thinking in terms of ‘agency’ is another example 
of this, because it dictates that the group enterprise be viewed as a 
unity only if the subsidiary has acted as a ‘quasi-agent’ of the parent 
company.87 In Europe, the image of the ‘dependent firm’ is even 
more influential. The French law on group enterprise thinks ex­
clusively in terms of the enterprise dependente.88 The situation is 
similar in other European countries: for example, Italy, Portugal, 
and the Netherlands.89 Even the German law on group enterprise of
86 Cf. Antunes, 1990.
87 Cf. Blumberg, 1983, pp. 20 ff.
88 Cf. Houin, 1982; Jeantin, 1990.
89 On the situation in Italy, see Alessi, 1988; for Portugal, Antunes, 1990; for the 
Netherlands, Franken, 1976, p. 22; de Knijff, 1989.
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1965, which is often praised as very advanced, remains dominated 
to a large extent by the legal image of the ‘dependent company’, at 
least as far as the de facto group is concerned.90 Compensation for 
loss, which is provided when the parent company issues the sub­
sidiary with disadvantageous directions, is oriented towards the 
image of a company acting autonomously in the market.91
The inappropriateness of this legal image does not need to be 
demonstrated here. It is self-evident from what has been said to date 
about the new type of organizational unity which characterizes the 
group enterprise.92 What is astonishing is the fact that it still forms 
the basis of so much legal regulation and is allowed to dictate 
problems and solutions. Only gradually has an opposing view made 
headway where the group enterprise has been viewed from ‘top 
down’ rather than vice versa. Here one sees the group enterprise as a 
legal unit from the point of view of the parent company. Early 
attempts to arrive at such a unity theory of the group, like that of 
Isay,93 have been unsuccessful. Today, by contrast, this unitary 
approach is prevailing across the board. In the forefront of this 
movement in Germany are Marcus Lutter94 and his school.95 French 
labour law, which, unlike French company law, takes the unitary 
approach seriously, is particularly advanced in this area.96 In the 
Netherlands, de Stuctuuregeling, which introduces compulsory 
supervisory boards into large corporations, was based on the legis­
lators’ view ‘that the group of companies had to be seen as a unity’, 
and thus exempts subsidiaries from this requirement.97 In the USA it 
is particularly Blumberg who criticizes the ‘piercing of the corporate 
veil’ and advocates a unitary view of the corporate group.98 And, of 
course, the new solutions adopted by the law of worker partici­
pation in France, the Netherlands, and Germany tend to view the 
group as a unitary enterprise, irrespective of whether they focus on 
co-determination via works’ councils or supervisory boards.99 Their
90 Cf. Hommelhoff, 1982, pp. 33 ff.
91 Rehbinder, 1986, p. 87.
92 For a critique see Assmann, 1990.
93 Isay, 1910.
94 Lutter, 1974a, b; 1977, 1985, 1987.
95 e.g. Timm, 1980; Schneider, 1981; Hommelhoff, 1982.
96 Cf. Savatier, 1986; Supiot, 1986; Rodière, 1990.
97 Honée, 1981, p. 40.
98 Blumberg, 1983, 1985, 1987.
99 Supiot, 1986; Lutter, 1975; Lutter and Uwe H. Schneider, 1977; Birk, 1990; de 
Knijff, 1989, pp. 71 ff.
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aim is to locate models of co-determination at the level of the parent 
company as the decision-making centre of the group.
However appropriate the unitary view may be, its concept of the 
group enterprise as a uniform hierarchy and its corresponding focus 
on the parent company as the centre of action and accountability 
does pose some problems. The works of the Lutter school provide 
the most clear examples of this. Here, too, a comparison is regularly 
drawn, but this time between the parent company and a ‘classic’ 
corporation. The main question is what kind of distorting effect 
does group formation have on the corporate governance of the 
parent company? What disturbances, what asymmetries arise in the 
internal balance of power of the organs of the corporation? What 
compensatory regulations are needed to counterbalance these dis­
turbances? This refers to the general meeting of the parent company, 
and means that its powers in relation to the group enterprise has to 
be redefined. In the famous Holzmüller case (Bundesgerichtshof 83, 
122), this ‘top-down’ thinking was expressed by the federal court 
when it increased the powers of the general meeting of the parent 
company.
The same criticism may be levelled against the unitary view of 
the group enterprise which prevails in labour law. Attempts are 
regularly made to identify the power centre of the group enterprise, 
the point at which the really important decisions are made. Time 
and time again, real power is seen to reside at the apex of the 
hierarchy. Kahn-Freund100 has already made clear how wrong it is 
to identify power and hierarchy in this way: ‘The state of power 
may be at the centre or at the periphery, or may be divided.’ 
Analyses of decision-making processes in group organizations 
should in fact have done away with such naive notions of hierarchy 
a long time ago.101
Despite undeniable progress, the unitary view fails to grasp the 
three characteristics of the group enterprise which we picked out as 
essential from the point of view of systems theory. First, thinking in 
terms of hierarchy in situations in which the power of the organ­
ization is seen to lie with the parent company fails to take due 
account of the need to decentralize power -  a need which arises 
because a hierarchical regulation of complex systems makes sense 
only if it is restricted to exerting indirect control over areas such as 
the budget and the appointment of key personnel. Secondly, it fails
100 Kahn-Freund, 1972, p. 353.
101 Cf. van den Bulcke, 1986.
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to take account of the fact that because market structures have 
become internalized within the organization, the group enterprise is 
to be understood as an ‘organized market’ rather than simply a 
hierarchy. Thirdly, it fails to do justice to the internal dynamics of 
the group enterprise by not focusing on the dynamic interplay of 
a multitude of autonomous centres of activity which the parent 
company has some difficulty in co-ordinating. Instead, it views the 
parent company as the symbolic centre of the activity of the group 
enterprise.
Accordingly, it is not hierarchy which should determine the legal 
image of the group enterprise, but the network; not the control 
power at the top, but the co-ordination of autonomous centres of 
activity. Nor can the concept of enterprise simply be transferred to 
the group as a whole, as, for example, Blumberg suggests.102. On 
the other hand, it is not enough to react to tendencies towards 
decentralization by coming forward with the notion of Unterneh- 
mensgruppe}03 Instead, the point is the co-ordination of a multi­
plicity of companies through one higher-order organization, the 
group enterprise.104 The group enterprise as a ‘corporate actor’, 
or even better as a poly-corporative network, is the catch-phrase 
which perhaps best describes the qualities of the group enterprise as 
a new phase in the development of industrial organization. The 
hierarchical structure of the group enterprise is certainly compatible 
with the concept of network. A ‘hierarchically organized network of 
semi-autonomous companies’ might be the best way of describing 
the situation.
The group enterprise network will thus have to be described as a 
legal subject, but one of a particular type which is significantly 
different from the traditional legal subjects, the natural and the legal 
person.105 The group enterprise as a network overcomes the tra­
ditional anthropomorphic concepts of the legal person and the 
corporate actor in two respects: (1) unitary imputation yields to 
multiple imputation; (2) personification yields to autonomization. 
These transformations are the only way to do justice to the unitary 
nature of the group.]
Unitary imputation has been one of the strongest constraints of 
anthropomorphic thinking in the context of corporate personality. 
The social fiction of a corporate actor, as well as the legal con-
102 Blumberg, 1983, pp. 23 ff.
103 Wiedemann, 1988, pp. 6 ff.
104 Balz, 1974, 1985.
105 Cf. ibid.
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struction of legal person, allow for one and only one centre of action 
and will: the ‘person’ that has to be conceived as the point of 
attribution for actions, rights, duties, and liabilities. Either the 
subsidiary is responsible or, by piercing the corporate veil, the 
parent company. Tertium non datur. If, however, the group enter­
prise is to be understood as a network of autonomous centres of 
activity, then we can free ourselves from this pressure towards 
unitary imputation and start from the simultaneous multiple im­
putation of actions and legal positions. The unitary imputation, 
always present in the case of the legal person must, in the case of the 
group enterprise, be distributed over three levels: the particular 
member of the group, the parent company, and the group enterprise 
network itself. A distinction has to be made between three different 
forms of imputation; the cumulative, in which the imputation is 
added; the alternative, in which the imputation is applied only on 
one level of the group enterprise; and the complementary, in which 
partial imputations at various group levels combine only when the 
things is looked at as a whole.
The technique of legal imputation itself needs to be chameleon­
like. It needs to adapt itself to the flexible practice of corporate 
groups, which is ad hoc and opportunistic in its choice of both the 
suitable blend between market and organization and the necessary 
degree of centralization. The legal imputation of actions, rights, 
duties, and liabilities must, if it wishes to react at all to the chopping 
and changing of the group, be detached from ideas of tying down 
accountability once and for all. The legal imputation of account­
ability must itself proceed ad hoc and opportunistically. One proved 
available model is of course the case method. This makes the ques­
tion of which group level to assign a particular action or legal 
position to dependent on the circumstances of the individual case. 
This means that it must have a large selection of criteria of im­
putation at its disposal.
The fact that operative and flexible decisions can be arrived at in 
this way is illustrated by Blumberg’s checklist of unity and diversity 
in the group.106
Formalities of the Subsidiary's Operations
(1) Separate book of accounts;
(2) Separate bank accounts;
(3) Separate meetings of the board of directors;
(4) Separate meetings of the shareholders.
106 Blumberg, 1983, pp. 456 ff.
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(9) Separate telephone numbers;
(10) Separate address;
(11) Separate letterhead.
Integration of the Business Activities of the Subsidiary and the Group
(12) Percentage of the total sales represented by sales to the parent 
and affiliates or sales of products of the parent and affiliates;
(13) Percentage of total purchases represented by purchases of the 
parent and affiliates;
(14) Performance of services for the parent or affiliates that they 
would otherwise have to perform directly;
(15) Coverage of warranties by the parent or affiliates for customers 
of the subsidiary.
Integration of the Internal Operation of the Subsidiary and the 
Group
(16) Loans, guarantees, or other financial assistance from the parent 
or affiliates;
(17) Inclusion of the subsidiary in the insurance coverage of the 
parent or affiliates;
(18) Participation in group employee retirement, profit-sharing, 
insurance, or other benefit plans;
(19) Participation in group employee training programs;
(20) Exchange and rotation of personnel among the parent, sub­
sidiary, or affiliates;
(21) Exchange of information and reporting;
(22) Group visitation and inspection programs;
(23) Group auditing controls;
(24) Consolidated tax returns;
(25) Subsidiary’s reliance on constituents of the group for essential 
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integration of the External Operations of the Subsidiary and the 
Group
(26) Common corporate names;
(27) Common logo;
(28) Common trademarks;
(29) Common national advertising campaigns;
(30) Consolidated annual reports;
(31) Representations to the public that the constituent companies are 
offices, branches, divisions, or integral parts of the group.
Extent of Participation by the Parent in the Decisionmaking of the 
Group
(32) General policies;
(33) Capital and operating budgets;
(34) Prices;
(35) Commitments;
(36) Salaries of officers;
(37) Self-dealing transactions involving officers and directors of the 
subsidiary;
(38) Other more intrusive participation in decisionmaking.
Other
(39) Independent existence of the subsidiary before acquisition by the 
parent;
(40) Different nature of the businesses of the subsidiary and affiliates 
within a conglomerate group.
Depending on its regulatory goals, legal policy should apply criteria 
of imputation in a flexible way, and not embark upon ‘la vaine 
recherche d’une définition du groupe’,107 which would be applicable 
in company law as well as labour law, in tax law as well as en­
vironmental law, in the law of contract as in the law of tort.108 In 
response to the network character of the group, the law should 
develop a ‘network of legal guarantees’.109 Requirements of legal 
certainty can, to a certain extent, be met by introducing a minimal 
set of facts establishing a group formation for all areas of law. This 
would focus on ‘unitary control’ or, better, on unitary network 
co-ordination. Building on this initial condition, the criteria of 
imputation should remain flexible. The choice and combination of 
the levels of group enterprise as objects of imputation need to be 
guided by the regulatory context. There are two ways of preventing
107 Jadaud and Sayag, 1975, p. 193.
108 See Collins, 1990.
109 Sciarra, 1990, p. 415.
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this from resulting in arbitrary khadi justice: namely, (1) the main­
tenance of the efficiency advantages of decentralization and (2) the 
effectiveness of regulation as the implementation of norm policy.110
The principal difference between the network and the legal person 
is the shift from unitary imputation to simultaneous multiple 
imputation. A second major difference results from the distinction 
between the identity of a network and that of a collective. The 
flexible, mobile character of a network requires legal autonomiza- 
tion but not complete personification. Indeed, complete personi­
fication would be counterproductive, since it would interfere with 
the three characteristics of the group that have been picked out. 
These are contextual regulation, the re-entry of the market, and the 
internal dynamics of the group. The following elements of a legal 
subjectivity of the network can probably be regarded as sufficient: 
(1) legal recognition of the collective identity of the group as a 
network of inter-organizational relations; (2) legal recognition of a 
unified group interest as the interest of the network, identical with 
neither the company interest of the group parent nor the sum of 
company interests of group members; (3) use of the consolidated 
annual reports of the group as a tool of accountability of the 
network; (4) recognition of the capacity of act for the network, 
mediated through the action of the group parent and/or of group 
members; (5) attribution of rights and obligations to the network; 
(6) liability of the network as a situationally variable liability of the 
parent company, the subsidiary, and the group enterprise as a 
whole.
VIII
To define the tasks of the law of corporate governance in this area, a 
comparison must be drawn between the de facto position of the 
group and the legal constitution of a unitary enterprise. However, 
it is the network itself or, more precisely, the system of inter-' 
organizational relations within the group enterprise that should 
form the basis of the comparison, not the parent company or its 
various subsidiaries. It is thus a question of developing guide-lines 
for the legal organization of the network itself.
In Europe, the internal constitution of multinational corporate 
groups is on the political agenda again. After early initiatives in the
110 Blumberg, 1983.
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1970s,111 the issue of special structures for European companies has 
gained new prominence in the European integration process. In June 
1987 the European Council requested ‘swift progress with regard 
to the company law adjustments required for the creation of a 
European company’. In July 1988 the Commission of the European 
Communities responded with a new initiative for a European 
company statute in its memorandum to Parliament, the Council, 
industry, and labour. After deliberations with the European and 
national institutions concerned, the Commission in August 1989 
proposed a statute for a European company. Thus, the question 
re-emerges as to whether corporate groups have to be treated as 
‘corporations sui generis’ that require constitutional rules of their 
own.
The counter-argument, which has already achieved the status of a 
dogma, is that the creation of company bodies specifically for the 
group enterprise is a mistake. According to this view, the group 
enterprise acts through the company bodies of its members.112 
Against this counter-argument one can say that network bodies have 
long since developed de facto and that they are prevented from 
assuming a legal form by this very objection. This is an issue to 
which we will return later. However, the counter-argument is right 
in the following respect: the group as a whole ought not to be 
compared with the classical, hierarchically structured corporation 
acting through its central bodies. The result of such a comparison 
would be the bureaucratic rigidification of corporate governance 
into a hierarchical organization. We must, rather, take the legal 
image of the ‘poly-corporatist network’ seriously. If the extremely 
flexible nature of network organization is to be maintained, or 
furthered, by the law, the three characteristics of the group enter­
prise outlined above must be systematically taken into consider­
ation; these are contextual regulation, the re-entry of the market, 
and the internal dynamics of a large number of centres of activity. 
This means that the classic organizational principles of the large 
corporation — division of powers and differentiation of functions -  
must be modified considerably if they are to be valid for the gover­
nance of the network.
If we turn our attention to the de facto constitution of the net­
work, it becomes clear that independent corporate institutions for 
the network have in fact developed -  contrary to the argument
111 Cf. Stein, 1971; Lutter, 1978, 1984.
112 Cf. Balz, 1974, p. 329; Unternehmensrechtskommission, 1980, pp. 654 ff.; 667.
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about the absurdity of the formation of independent bodies within 
the group enterprise.113 The parent company’s ‘right to instruct’ its 
subsidiary is simply the embodiment of this type of network in­
stitution, which, according to classic company law, should really be 
illegitimate. At the same time it becomes clear that asymmetries have 
arisen in the de facto group constitution. Correcting these would be 
a task for a future group enterprise law.
If we analyse the group enterprise from the point of view of the 
resource-holders concerned, there is clearly a marked increase in the 
power which management is able to wield over shareholders and 
workers.114 The loss of power of minority shareholders in sub­
sidiaries is a theme to which the law on group enterprises returns 
again and again. However, it is only relatively recently that attention 
has focused on the extent to which shareholders in the parent 
company have had to surrender power and influence to the group 
management.115 Mediation of the workers’ influence, whether 
through staff representation or organized trade unions, has been 
amply documented in the literature on co-determination within the 
group enterprise. According to the idea of a ‘coalition of producers’, 
a notion which was developed in the debate on co-determination 
(see section V above), those who have a stake in the company 
transfer their property rights to the corporate actor. These rights 
are in turn distributed among the members of the organization 
as ‘organisationally bound property rights’ in accordance with 
efficiency criteria.116 If one accepts this version of things, then the 
task facing corporate governance is to transfer property rights to the 
group enterprise network.
If we analyse how the functions of operation, control, and 
legitimation are actually balanced in the governance of group 
enterprises, it becomes clear that operation clearly prevails at the 
expense of control and legitimation. In fact, it is only the operative 
function which has created independent institutions for the group 
network. These are embodied in the rights of the dominant company 
to instruct, in its control over the general meeting of subsidiaries, in 
filling supervisory and managerial posts in subsidiaries, in group 
contractual structures, and in interlocking directorships.117 By 
contrast, the supervisory and legitimation functions have not
113 Cf. Schneider, 1981; Lutter, 1985; Kuhn, 1987; Theisen, 1988, p. 280.
114 Trescher, 1989, p. 64.
115 Timm 1980; Hommelhoff 1982; Lutter, 1985.
116 Krause, 1986, pp. 229 ff.
117 Lutter, 1985.
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been able to have much of an influence in the network. The cor­
responding control and legitimation institutions in the network 
are practically non-existent, or are at a rudimentary stage. In the 
affiliated companies, previously existing control and legitimation 
have ceased to have any real function because of group formation. 
Even in the parent company their effect is mediated by the fact that 
access to the network and to the subsidiaries is primarily through 
the executive of the parent company.
Legal policy’s response to those asymmetries in the group enter­
prise is to construct countervailing networks of control and legi­
timation within the group itself. From a policy perspective, it is 
a question of developing a ‘political system’ within the group as a 
counterweight to the fully developed operational system. This 
would, to a certain extent, neutralize imbalances of power between 
groups of resource-holders, and would restore an equilibrium 
between operation, control, and legitimation. We are not aiming 
here at institutionalizing traditional conceptions of corporate 
governance: that is, organs of legitimation and control for the group 
enterprise as a whole. The emphasis, rather, is on flexible counter­
institutions fulfilling functions of legitimation and control which 
keep up with the chameleon-like character of the operational 
network.
Looking at the rudimentary beginnings of corporate constitutions 
from this point of view, it is the Vredeling Directive which provides 
information rights for workers in complex companies, that is 
most likely to meet the demands for flexibility in the controlling 
network.118 Against the parent company’s right to instruct, it 
establishes a network of information rights and duties which could 
serve as the basis for the development of a ‘political system’ within 
the group enterprise. The very flexibility of the contractual mech­
anism of collective bargaining is the key to its effectiveness. It 
provides opportunities for extending the system to the sphere of 
information, consultation, even negotiation, in order to be able to 
influence management decisions.119 In particular, by not bothering 
to fix the legal form of the group or to define the institutional 
competences of bureaucratic organs, it frees itself from the rigid 
constraints of a German-style institutionalized form of co-deter- 
mination. Collective bargaining makes it in principle possible to 
respond flexibly to the changing forms of organization within the
118 Cf. Blanpain, 1986; Vandamme, 1986; Pipkorn, 1990; Treu, 1990.
119 Blanpain, 1986, p. 30.
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group enterprise. At the same time this gives it a chance to be 
relatively immune to the circumvention strategies of the operational 
system.
The problem of this approach lies in the relative weakness of 
mere information duties as against genuine co-determination rights 
and -  even more important -  in the absence of a co-ordinating 
centre for the countervailing network. The very fact that it is rooted 
in collective bargaining reveals its weakness as a contractual strategy 
which lacks organizational support.120
In this respect institutionalized solutions which start at the level 
of the parent company have a clear advantage. The French com ité  
d ’en terprise , like the Dutch centrale on d ern em in gsrad , the German 
K o n zern b etrieb srat, and workers’ participation on the supervisory 
board, emphasize influencing co-ordination in the network by 
concentrating on the parent company. What makes these solutions 
so interesting is the fact that although they are institutionally located 
in the parent company, they tend to be aimed at the network itself. 
They are thus inimicable to the system, but right for the network. 
They go against the principles of the corporate governance of a 
private company by representing not only the staff of the parent 
company but the staff of the subsidiaries as well. All the same, their 
network character is restricted to the functions of recruitment and 
representation, whereas their powers in relation to the network are 
underdeveloped. It is here, in their ability to control the network, 
particularly through the supervisory board with regard to personnel 
policy in the subsidiaries, that opportunities for the future lie.
To be sure, the main problem resides elsewhere: in their fixation 
on a company or plant body with more or less rigidly pre-defined 
powers. This makes them relatively rigid and inflexible. They are 
thus unable to react to management’s attempts to escape their 
control by reorganization.
The contractual arrangements which evolve from the collective 
bargaining system offer far greater flexibility in this respect. For they 
also provide the means to adapt possibilities for control, legiti­
mation, and co-determination to the constantly shifting needs of the 
organization. The flexibility afforded by collective bargaining is far 
more suited to the network character of the group enterprise. But 
of course contractual arrangements themselves are not entirely 
without problems. Their extreme dependence on the fluctuating 
state of the economy and the market makes their control capacity
120 Vardaro, 1990, pp. 237 ff.
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look highly problematic. They do not have at their disposal the 
formalized power positions of institutional systems of co-deter­
mination which make the latter relatively immune to power and 
market fluctuations.121
The future of a countervailing network seems to lie in an intel­
ligent combination of previous attempts at regulation. This is 
certainly the line taken by Vardaro, who adumbrates a carefully 
calculated mixture of contractual and organizational elements.122 
According to Vardaro, supranational contractual strategies in multi­
national concerns should be supported by national organizational 
strategies.
I would like to end with an open question. Might not the 
solution for the future governance of group enterprises lie in the 
formation of a centre for control and legitimation that does not lay 
down a rigid catalogue of competencies, a centre that possesses the 
legal equipment to compel contractual arrangements for those tasks?
121 Streeck, 1984, 1987.
122 Vardaro, 1990.
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